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³³Abstract³³ 
This thesis presents the work of Norman O. Brown and Herbert Marcuse as responses 
to a romantic problematic obtained first and foremost from the legacy of Immanuel 
.DQW·V critical philosophy, and, secondly, from the first significant American realisation 
of this inheritance in the writings of Ralph Waldo Emerson.  The importance of this 
romantic reading is that it escapes the usual interpretations of Marcuse and Brown in 
terms of Marxism and Psychoanalysis, instead tracing the significance of their thought to 
an earlier philosophical foundation in Europe and America.  Kant and Emerson remain 
touchstones throughout; and it is through them that, in Chapter 1, I have determined 
ZKDW , VKDOO EH FDOOLQJ URPDQWLFLVP LQ DQ $PHULFDQ FRQWH[W UHDGLQJ (PHUVRQ·V HVVD\
¶([SHULHQFH·DVDQH[HPSODU\RFFDVLRQ,Q&KDSWHUWZRRIWKHPDMRUZRUNVRI
Marcuse and Brown, Eros and Civilization (1956) and Life Against Death (1959) are exam-
ined philosophically in terms of their dialectical rethinking of narcissism, showing how 
they begin to respond to the romantic question set out in Chapter 1.  In Chapter 3, I ex-
amine the use of myth and aesthetics, paying particular attention to the integrity of the 
IDLOLQJVRI0DUFXVH·VDHVWKHWLFWKHRU\ZKLFKVWHPIURPLWVURPDQWLFRULJLQVLQ.DQWDQG
6FKLOOHU &KDSWHU  LV D UHDGLQJRI%URZQ·V /RYH·V%RG\ (1966), presented against Mar-
FXVH·VFULWLFLVPVLQZKLFK,HVWDEOLVKWKHLPSRUWDQFHRIV\mbolism and originality 
for Brown, tracing them again to themes present in Kant and Emerson.  Chapter 5 in-
WHUSUHWV%URZQ·VClosing Time WKURXJKDQH[WHQVLYHUHDGLQJRIWKDWERRN·VSULPDU\
source, the proto-URPDQWLF*LDPEDWWLVWD9LFR·VNew Science (1744).  The Conclusion lo-
cates Brown and Marcuse within the myth and symbol tradition of American Studies, 
showing how they re-vision America as a romantic ideal. 
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³³Preface³³ 
Romanticism, as Isaiah Berlin observes in his 1965 Mellon Lectures, is best left unde-
ILQHG¶,QGHHG·KHZULWHV¶WKHOLWHUDWXUHRQURPDQWLFLVPLVODUJHUWKDQURPDQWLFLVPLWVHOI
and the literature defining what it is the literature on romanticism is concerned with is 
TXLWHODUJHLQWXUQ·1  Consequently, I recognise his trepidation in embarking on a project 
to which romanticism is central.  Nevertheless, during my research I have been able to 
glean a few broad conceptions of this vast topic, and have distilled these to the particular 
positions set out in Chapter 1.  I will not anticipate those points here, but rather, follow-
ing Berlin, state the most general case for the importance of romanticism.  He argues 
that more than being a literary or a philosophical movement³as I treat it here³
romanWLFLVP LV WKH ¶JUHDWHVW VLQJOH VKLIW LQ WKH FRQVFLRXVQHVVRI WKH :HVW that has oc-
FXUUHG·Roots: 30).  Even assuming that he means subsequent to the Reformation (which 
is by no means clear) Berlin is asserting that romanticism is more significant to conscious-
ness, than, say, the French Revolution, the Industrial Revolution, and the two World 
Wars of the last century.  The simple reason for this is that romanticism breaks with the 
most ancient preconception that Western civilization inherited from the Greeks and 
from early Christianity, namely the principle of an ordered universe (Roots: 2-20).  Every-
thing else flows from this, because after the romantic revolution the West is plagued by 
ZKDW,ZRXOGFDOOD¶VHFXODULUUDWLRQDOLW\·WKHLQDELOLW\WRORFDWHDQ\YDOXHVZLWKUHJDUGWR
anything greater than subjective consciousness.  This shift is the key to this thesis, and to 
ZKDW5LFKDUG(OGULGJHKDVUHFHQWO\FDOOHG¶WKHpersistence of romantiFLVP·2 
                                                 
1 Isaiah Berlin (Henry Hardy ed.), The Roots of Romanticism (London: Pimlico, 2000), p. 1.  Hereafter re-
ferred to as Roots in the text. 
2 Richard Eldridge, The Persistence of Romanticism: Essays in Philosophy and Literature (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2001). 
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 These claims are lofty and broad, and they will inevitably be narrowed in what 
follows. They hold, however, as the broadest context for my interpretation of particular 
works by Norman O. Brown and Herbert Marcuse, which must be differentiated by this 
from what has gone before.  When these thinkers have been understood at all³and with 
Brown my attempt is the first on this scale³it is in terms of either or both of Marxism 
and psychoanalysis.  With Marcuse this has been done most successfully by Douglas 
Kellner in his exemplary Herbert Marcuse and the Crisis of Marxism (1984).  This work sym-
SDWKHWLFDOO\ WUDFHV0DUFXVH·VGHYHORSPHQWDV D response to the various trends and hia-
tuses in Marxism throughout the twentieth-century.  More critical is Morton School-
PDQ·VThe Imaginary Witness: The Critical Theory of Herbert Marcuse (1980).  He sees Mar-
FXVH·V HDUO\ DQG ODWH SHULRGV DV WRR URPDQWLF Py word), clearly favouring the work 
achieved under his allegiance to the Frankfurt School in the 1930s.  Most critical is Alas-
GDLU 0DF,QW\UH·V VKRUW Herbert Marcuse (1970), which was written as a reaction at the 
KHLJKWRI0DUFXVH·VIDPHDQGZKLFKGLVPLVVHs him on all counts.  In terms of a Freu-
GLDQ0DU[LVWFURVVRYHU UHDGLQJ WKHUH LV6LGQH\/LSVKLUH·VFOHDUDQGV\PSDWKHWLF Herbert 
Marcuse: From Marx to Freud and Beyond (1974).  There are more or less Freudian readings 
in shorter pieces by Paul Robinson (1969), Richard King (1972), Jean Laplanche, and 
more recently by Joel Whitebook (1996), that I will refer to where necessary.3  The ro-
PDQWLF SRVLWLRQ KDV QRW EHHQ WDNHQ XS DW OHQJWK DSURSRV RI 0DUFXVH·V PRUH EURDGO\
though references to it are made with regaUGWRKLVDHVWKHWLFVDQGWKHJHQHUDO¶IHHO·RIKLV
EUDQGRIXWRSLDQFULWLFDOWKHRU\%XWKHUHWKH¶URPDQWLF·LVPRUHRIWHQWKDQQRWUHJUHt-
                                                 
3 Paul Robinson, The Freudian Left: Wilhelm Reich, Geza Roheim and Herbert Marcuse (Ithica: Cornell University 
Press, 1990), pp. 147-  -HDQ /DSODQFKH ´1RWHV VXU 0DUFXVH HW OD 3V\FKDQDO\VHµ La Nef (Vol. 26, 
1969), pp. 111-138.  Richard H. King, The Party of Eros: Radical Thought and the Realm of Freedom (New York: 
Delta, 1973), pp. 116-172.  Joel Whitebook, Perversion and Utopia: A Study is Psychoanalysis and Critical Theory 
(Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 1996), pp. 24-41. 
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fully alluded to³LW LVRI WKHVHQWLPHQWDOSHUVXDVLRQ UDWKHU WKDQ%HUOLQ·VPDMRUVKLIW LQ
the consciousness of Western modernity. 
 With regard to Norman O. Brown, the useful bibliography shrinks dramatically.  
There has yet to be a full-scale monograph produced on his work that treats it from any 
SHUVSHFWLYH7KHPRVWV\PSDWKHWLFWUHDWPHQWLV5LFKDUG.LQJ·VFKDSWHULQ972.  Since 
then, there have been articles discussing Brown with reference to, for example, perform-
ance art (Herbert Blau, 1988) or the body (E. F. Dyck, 1989).  There are a few more 
consequential works that treat Brown alongside Marcuse, those already mentioned by 
King and Robinson contain useful comparisons.  One particularly good essay on both is 
1DQF\&KRGRURZ·V ¶%H\RQG'ULYH7KHRU\2EMHFW5HODWLRQVDQGWKH/LPLWVRI5DGLFDO
,QGLYLGXDOLVP·ZKLFK,GLVFXVVLQ&KDSWHU:LWK%URZQWKHQWKHSDrticularity 
of the romantic position is less important than the fact that such a vital and engaging 
figure is being written about at all. 
 7KLVWKHVLVLVDQDWWHPSWWRUHFODLPDWOHDVWDSDUWRI0DUFXVH·VRHXYUHIURPWKH
Marxists and the psychoanalysts (and is in debate with the latter in particular), giving him 
a broader philosophical basis in romanticism.  This thesis is also a recuperation of the 
thought of Norman O. Brown.  One of the major obstacles to overcome in this dual in-
terpretation is the discussion of two ostensibly European figures within a largely Euro-
pean framework, romanticism, which yet belongs to the intellectual climate of post-
World War II America.  In the end, I decided to yield historical specificity in favour of 
achieving clarity of ideas; after all, the claims I am making in the thesis are about the intel-
lectual location of the thinkers.  Consequently, the following has become something of a 
transatlantic endeavour, based on the circulation of problems in an intellectual rather 
than a social history.  An instance of this is that, in the terms of this thesis, Brown is 
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closer to Ralph Waldo Emerson, the exemplar of American Romanticism, than to say, 
Lionel Trilling, his historical contemporary.  Indeed, as Chapter 1 makes clear, Emerson 
is the American touchstone of romanticism, and remains so throughout the later chap-
WHUV&KDSWHUJRHVRQWRQDUURZ%HUOLQ·VFODLPVWRWKHSDUWLFXODUHSLVWHPRORJLFDOSURb-
lems of romanticism.  I locate their expression in the fragmentary form of the Emerson-
ian essay, which prefigures the formal devices used by Brown in /RYH·V%RG\, examined in 
Chapter 4.  Chapter 2 brings the problem of history into the foreground, arguing that the 
LGHDRI¶KLVWRU\·LWVHOILVXQVHWWOHGWKXVSURYLGLQJDVSHFLILF¶KLVWRULFDO·FRQWH[WIRU%URZQ
in particular, but also for Marcuse, is in question on these thinkers terms.  In particular, 
WKLV FKDSWHU H[SODLQV WKHLU +HJHOLDQ UHDGLQJV RI )UHXG·V LQVWLQFW WKHRU\ DQG WKH VXEVe-
quent reinterpretation of narcissism.  Chapter 3 opens Marcuse and Brown up to two 
more key romantic tropes, the mythical and the aesthetic.  The mythical is addressed in 
WHUPVRIERWKWKLQNHUVWKHQ0DUFXVH·VDHVWKHWLFVDUHUHODWHGWRWKHLUURPDQWLFRULJLQVLQ
Kant and Schiller.  The major question for Chapters 4 and 5 is the romantic demand for 
WKH ¶QHZ· RU WKH ¶RULJLQDO·  +HUH WKHUH LV D PDUNHG GLIIHUHQFH EHWZHHQ 0DUFXVH DQG
Brown, the former taking a stand on determinism, the second on the origin of the new 
in a mystical poetics.  Chapter 4 discusses this in terms of /RYH·V%RG\ and symbolism; 
&KDSWHULVFHQWUHGRQ*LDPEDWWLVWD9LFR·VSRHWLFORJLFDVWKHSURWRW\SHRIDURPDQWLF
creativity.  The Conclusion returns me, briefly, to the problem of America in American 
6WXGLHV  +HUH , EULHIO\ SXUVXH LW DV DQ ¶LGHD· RU ¶P\WK· LQ WKH (PHUVRQLDQ WUDGLWLRQ
¶$PHULFDLVDSRHPLQRXUH\HV·WKDWLV$PHULFDDVDURPDQWLFSRVVLELOLW\WKDWSHUVLVWV
in Brown and Marcuse. 
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³³Chapter One³³ 
Locating an American Romanticism: Ralph Waldo Em-
erVRQ¶V µ([SeULHQFH¶ 
 
To define and to locate an American romanticism that could bequeath an identifiable 
tradition to both Norman O. Brown and Herbert Marcuse is the task of this chapter.  
Almost immediately, this claim needs qualification, since it may be misunderstood as do-
ing somethLQJ,DPH[SUHVVO\QRWGRLQJ7KHTXDOLILFDWLRQKDQJVRQWKH LPSOLHG ¶Ooca-
WLRQ·RIWKHUXEULF³this is not something about which I can be precise.  It is not neces-
VDULO\$PHULFDDQGLWLVDOVRQRWQHFHVVDULO\(PHUVRQ·VHDUO\QLQHWHHQWKFHQWXU\WKDW,DP
discussing.  However, this is both the time and the place where certain ideas that interest 
me and prefigure the main themes of my thesis can be said to hold together.  Perhaps 
this potential for confusion is best answered by asserting that it is not the political or his-
torical situation of New England at that time that draws me there.  Rather that this was a 
location where certain ideas were received from Europe and given new expression in and 
through the work of the Transcendentalists, specifically Ralph Waldo Emerson.  What I 
DPORRNLQJWRH[SUHVVLVDPHOWLQJSRWRI¶LGHDV·QRWRI¶VRFLDOKLVWRU\·+DYLQJLGHQWLILHG
this problem, I want to lay it aside for now and outline the ways in which I intend to ap-
proach romanticism. 
 The romanticism that forms the spine of my reading can be traced to the early 
German romantics who wrote and thought in Jena in the last decade of the eighteenth 
century and the first decade of the nineteenth century.  Theirs was not a literary romanti-
cism per se³indeed, its avowedly literary output was minimal³but a form of romanti-
FLVP ZKLFK UHVSRQGHG WR )ULHGULFK 6FKOHJHO LQMXQFWLRQ WKDW ¶SRHWU\ DQG SKLORVRSK\
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VKRXOGEHPDGHRQH·1  What was to be established by this unification was a new relation 
between a way of, say, expressing the world, poetry, and a way of understanding it, philoso-
phy; and what happens when expression and understanding become one. 
A particular derivation of this that I have in mind, and which sets out my first 
working definition of the romantic, is the domestication of the claims of philosophical 
V\VWHPV LQDQRVWHQVLEO\ ¶SRHWLF· PHDQLQJ OLWHUDU\RUFUHDWLYH³poiesis³UDWKHUWKDQ ¶So-
HWU\· per se) transformation of the everyday.  Here the unity of poetry and philosophy 
means using language in a specific way to register profane experience.  Novalis expresses 
the transformation thus: 
 
By giving the commonplace a higher sense, the usual a mysterious ap-
pearance, the known the dignity of the unknown, the finite an infinite 
appearance, I romanticise it³The operation is the other way round for 
the higher, the unknown, the mystical, the infinite³it is logorhythmised 
by this connection³It gains an everyday expression.2 
 
I take the self-FRQVFLRXV QHRORJLVP ¶ORJRUK\WKPLVHG· DV $QGUHZ %RZLH VXJJHVWV WR
mean a re-locating of the GLYLQHLQWKH¶PXVLF·RIRUGLQDU\ODQJXDJHlogos and rhythm³
poetry).  That is, as a translation of the burden of the divine into the creative powers of 
everyday speech.  This begins to express an idea of the romantic reversal which I want 
to carry forward and continue to develop in what follows: the spiritualisation of the eve-
ryday and the secularisation of the divine.  This also means the recollection of the mys-
tery of the simple, and the ordinary, perhaps a kind of animism.3 
                                                 
1 Friedrich Schlegel (trans. Peter Firchow), Philosophical Fragments (Minneapolis: Minnesota University Press, 
1991), p. 14.  Hereafter referred to as PF in the text. 
2 Cited in Andrew Bowie, From Romanticism to Critical Theory: The Philosophy of German Literary Theory (Lon-
don: Routledge, 1997), p. 80.  Hereafter referred to as RCT in the text. 
3 Cavell makes this point in his In Quest of the Ordinary: Lines of Skepticism and Romanticism (Chicago: Chicago 
University Press, 1994), pp. 45, 53.  Hereafter referred to as IQO in the text.  The idea of animism is a 
SRLQWRIGLVFXVVLRQLQ&KDSWHURQ%URZQ·VXVHRI9LFR 
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However, I do not want to look at this in an expressly poetical way, which, for 
example, might correspond to the aesthetics of Lyrical Ballads (1798).  Rather, I hear in it 
D FDOO WR WHVW WKH ¶KLJKHU· FODLPVRISKLORVRSK\ FRUUHVSRQGLQJ WR(PHUVRQ RSHQ FKDl-
OHQJHDWWKHFORVHRI¶([SHULHQFH· ¶WKHWUXHURPDQFHWKHZRUOGH[LVWV WRUHDOLVHZLOOEH
WKHWUDQVIRUPDWLRQRIJHQLXVLQWRSUDFWLFDOSRZHU·4  For, as I shall unfold it below, what 
Emerson attempts in this essay and in related journal entries is to measure the claims of 
philosophy.  ,QSDUWLFXODU WKRVHSHUWDLQLQJ WR ¶WKH LQILQLWH DQG WKHXQNQRZQ·E\XVLQJ
the scale of lived experience, examining their discrepancies to find the right path to 
overcome them.  Also to move the other way, to test everyday life by the questions phi-
losoph\DVNVRILWTXHVWLRQVGHPDQGHGE\WKHPLQG·VSURJUHVVLRQWRLQILQLW\ZKDWPLJKW
EHFDOOHG¶UHDVRQ·6RZKHQ(PHUVRQZULWHVLQDQGRI¶([SHULHQFH· ¶/LIHLVQRWGLDOHc-
WLFV·Essays: 236), I hear in this a criticism of life, say the everyday, as much as of dialec-
tics, say philosophy, and observe that he is plotting a course between them.  For Emer-
son, philosophy has to be lived; or rather, it has to answer to experience.  In this, I am in 
part following the contribution to Emerson studies put forward by Stanley Cavell.  For 
ZKRPLQWKHZRUGVRI6LPRQ&ULWFKOH\¶URPDQWLFLVPLVWKHGLVFRYHU\RIWKHH[FHSWLRn-
DOLW\RIWKHHYHU\GD\RU«WKHXQFDQQLQHVVRIWKHRUGiQDU\·5 
 A second, and perhaps more familiar, working through of romantic theory is 
presented by M. H. Abrams in The Mirror and the Lamp.  The title of which is an elegant 
summation of the epistemological shift the book covers: the historical development of 
critical theories from metaphors of mimetic reflection to those of expressive creation.  
                                                 
4 Ralph Waldo Emerson, Essays (London: Everyman, 1971), p. 252.  Hereafter referred to as Essays in the 
text. 
5 Simon Critchley, 9HU\/LWWOH«$OPRVW1RWKLQJ'HDWK/LWHUDWXUH 3KLORVRSK\ (London: Routledge, 1997), p. 
120.  Hereafter referred to as VLAN in the text. 
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That is, from the subject (here the poet) passively reflecting light, to the subject actively 
emitting light, illuminating the object.  Abrams argues that this shift takes place around 
the end of the eighteenth century, primarily as a response to the critical philosophy of 
,PPDQXHO .DQW  ,QGHHG $EUDPV· DUJXPHQW LV EDVHG RQ WKH FRQVHTXHQFHV RI .DQW·V
¶&RSHUQLFDQ UHYROXWLRQ·  %ULHIO\ WKLV UHYROXWLRQ GHVFULEHV WKH QHZ XQGHUVWDQGLQJ RI
subMHFWLYLW\ LQZKLFKNQRZOHGJHFRUUHVSRQGVQRW WR WKHREMHFW·V LQIOXHQFHRQ WKH sub-
ject, but to the a priori facility to actively determine an object through our built in facul-
WLHV7KHRXWFRPHRIWKLVLVWKDW¶WKHSHUFHSWXDOPLQG>SURMHFWV@OLIHDQGSDVVLRQLQWRWKH
ZRUOG LW DSSUHKHQGV·6 as a lamp, not as a passive receiver of objective impressions³a 
mirror³as the previously dominant empiricist theories had argued.  I will have more to 
say on this later and in subsequent chapters. 
 The third aspect of my definition of romanticism takes into consideration its 
form, in particular the H[HPSODU\ IRUPRI WKH -HQD URPDQWLFV ¶WKH IUDJPHQW· 3KLOOLSH
Lacoue-Labarthe and Jean-Luc Nancy, in their study of Jena romanticism The Literary 
AbsoluteGHVFULEHWKHIUDJPHQWDV¶WKHURPDQWLFJHQUHpar excellence·7  And they place it in 
contradistinction to the systematic working through of philosophical problems most 
easily identified in German Idealism.8  The fragment comes from a tradition of writing, 
Montaigne and Pascal, for example, which 
 
can be characterized by three traits: the relative incomSOHWLRQWKH¶HVVD\·
RU DEVHQFH RI GLVFXUVLYH GHYHORSPHQW WKH ¶WKRXJKW· RI HDFK RI LWV
                                                 
6 M. H. Abrams, The Mirror and the Lamp: Romantic Theory and the Critical Tradition (New York: Norton, 
1958), p. 68. 
7 Phillipe Lacoue-Labarthe and Jean-Luc Nancy (trans. Phillip Barnard and Cheryl Lester), The Literary 
Absolute: The Theory of Literature in German Romanticism (Albany: SUNY Press, 1988), p. 40.  Hereafter re-
ferred to as LA in the text. 
8 In addition see Karl Ameriks ed. The Cambridge Companion to German Idealism (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 2000).  Hereafter referred to as CCGI LQWKHWH[W,QSDUWLFXODU$PHULNV¶,QWURGXFWLRQ,n-
WHUSUHWLQJ*HUPDQ ,GHDOLVP· SS - DQG3DXO)UDQNV ¶$Ol or Nothing: Systematicity and Nihilism in 
-DFREL5HLQKROGDQG0DLPRQ·SS-116). 
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pieces; the variety and mixture of objects that a single ensemble of pieces 
can treat; the unity of the ensemble, by contrast, constituted in a certain 
way outside thHZRUNE\WKHVXEMHFWWKDWLVVHHQLQLW« 
(LA: 40) 
 
7KLV LVRI FRXUVH DPDQQHURIGHVFULELQJ WKHZRUN WKDWJRHVRQ LQ(PHUVRQ·V HVVD\V
that will be familiar to readers of his critics: an absence of systematic and consistent de-
velopment, and an often heterogeneous mixture of subjects (occasionally prefiguring 
:KLWPDQ·VOLVWV:KDWLVPRUHFRPSOLFDWHGLVWKHIDFWWKDWWKHIRUPDOXQLW\RIWKHZRUN
LV¶GHVFULEHGH[WHUQDOO\·WKDWLVJLYHQE\WKHUHDGHUUDWKHUWKDQWKHZULWHUDSRLQW,VKDOO
take up toward this end of this chapter.  In one way, as Maurice Blanchot acidly ob-
VHUYHV ¶WKHIUDJPHQWRIWHQVHHPVDPHDQVIRUFRPSODFHQWO\DEDQGRQLQJRQHVHOIWRWKH
VHOIUDWKHUWKDQDQDWWHPSWWRHODERUDWHDPRUHULJRURXVPRGHRIZULWLQJ·DQGWKXV¶VLm-
ply to welcome RQH·VRZQGLVRUGHU·9  Such criticisms of Emerson are amongst the most 
persistent in the scholarship.  But on another level, as we shall see, this is an important 
FRQVHTXHQFH RI WKH QHZ VXEMHFWLYLW\ LQDGYHUWHQWO\ DQQRXQFHG E\ .DQW·V &RSHUQLFDQ
revolution. 
 The fourth definition brings together the common source of three foregoing 
PRPHQWV WKHHYHU\GD\ WKH ODPSDQG WKH IUDJPHQW DQG LVEDVHGRQ&DYHOO·VZRUNRQ
Emerson and romanticism, largely presented in lectures in the 1980s.10  It boils down to 
the fact that romanticism is a response to or dissatisfaction with, the conclusions drawn 
IURP.DQW·VFULWLFDOSKLORVRSK\,QGHHGWRSDUDSKUDVHDIDPRXVFRPPHQWIURP$1
                                                 
9 Maurice Blanchot (trans. Susan Hanson), The Infinite Conversation (Minneapolis: Minnesota University 
Press, 1993), p. 359.  Hereafter referred to as IC in the text. 
10 Stanley Cavell, The Senses of Walden (Exp.Edn.), (San Fransisco: North Point Press, 1981), hereafter re-
ferred to as SW in the text; This New Yet Unapproachable America: Lectures after Emerson after Wittgenstein (Al-
buquerque: Living Batch Press, 1989), hereafter referred to as NYUA in the text. 
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:KLWHKHDG·VProcess and Reality,11 romanticism can be described as a series of footnotes to 
Kant.  Though on first glance this definition may seem to place the origin of Romanti-
cism at a specific point, it actually broadens the definition of the romantic because of the 
centrality of Kant to the Western tradition. 
What is at issue in this dissatisfaction is, according to Cavell, the continuing 
DFKLHYHPHQW RI .DQW KLV ¶VHWWOHPHQW· IQO: 28-29) which doubles as the location of 
URPDQWLF SKLORVRSKLFDO XQHDVH  2VWHQVLEO\ .DQW·V FULWLFDO SKLORVRSK\ VRXJKW WR GLs-
abuse (to critique) dogmatic theories about god, knowledge, aesthetics and morality by 
showing, in a series of transcendental deductions, that what we had taken thus far to be 
¶UHDOLW\·ZDVLQIDFWDFRQVHTXHQFHRIRXUVXEMHFWLYLW\12  Also, and this is where the crux 
of the romantic problem lies, he severely circumscribed the ability of humankind to 
know either the universe or its place in it.  This is because Kantian idealism locates 
NQRZOHGJHRIWKHZRUOGVXEMHFWLYHO\DQGDVVXFKWKHZRUOGRIWKH¶REMHFW·³the famous 
thing-in-itself³becomes unknowable.  Thus, Kant refuted a mode of access to the 
world.  And, perhaps more critically for his own epoch, in the same movement he 
crushed any unmediated access to god via revelation: if we can only know our own ex-
periences, we cannot know god, but only our experiences.  The problem was, then, that 
in keeping with the radical Protestant rationalism of his era, faith and knowledge became 
                                                 
11 Alfred North Whitehead, Process and Reality (Corrected Edn.), (New York: The Free Press, 1978), p. 39.  
If it would not have proved too much of a digression, it would have been fertile to have considered the 
possibLOLW\RIFRQJUXHQFHEHWZHHQ:KLWHKHDG·VSKLORVRSK\RIRUJDQLVPDQGWKHFOHDURUJDQLFWHQGHQFLHVRI
the theory of the fragment. 
12 ,PXVWVWUHVVWKDW.DQWLDQVXEMHFWLYLW\GRHVQRWSRLQWWR¶LQGLYLGXDOLW\·RUWRWKH¶PHUHO\VXEMHFWLYH·EXW
rather to a set of shared human faculties which delineate universal human limitations³i.e., none of us can 
see infra-red or hear dog whistles, but, we all share the same five-senses to a significant degree, and we all 
share, Kant argues, the same a priori faculties.  This does not mean that we have to understand them in the 
same way, though Kant does try to provide a normative platform for such an understanding in the Critique 
of Pure Reason (1781) and elsewhere.  Some of the complexities of the Kantian subject will be an issue for 
Chapter 4. 
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sundered.  No longer could god be proven to exist by the understanding, no longer 
could reason support a faith that became literally blind.  Instead, the understanding is 
limited to a horizon of subjective a priori experience that holds to determinate knowledge 
(e.g., cause and effect).  Whilst reason is given over to abstractions³WKH¶LGHDV·RIJRG
immortality, the infinite, the sublime, which exceed the powers of the understanding. 
Even so, this did not stop Kant from believing in god.  One aim of his philoso-
phical critique of established metaphysics was actually to protect faith by deliberately lim-
iting the cognitive realm, which was being expanded dangerously in that direction by the 
EXUJHRQLQJVFLHQFHV 7KXV.DQWJDYHVWULFWSDUDPHWHUV IRU WKH ¶QHZVFLHQFHV· VHtting 
WKHLUKRUL]RQRIIIURPDQRWKHUXQNQRZDEOHEXWKHDUJXHGUDWLRQDOO\EHOLHYDEOH¶VSDFH·
JRG·VZRUld of the thing-in-itself, of freedom and of moral imperatives.  This division 
has come down to us as that between the phenomenal and the noumenal or the sensible 
and the intelligible.  What begins as a move to protect knowledge from dogmatic asser-
tions about things-in-themselves (the determinism of Spinoza), and from a scepticism in 
which we may not be able to have any knowledge of objects at all (even subjective 
knowledge³+XPH HQGV XS ¶VXQGHULQJ· WKH XQLYHUVH DQG VHHPLQJO\ OHDYLQJ KXPDQV
with the poorer part at that³WKHZRUOGRI ¶DSSHDUDQFH· 7KLV UHVXOWHG LQZKDW&DYHOO
FDOOVDGLVVDWLVIDFWLRQDQGWRZKLFKKHUHVSRQGVZLWKVRPHLURQ\¶7KDQNVIRUQRWKLQJ·
(IQO: 31).  Consequently the romantics and the later idealists were caught in the ambiva-
lent position of trying to refute something in Kant, usually his denial of access to the 
thing-in-itself, whilst remaining true to his insights, particularly the new subjectivity.  
This two-world problematic, as I shall show, is played out in the central drama of Emer-
VRQ·V¶([SHUiHQFH· 
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 Returning with this duality in mind to what I said above, I do not want to locate 
URPDQWLFLVPLQD¶SODFH·VD\$PHULFDDQGLQDWLPHVD\¶WKHILUVWKDOIRIWKHQLQHWHHQWK
FHQWXU\· EXW UDWKHU LQ WKLV VWDWH RI XQVHWWOHGQHVV³¶EHWZHHQ ZRUOGV· DV &DYHOO SXWV LW
(IQO: 32)³WKDW HPHUJHV IURP .DQW·V ¶WZR-ZRUOG· WKHRU\  5RPDQWLFLVP LV E\ WKHVH
lights, a condition of unreconciled unhappiness, a restless awareness that things should 
be otherwise, but with a structural impossibility of bringing this otherness to the surface.  
(This tension will become an important issue that I want to think through in this thesis.)  
6XFKDGLVVDWLVIDFWLRQPD\QRWVHHPWRUHVRQDWHDWILUVWJODQFHZLWK(PHUVRQ·VUHQRZQHG
¶RSWDWLYH· PRRG KLV JHQLDOLW\ DQG JHneral affirmative spirit.  But hope can only exist 
where there is, on some level, discontent; hope is always the desire for something better, 
which must mean that what is extant is somehow worse.  Cavell locates this initial sense 
of despair in the mid-world inhabited by Emerson as a more or less successful inter-
preter of Kant, at least as someone who is willing to take on the inheritance of the criti-
cal philosophy.  But this general sense of dissatisfaction, I would argue, also pervades 
&DYHOO·V RZQ VHQVH of skepticism, where the skeptical is located in an inability to be-
lieve³or rather to sustain belief³in the way the world is given to us (in criteria).  Skep-
ticism and romanticism have, then, a utopian aspect, if, that is, the optative can be taken 
to chime with the utopian.  Though perhaps a better way of expressing it would be to 
recognise that this space between the two worlds, where I have located romanticism, is 
the no-place that is named by utopia. 
 This trope of location is taken up explicitly by Emerson in one of his most fa-
mous questions, from the opening line of what is generally recognised as his greatest 
esVD\¶([SHULHQFH·¶:KHUHGRZHILQGRXUVHOYHV"·Essays: 228).  I would like to suggest, 
WHQWDWLYHO\ WKDW ¶ZH· ILQGRXUVHOYHVEHWZHHQZRUOGVEHWZHHQ ¶DSSHDUDQFH·DQG ¶UHDOLW\·
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able to acknowledge them both, but not to escape their difficulties.  I also hope to show, 
WKDWWKLVLQLWLDWHVDQDQVZHUDGHTXDWHWRWKHFRPSOH[LWLHVRI¶([SHULHQFH·LQSDUWLFXODUWR
¶([SHULHQFH· DV D ZRUN RI PRXUQLQg that works through the sense of disappointment 
ZLWKWKHHSLVWHPRORJLFDOOLPLWDWLRQVRI.DQW·VFULWLFDOSKLORVRSK\ 
(PHUVRQ·V DQVZHU WRKLV TXHVWLRQ IROORZV LPPHGLDWHO\XSRQ LW ¶,QD VHULHV RI
which we do not know the extremes, and believe that it has nRQH· Essays: 228).  The 
imDJHU\RIWKHDQVZHUERUURZHGIURP3LUDQHVLVXJJHVWVWKDWKH¶ILQGV·KLPVHOIDWWHQu-
ated, drawn out across a spectrum, which disappears into infinite regress in front and 
behind.  But, a philosophical analogue is provided by Friedrich Schlegel, in the Athe-
naeum Fragments¶9LHZHGVXEMHFWLYHO\SKLORVRSK\«DOZD\VEHJLQVLQPHGLDVUHV·PF: 84).  
Wherever philosophical speculation begins, it has always already originated somewhere 
else, sometime earlier, and is always already being pursued, projected.  Emerson phrases 
WKLVFRPSURPLVHGVXEMHFWLYLW\LQDSRHWLFIUDJPHQWWKDWKHDGDSWVIURP6RSKRFOHV·Anti-
gone LQVHUWHG LQ ¶([SHULHQFH· ¶6LQFHQHLWKHUQRZQRU\HVWHUGD\EHJDQ7KHVH WKRXJKWV
which have been ever, nor yet can/A man be founGZKRWKHLUILUVWHQWUDQFHNQHZ·Es-
says: 244).13  In this sense, then, the philosopher is always trying to catch up with history.  
The point is that each thinker only provides an incomplete fragment³is a fragment, as 
we shall see.  This, also, is disappointing, dissatisfying.  It is why I agree with Critchley 
ZKHQKHZULWHV¶:KHUHGRHVSKLORVRSK\EHJLQ",WEHJLQV,EHOLHYHLQDQH[SHULHQFHRI
disappointment·VLAN,QDGGLWLRQHTXDOO\LPSRUWDQWIRUDUHDGLQJRI¶([SHULHQFH·
LV&DYHOO·VJULPFRQFOXVLRQLQVSLUHGE\¶([SHULHQFH·WKDW¶>S@KLORVRSK\EHJLQVLQORVVLQ
                                                 
13 It comes from a passage where Antigone is accusing Creon of breaking the immutable and god given 
laws with regards to the death rights of her brother Polynices.  A modern translation by Andrew Brown 
UHDGV ¶,GLGQRW VXSSRVH WKDW \RXUGHFUHHVKDG VXFKSRZHU WKDW \RX DPRUWDO FRXOGRXW UXQ WKHJRGV·
unwritten and unfailing rules.  For their life is not of today or yesterday but forever, and no one knows 
ZKHQ WKH\ ILUVW DSSHDUHG· OO -460, Sophocles: Antigone (Warminster: Aris and Phillips, 1987).  Antigone 
seems a most apSURSULDWHFKRLFHKHUHDVOLNH¶([SHULHQFH·LWGUDPDWLVHVDQLQFRPSOHWHZRUNRIPRXUQLQJ 
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ILQGLQJ\RXUVHOIDWDORVV·NYUA: 114).  It begins, then, with Emerson, in the middle of 
a series of essays, striving to locate meaning in and from the loss of his son.14 
 
I 
 
But why locate Emerson as a philosopher within romantic philosophy at all when so 
many critics seem to have gone to the trouble to contain him in a more literary matrix?  
I think this depends on whether you want from Emerson either the birth of a literary 
tradition in the American Renaissance, or the birth of the American Thinker (the Man 
7KLQNLQJRIWKH¶$PHULFDQ6FKRODU·,WDOVRGHSHQGVRQZKDW\RXZDQWIURPSKLORVo-
phy, that is, what you want it to look like.  The majority of critics seem to have angled 
toward tKH IRUPHU KRSLQJ WR ILQG LQ (PHUVRQ HDUO\ VLJQV RI $PHULFD·V OLWHUDU\ LQGe-
pendence.  If they examine Emerson philosophically, they find him wanting methodol-
ogically and stylistically: he is too poetic.15 
                                                 
14 This seems to dismiss the idea of philosophy beginning in wonderment.  But, it may be argued that the 
feeling of wonderment or the sublime is rather a reaction to the initial loss of meaning and place that oc-
curs in the reception of the world as such³the reassertion of the sureties of reason against the limitations 
of cognition.  A parallel occasion is discussed in Chapter 4. 
15 For Santayana, Emerson did not know what he meant by his philosophical terms, was unable to pin 
WKHP LQWRD UHDOLW\ZKLFK ¶HOXGHGKLP· *6DQWD\DQD ¶(PHUVRQ· LQ0LOWRQ5.RQYLW] DQG6WHSKHQ(
Whicher eds. Emerson: A Collection of Critical Essays (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1962), p. 32  Hereafter 
referred to as CCE in the text.  Also, he claims, Emerson was largely ignorant of German philosophy, 
coming to similar conclusions, but through exaggerating the omnipotence of the imagination, usurping the 
SRZHU¶ZKLFKKDGEHORQJHGWRJRG·DQGWKHQHVWDEOLVKLQJ¶WKHVXSUHPDF\RIPLQGRYHUPDWWHU·CCE: 33).  
Ultimately this collapsed back into a Puritan mysticism, failing the reality test, giving up on evil (a com-
mon complaint against Emerson), and thus on ¶PDQKRRG·,QWUXWKIRU6DQWD\DQD(PHUVRQ·VZRUNZDV
DQXQVDWLVI\LQJ¶JHQWHHO·PL[RI¶UHOLJLRQH[SUHVVLQJLWVHOIDVDSKLORVRSK\DQGYHLOHGDVDWLWVVHWWLQJLWGe-
VFHQGHGWKHKHDYHQVLQYDULRXVWLQWVRISRHWU\DQGVFLHQFH·CCE.: 37). 
René Wellek, in contrast to Santayana, does not consider Emerson a mystic, as he recognises 
(PHUVRQ·VH[WUHPHVFHSWLFLVPWRZDUG WKH ¶VXSHUQDWXUDO LPSOLFDWLRQVRI WKHRFFXOW· ¶(PHUVRQDQG*Hr-
PDQ3KLORVRSK\· New England Quarterly (XVI, March 1943), p. 44; hereafter referred to as EGP in the 
text)  He also pays a great deal of attention to just how much German philosophy Emerson is likely to 
have read or come into contact with, noting, for example, that he did have a copy of the 1838 translation 
RIWKH.DQW·VCritique of Pure Reason, that there were pencil markings in the margins and that he had read a 
number of more or less adequate summaries and glosses on German thought.  But, he concludes that, 
firstly, Emerson was misled about philosophy by first generation English interpreters, in particular Col-
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 The earliest systematic monograph on Emerson is by Henry David Gray, pub-
OLVKHG LQ :KLOVW*UD\DUJXHV WKDW ¶>W@KHUH LVQRQHHG WR UHPLQG WKHSKLORVRSKLF
ZRUOGWKDW(PHUVRQZDVSULPDULO\DSRHW·16 KHTXDOLILHVWKLVSRVLWLRQVD\LQJ¶WKDW(PHr-
son had a right conception of philosophy, and worked it not as a literary dilettante but 
ZLWKWKHVHULRXVQHVVRIRQHFRQFHUQHGZLWKWKHSUREOHPVWKHPVHOYHV·EST: 26).  And 
KHJRHVRQWRJLYHDFRKHUHQWLIOLPLWHGDFFRXQWRI(PHUVRQ·VSKLORVRSKLFDO¶V\VWHP·³
which, as he points out, is not an architectonic but is rather an application of philosophy 
to problems. 
The most prominent figure to give an unabashed welcome to Emerson as a phi-
ORVRSKHU LV -RKQ'HZH\ LQ DQG LQPDQ\ZD\V&DYHOO·V UHDGLQJRI(PHUVRQFDQ
been seen here in miniature.  For Dewey Emerson is, or is not, only a philosopher or only 
a poet depending on whether you mean to denigrate or praise him with either title 
(CCE: 24-25).  He places Emerson in a category that covers both without diminishing 
either, and which overcomes the attempts to fence in literature or philosophy, to keep 
them apart.  Somewhat akin to Gray, Dewey finds the importance of system in Emer-
VRQ·VSKLORVRSK\QRWWREHLQDQ\V\VWHPDWLFDSSURDFKWRPHWDSK\VLFVRUWKHGHVLUHRU
                                                                                                                                           
HULGJHDQG&DUO\OH6HFRQGO\WKDWWKH7UDQVFHQGHQWDOLVW¶IDLWK·ZDV¶GHHSO\URRWHGLQWKHLUPLQGVDQGWKHLU
RZQ VSLULWXDO DQFHVWU\· (*3  7KXV7UDQVFHQGHQWDOLVPKDV D3XULWDQKHULWDJH DQG ILQGVERWK LWV
roots and its fruits there in such figures as Jonathan Edwards. 
6WHSKHQ:KLFKHU·VFDQRQLFDOFreedom and Fate: An Inner Life of Ralph Waldo Emerson (Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 1971; hereafter referred to as FF) sees Emerson as rather a clumsy 
thinkeUVSLOOLQJDVPXFKDVKHVLSVIURPWKHFXSRI¶0RGHUQ3KLORVRSK\·FF: 17) and, moreover, decid-
ing that, philosophically, Emerson was a naïf, whose conclusions were not obtained through study, rigor-
RXVRURWKHUZLVHEXW LQ ¶DIUHVK LQVLJKWRIKLVRZQZKose nature, he worked out initially by inspection 
ZLWKRXWPXFKUHJDUGWRSUHFHGHQW,WVHIIHFWLVQRWXQOLNHWKDWRIDSULPLWLYHSDLQWLQJ·FF: 31).  This elic-
its a repetition of the most damning criticism of Emerson as a philosopher³which goes right back to 
Arnold³¶WKHDEVHQFHRIORJLFDOVWUXFWXUH·FF:31). 
4XHQWLQ$QGHUVRQ·VThe Imperial Self An Essay in American Literary and Cultural History (New York: 
Alfred A. Knopf, 1971), attempts both to deny Emerson the title of philosopher, and secondly, to make 
WKHOHVVXVXDOFODLPWKDWKHLVQRWLQIDFWDURPDQWLF7KHRQO\ZD\,FDQXQGHUVWDQG$QGHUVRQ·VFODLPLV
WKDWLWEHORQJVWRKLVODUJHUOLWHUDU\WKHVLVRIWKH¶LPSHULDOVHOI·DFFRUGLQJWRZKLFKWKHUHLVQRVRFLDOO\RU
philosophically engaged understandinJLQ(PHUVRQ·VWKRXJKW 
16 Henry David Gray, Emerson: A Statement of New England Transcendentalism as Expressed in the Philosophy of Its 
Chief Exponent (New York: Frederick Ungar, 1917), p. 26, hereafter referred to as EST in the text. 
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IDLOXUHWRPDWFKVXFKDQDSSURDFKEXWLQ¶WKHIDFWWhat he takes the distinctions and clas-
sifications which to most philosophers are true in and of and because of their systems, 
DQGPDNHVWKHPWUXHWROLIHRIWKHFRPPRQH[SHULHQFHRIWKHHYHU\GD\PDQ·CCE: 27).  
Emerson puts his thoughts to work, does not rest them in any self-sustaining algebraic 
RUDUFKLWHFWRQLFIRUPXODWLRQEXWWHVWVWKHP¶V\VWHPDWLFDOO\·LQDQGWKURXJKKLVOLIHHx-
SHULHQFHV7KLVLQIDFWLVZKDW,VKDOODUJXH¶([SHULHQFH·LV,WLVDQessayD¶WU\LQJRXW·
of philosophical positioQV2IFRXUVHWKHWHUP¶HVVD\·FRPHVIURP0RQWDLJQH·V ¶essais·
RU¶WULDOV·LWLVZHOONQRZQWKDW0RQWDLJQHZDVDPRQJVW(PHUVRQ·V¶UHSUHVHQWDWLYHPHQ·
Because of this, Dewey sees Emerson as different from the other Transcendentalists, say 
Bronson AlcotWEHFDXVH WKH WUXWKVRIKLVSKLORVRSK\ LWV LGHDVDUHQRW ¶RWKHUZRUOGO\·
EXWDUH¶YHUVLRQVRIWKHKHUHDQGQRZDQGIORZIUHHO\·CCE: 28).  Emerson, then, is not 
an essentialist, and perhaps, from what Gray and Dewey say about him, it is apparent 
why he is often associated with the origins of pragmatism.17 
2QHRIWKHPRVWUHFHQWDWWHPSWVWRSODFH(PHUVRQ·VSKLORVRSK\RFFXUVLQ'DYLG
9DQ /HHU·V (PHUVRQ·V (SLVWHPRORJ\ 7KH $UJXPHQW RI WKH (VVD\V,18 published in 1986.  His 
book provides an extremely detailed and rigorously argued reading of Emerson as an 
epistemologist in the Kantian tradition (EE: 1-19), and as foreshadowing some of the 
insights of Wittgenstein.  One thing that Van Leer observes in his own critique of Em-
HUVRQ·V UHFHSWLRQ LV WKH XQXVXDOO\ KLJK standards that Emerson is supposed to have 
failed to reach, in particular by Santayana and Wellek.  It is as if in the 1830s and 1840s 
there were consistent readings of Kant to which Emerson could be compared and found 
                                                 
17 This is not something I want to pursue here, my engagement is with romanticism; but it is taken up by 
Cornel West in his The American Evasion of Philosophy: A Genealogy of Pragmatism (Madison: The University of 
Wisconsin Press, 1989), pp. 9-41 and passim. 
18 David Van Leer, EPHUVRQ·V (SLVWHPRORJ\ 7KH $UJXPHQW RI WKH (VVD\V (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1986).  Hereafter referred to as EE in the text. 
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wanting.  Van Leer tends to find that where Emerson is inconsistent, Kant himself was 
inconsistent, or at least unclear; for example, his use of the distinction between tran-
scendent and transcendental, which I shall be discussing below.  Also, he points to the 
futility of trying to put EmersRQ·VSRLQWVQH[WWR.DQW·VSRLQWVWRILQGRXWZKHUHWKH\
are similar or whether a misreading has occurred.  And, again, for Van Leer, it is where 
Emerson puts philosophical ideas to work that is important; not if he could state their 
SODFH LQ .DQW·V DUFKLWectonic, but how he could locate them in his experiences³and 
what his experiences might mean if reflected through Kantian, or idealist, or romantic 
lenses.  In the end, though, I am not sure that Van Leer reads Emerson as a philosopher, 
or whether he reads him as someone who can be read through philosophy³the distinc-
tion is important, but often very hard to maintain. 
In my view, the relationship between Emerson and the philosophy of Kant must 
be seen as important, perhaps even vital, yet it remains necessarily oblique.  Emerson 
complements Kant, occasionally challenges him, but it is impossible to mistake Emer-
VRQ·VSKLORVRSK\IRUDIXOO-EORRGHGFULWLTXHRIRUDGYDQFHPHQWXSRQ.DQW·VRZQSRVi-
tions.  Indeed, to read Kant into Emerson is something of a speculative endeavour, as it 
KDVEHHQZLWKPXFKRI&DYHOO·VILQHZRUNLQWKLVGLUHFWLRQ7RPDNHDQ\IXUWKHUFODLPV
is fraught with danger.  Therefore, if I draw out a common thread from these criticisms, 
I would repeat that what is important for Emerson is that philosophy should answer to 
as well as ground experience.  It should not be cut off from the questions of the every-
day. 
 To overcome the problem of whether Emerson is a philosopher what needs to 
be refuted is the idea that philosophy is located either in the reception of prior philoso-
phers and in the working out of their problems on their terms, or, more controversially, in 
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a particular version of orthodox systematic rigor.  This is precisely the perspective from 
which Cavell engages with Emerson: as someRQH ZKR LV QRW D ¶SURIHVVLRQDO SKLORVo-
SKHU·LQWKHVHQVHRIDFDGHPLFDUJXPHQWV¶DERXWSKLORVRSK\·,QGHHGKHVHHV(PHUVRQ
living in a time and in a country where such titles do not yet exist, or rather are only just 
coming into being³the unique position RI$PHULFDVWLOOEHLQJ¶EHWZHHQZRUOGV·&DYHOO
and this is significant, wants both to counter the position that Emerson is not a philoso-
SKHUEXWDOVR WRSUHVHUYH LQ VRPHZD\(PHUVRQ·VGLVWDQFH IURPKRZSKLORVRSK\KDV
come to be understood such that Emerson is not considered a part of it.19   Throughout 
the 1980s, this re-WKLQNLQJRI(PHUVRQZDVDWWKHKHDUWRI&DYHOO·VZRUN,WLVWKLVSe-
riod that interests me here. 
In This New Yet Unapproachable America, Cavell takes up the problem of Emerson 
as philosopher, and in doing so reflexively implicates his own earlier work. 
 
I can think of no one else in the history of thought about whom just this 
gesture of denial is characteristic, all but universal, as if someone per-
versely keeps insisting³perhaps it is a voice in the head³that despite all 
DSSHDUDQFHVDSKLORVRSKHUDIWHUDOOLVZKDW(PHUVRQLV«%XWZKDWLV
the state in which the claim of philosophy is refused and yet a claim 
upon philosophy is entered?  It might be quite as remarkable, or rare, as 
the state of philosophy itself, so to speak, and no less urgent to deny. 
(NYUA: 78) 
 
This preserves the tension between admitting that Emerson is a philosopher and want-
ing to test that claim by, perhaps, finding out what it is that maintains, consistently, Em-
HUVRQ·VGLVWDQFHIURPSKLORVRSK\,WKLQNZKDW&DYHOOLVZRUNLQJWRZDUGLVWKHIDFWWKDW
                                                 
19 It is perhaps significant that Cavell is responding in part to his own, self-admittedly partial, reading of 
Emerson in the 1971 edition of The Senses of Walden, where, next to Thoreau, Emerson is seen, familiarly 
enough, as misunderstanding Kant.  The two essays appended to The Senses of Walden in the later 1981 edi-
tion, are in part reflections on and refutations of thLVHDUOLHUGLVPLVVDO )RUDUHDGLQJRI&DYHOO·V OLWHUDU\
¶FRQYHUVLRQ·VHH%DUEDUD3DFNHU¶7XUQLQJWR(PHUVRQ·Common Knowledge (Vol. 5, No. 2, Fall 1996), pp. 
51-60. 
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if Emerson is a philosopher, then a lot of those who have previously been considered 
philosophers and what has long been considered philosophy, might not be, might be 
denied that title in turn.  In this way, Emerson, for Cavell, joins such people as 
Nietzsche, Heidegger and Wittgenstein, in changing the shape and the goal of philoso-
phy.20 
The determination of just what philosophy is, then, is at stake here. Cavell argues 
that it comes down to an understanding of what constitutes philosophical rigor, or 
rather, what is acceptable as philosophical rigor, and what constitutes a threat to that kind 
of philosophical rigor.  That Emerson is threatening, or at least embarrassing, to the or-
thodoxy is something that Cavell does not doubt; in fact he is relying on it to make his 
point for him.  This is, broadly, to do with the way philosophy is written, and the way 
philosophy is read.  It is the style in which Emerson writes and thus how he demands to 
be read that holds him outside the philosophical canon.21  There is an assumption, then, 
WKDWSKLORVRSKLFDODUJXPHQWKDVWRORRNDFHUWDLQZD\IROORZDFHUWDLQPHWKRGRI¶ORJi-
FDO·DQGDFFUHWLYHDUJXPHQWLQRUGHUWREHSKLORVRSK\DWOeast, in the Anglo-American 
academy which Cavell is addressing).  Emerson clearly does not do this; in fact, he fa-
mously denies its efficacy: 
 
If we consider what persons have stimulated and profited us, we shall 
perceive the superiority of the spontaneous or intuitive principle over the 
arithmetical or logical.  The first always contains the second, but virtual 
and latent.  We want in every man a long logic; we cannot pardon the ab-
sence of it; but it must not be spoken.  Logic is the procession or pro-
portionate unfolding of the intuition; but its virtue is as silent method: 
                                                 
20 ,WLVWUXHKRZHYHURQDPRUHPXQGDQHOHYHOWKDWPXFKRI&DYHOO·VFLUFOLQJDURXQGthis problem arises in 
that he was trying to deliver lectures to orthodox philosophy departments, and consistently needed to at-
tempt to pre-empt their forebodings about admitting Emerson into a canon, whilst, of course, maintaining 
the position that he does not want Emerson to be admitted to any particular canon. 
21 Similar problems can be seen to have been faced by Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Heidegger and Derrida, but 
LWUDUHO\VWRSVWKHPIURPEHLQJFRQVLGHUHGDV¶SKLORVRSKHUV·7KLVPD\EHWRGRZLWKWKHGLIference be-
tween European and American receptions of philosophy, which I shall come to shortly. 
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the moment it would appear as propositions, and have a separate value, 
it is worthless. 
(Essays: 179-182) 
 
(PHUVRQ·V SULYLOHJLQJ RI WKH LQWXLWLYH RYHU WKH V\VWHPDWLF RU ORJLFDO22 contradicting 
much of the analytic tradition, has not endeared him to their ranks.  And the further fact 
WKDWLQWKHVDPHHVVD\SURYRFDWLYHO\HQWLWOHG¶,QWHOOHFW·KHZULWHV¶$WUXHPDQQHYHUDc-
TXLUHVDIWHUFROOHJHUXOHV·Essays: 182) is only going to add to the embarrassment felt by 
those who are establishing university syllabi.  Emerson, then, could be both an embar-
UDVVPHQWDQGDWKUHDWWR¶ORJLFDO·WUDGLWLRQVRISKLORVRSK\³but has tended to be seen (or 
not) as something of an irrelevance. 
Unfortunately, he seems to have made it all too easy for the orthodox to ignore 
DQGUHSUHVVKLPFDWHJRUL]LQJKLPDVD¶SRHW·DQ¶DSKRULVW·D¶P\VWLF·³banishing him to 
Literature departments (where, incidentally, he sits rather well).  Nevertheless, Cavell is 
determined to reach out and include Emerson, to recognise in him a method of phi-
ORVRSKLVLQJZRUWK\RILQKHULWDQFHDQGWRDUJXHWKDWKHHPERGLHV¶DPRGHRIWKLQNLQJD
mode of conceptual accuracy, as thorough as anything imagined within established phi-
losophy, but invisible to philosophy because based on an idea of rigor foreign to its es-
WDEOLVKPHQW· IQO: 14).  What Cavell recognises, which others have not³even the fa-
vourable responses of Dewey and Van Leer³is that the way Emerson writes is a method 
of philosophy in itself  ,W LV KRZHYHU D ZD\ RI ¶GRLQJ· SKLORVRSK\ WKDW LV WKUHDWHQHG E\
drowning in the mid-Atlantic, based as it is upon a dual participation in and rejection of 
                                                 
22 ,QKLVGD\WKLVPHDQW¶7KHJUHDWGLVWLQFWLRQEHWZHHQWHDFKHUVVDFUHGRUOLWHUDU\EHWZHHQSRHWVOLNH+Hr-
bert, and poets like Pope; between philosophers like Spinoza, Kant and Coleridge,³and philosophers like 
Locke, Paley, Mackintosh, and Stewart; between men of the world who are reckoned accomplished talkers, 
and here and there a fervent mystic, prophesying half-insane under the infinitude of his thought, is, that 
one class speaks from within, or from experience, as parties and possessors of the fact; and the other class, 
from withoutDVVSHFWDWRUVPHUHO\RUSHUKDSVDVDFTXDLQWHGZLWKWKHIDFWRQWKHHYLGHQFHRIWKLUGSHUVRQV·
(Essays: 161). 
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the American and the Continental traditions.  The American tradition (say, pragmatism 
and Anglo-American analytic philosophy) is located, Cavell argues, in the answers to cer-
tain sets of problems to be solved or clarified, squirrels running round trees and the like.23  
The continental tradition is based on certain books that must be read, that is, inter-
preted³this has come down to us as hermeneutics.  Emerson and Thoreau stand, or fall, 
VRPHZKHUHEHWZHHQWKHVHWZRSRVLWLRQV7KH\DUH¶FRQWLQHQWDOV·DVIDUDVWKH\Gemand 
to be read and make reading them in turn, through the style of their writing, a philoso-
SKLFDOFODLPLQLWVHOI%XWWKH\DUH¶$PHULFDQV·LQWKDWWKH\GRQRWDGYRFDWH¶ERRNOHDUn-
LQJ·LQIDFWDUHYHU\RIWHQKRVWLOHWRLWWKRXJKZLWKWKHPHDVXUHGLURQ\RIWKHZHOO-read), 
instead only accepting philosophy on the basis of experience.  Writing, however, and how 
it inspires or deflects reading, becomes the most important thing of all.  The bridge that 
WKH\FUHDWHDFURVVWKHWUDGLWLRQVWKHLUHVVHQWLDOO\¶IRUHLJQULJRU·¶is the task of endless respon-
VLELOLW\IRURQH·VRZQGLVFRXUVH·IQO: 14; emphasis added). 
Writing becomes the essential experience.  And philosophical writing can only 
bear this weight, this weight of responsibility, if it is weighed against experience, is re-
sponsible for experience, and if the textual responsibility of philosophy as a way into life 
LVQRWPHUHO\ LQWHUWH[WXDO ¶LQWHOOHFWXDORU FULWLFDOEXW VWXUG\· Essays: 237), as Emerson 
SXWV LW LQ ¶([SHULHQFH· $OWHUQDWLYHO\HYHQPRUHFOHDUO\ LQ ¶6SLULWXDO/DZV·ZKLFKPD\
UHYHDO&DYHOO·VRZQVRXUFH 
 
We have yet to learn that the thing uttered in words is not therefore af-
firmed.  It must affirm itself, or no forms of grammar and plausibility 
                                                 
23 See William JameV ¶:KDW3UDJPDWLVP0HDQV· LQ/RXLV0HQDQGHGPragmatism: A Reader (New York: 
Vintage, 1997), p. 93. 
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can give it evidence, and no array or arguments.  The sentence must also 
contain its own apology for being spoken.24 
(Essays: 90) 
 
Words, in and as themselves, affirm nothing.  Only as they belong to experience, giving 
and receiving their shape therein, do they gather meaning to themselves.  That this de-
rives from a romantic conception of philosophy, if it is not clear already, should become 
PRUHVRZKHQSODFHGQH[WWR6FKOHJHO·VLQMXQFWLRQWKDW¶,QWUXHSURVHHYHU\WKLQJKDVWR
be underOLQHG·PF: 80).25  The weight of words is the burden of experience. 
 
II 
 
¶([SHULHQFH· WKHQ GRHV QRW MXVW QDPH WKH (PHUVRQ HVVD\ LQ TXHVWLRQ  )ROORZLng 
through what this word means (the weight it carries) becomes crucial for an understand-
ing of how Emerson relates to the romantic thought that I wish to inherit in this thesis.  
The problem to overcome, however, is that the paper trail of Emerson criticism leads in 
the opposite direction, away from romanticism, with its debt to idealism, and towards 
empiricism.  Transcendentalism has been seen as a denial of experience, or at least a cer-
WDLQXQGHUVWDQGLQJRI¶H[SHULHQFH·7KLVFULWLFLVPLVDQDORJRXVWR6DQWD\DQD·VDUJXPHQW
that reality eluded Emerson.  Experience and reality are not put into question, but in-
                                                 
24 7KRXJKWKLVLVSXEOLVKHGLQ(PHUVRQ·VMRXUQDOUHYHDOVWKDWLWKDGEHHQDFRQVLGHUDWLRQDVHDUO\DV
 ¶(YHU\FRPSRVLWLRQLQSURVHRUYHUVHVhould contain in itself the reason of its appearance.  Thou-
sands of volumes have been written & mould in libraries of which this reason is yet to seek³does not 
appear.  Then comes Adam Smith, Bacon, Burke, Milton, then comes any good sentence & its apology is 
LWVRZQZRUWK  ,WPDNHV LWVSHUWLQHQFH· 5DOSK:DOGR(PHUVRQ-RHO3RUWHHG Emerson in His Journals 
(Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1982), p. 80.  Hereafter referred to as Journals in the text. 
25 Emerson cites this passage twice in Journal entries from October 27th 1831 and 12th April 1834. In Wil-
liam H. Gilman et al. eds., The Journals and Miscellaneous Notebooks of Ralph Waldo Emerson, Vol. III (Cam-
bridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1963), p. 271 and William H. Gilman et al. eds., The Journals and Mis-
cellaneous Notebooks of Ralph Waldo Emerson, Vol. IV (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1964), p. 
273. 
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VWHDG IRUP D SUHVXPHG LUUHGXFLEOH NHUQHO XVXDOO\ RI ¶KDUG NQRFNV· 'U -RKQVRQ·V
stubbed toe) by which to measure philosophical thought.  But, I shall argue, what ex-
peULHQFHLVDQGKRZLWVKDSHVUHDOLW\DUHWKHYHU\WKLQJVDWVWDNHLQ(PHUVRQ·VHVVD\%XW
if his debt to idealism is mistaken for a hard learned empiricism, which it is by Stephen 
Whicher, Barbara Packer, and Sharon Cameron,26 for example, then the lessons of his 
essay are not worked through to their more challenging conclusions. 
 -XVWZKDWLVDQGLVQRWEHLQJ¶WUDQVFHQGHG·LQ7UDQVFHQGHQWDOLVPDQGMXVWZKDW
(PHUVRQPHDQV RU VWULYHV WRPHDQE\ ¶LGHDOLVP· QHHG WREH LQYHVWLJDWHG LQRUGHr to 
XQGHUVWDQG WKH .DQWLDQ LQKHULWDQFH LQ (PHUVRQ·V SKLORVRSK\ ZKLFK LV , DP DUJXLQJ
RQHRI¶H[SHULHQFH·$VZHKDYHVHHQ.DQWIRUPXODWHVDQHJDWLYHSKLORVRSK\LQRUGHUWR
SURWHFW PHWDSK\VLFV IURP WKH H[WUHPHV RI HPSLULFLVW VNHSWLFLVP +XPH·V WKUHDW.  His 
cognitive restriction makes a large part of what had been understood as the available 
world off limits.  The forbidden knowledge that Kant calls, variously, the noumenal, the 
supersensible, the transcendent, is unavailable to a priori subjective intuition³that is, to 
subjective experience.  The un-experienceable realm corresponds, as I said earlier to the 
thing-in-itself, to the divine, to moral autonomy, to freedom and to immortality (the 
SXUH LGHDV RI UHDVRQ RU ¶UHJXODWLYH LGHDV· .DQW·V LQWHUSUHWDtion of Plato), which Kant 
believes reason can assume, but that the understanding cannot prove.  They are the end 
result of a rational faith and form regulative rather than determinate (or legislative) prin-
ciples. 
                                                 
26 Whicher, FF, pp. 111ff; Barbara L. Packer, (PHUVRQ·V)DOO$1HZ,QWHUSUHWDWLRQRI WKH0DMRU(VVD\V (New 
York: Continuum, 1982), pp. 156ff, hereafter referred to as EF LQWKHWH[W6KDURQ&DPHURQ¶5HSUHVHQWLQJ
*ULHI(PHUVRQ·V´([SHULHQFHµ·Representations (15, Summer 1986), p. 23, hereafter referred to as RG in 
the text.  Though much good work is done by each of these people, on the vital issue of idealism and em-
piricism they remain inadequate, stemming from the repression of philosophy diagnosed by Cavell. 
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What, then, can the subject knowZKDW¶REMHFWV·DUHDYDLODEOHWRWKHXQGHUVWDQd-
ing and to experience qua knowledge of those objects?  The realm of experience is based 
XSRQWKH  ¶WUDQVFHQGHQWal· QRWWREHFRQIXVHGZLWK ¶WUDQVFHQGHQW·ZKLFKFRUUHVSRQGV
to the manner in which the subject must exist in order to be able to intuit, i.e., perceive 
objects through the senses.  Kant concludes, that the way in which the subject has access 
to an object must be equivalent to the conditions for the possibility of that object.  Objects 
can only emerge because of how they are intuited, and Kant asserts that these are the 
same DVWKH¶FRQGLWLRQVIRUWKHSRVVLELOLW\RIH[SHULHQFH·ZKLFKFRQVLVWDIWHUDOORQO\LQ
judgements made about objects.27 
To recapitulate, experience is conditioned not by the incoming object reflected, 
RU¶LPSUHVVHG·XSRQWKHHPSW\SDVVLYHPLQGHPSLULFLVPEXWE\WKHZD\WKH¶PLQG·Lt-
VHOI LV ¶WUDQVFHQGHQWDO· DFWLYHO\GHWHUPLQLQJDQGV\QWKHVLVLQJ WKHZRUOG  ,Q(PHUVRQ·V
ZRUGV¶:HDQLPDWHZKDWZHFDQDQGZHVHHRQO\ZKDWZHDQLPDWH1Dture and books 
EHORQJWRWKHH\HVWKDWVHHWKHP·Essays: 24).  What we learn from Kant is that the ob-
jective world is a priori VXEMHFWLYHDQGZKDWZHXQGHUVWDQGDVWKH¶PHUH·DSSHDUDQFHRI
the world is the way it is real for us because experiences are what allow for knowledge.  
7KH¶UHDO·ZRUOGWKHQLVHYHU\WKLQJWKDWLVNQRZDEOHLQWKLVZD\7KXVKLVFULWLFDOSKi-
losophy claimed to be both a critical or transcendental idealism and an empirical realism.  
,QWKLVVHQVHRQO\LV¶([SHULHQFH·HPSLULFDO.DQWGLGQRWEHOLHYHWKDWWKHZRUOGZDV¶DOO
LQ WKHPLQG· OLNH LQWHUSUHWDWLRQVRI%HUNHOH\ DQ LQIOXHQFHRQ WKH HDUO\(PHUVRQ QRU
that our perceptions could give us access to absolute reality like the rationalists.  Kant 
straddled a very fine line between the two.  But, as Cavell has pointed out, this balance 
                                                 
27 This is obviously a very condensed and inadequate reading, but I return to these points in more depth 
with regard to time, space and the creative imagination in chapters 3 and 4. 
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has remained relatively settled into the twentieth century, and the major works of phi-
ORVRSKHUVOLNH+HLGHJJHUDQG:LWWJHQVWHLQDUHVWLOOFRQWHQGLQJZLWKWKLV.DQWLDQ¶VHWWOe-
PHQW·,QGHHGWKHGLIIHUence between the transcendent and the transcendental³which 
Emerson interprets rather than misunderstands³is another way of expressing the ro-
mantic discontent with Kant, which leads philosophy, in its romantic phase, toward po-
etry: the attempt to (re-)enchant the everyday and to a secularisation or disenchantment 
of the sacred.28 
 :HFDQHDVLO\VHHKRZWKLVLQIOXHQFHVWKHHDUO\(PHUVRQ·VLGHDRIWUDQVFHQGHn-
talism in the 1836 monograph Nature.  Indeed, it gives us perhaps his most infamous 
SDVVDJH¶Standing on the bare ground,³my head uplifted into infinite space,³all mean 
egotism vanishes.  I become a transparent eyeball; I am nothing; I see all; the currents of 
WKH8QLYHUVDO%HLQJFLUFXODWH WKURXJKPH , DPSDUWRUSDUFHORI*RG· SE: 39).  The 
transparent e\HEDOOLVWKHSHUIHFWFLUFOHRIVXEMHFWLYLW\ZKHUH(PHUVRQ·V¶,·H[DFWO\FRUUe-
VSRQGWRKLV¶H\H·DQGZKLFKLVQRWPHUHHJRWLVPEXWDZD\RIEHLQJWKDWGLVFORVHVWKH
world.  And it is not surprising that Emerson is generally understood to have missed the 
nuances of what Kant is doing in constructing his division.  That is, as Wellek puts it, to 
have confused the transcendent claim of reason with the transcendental claim of the un-
derstanding, and so to have appropriated the transcendent where only the transcenden-
tal is possible (EGP: 43-  (PHUVRQ RYHUVWHSV .DQW·V HSLVWHPRORJLFDO OLPLWV³we 
might say he becomes a romantic³when he becomes part and parcel of God, that is 
unifies his experience with the divine.29  ,QDGGLWLRQKHLVVDLGWRXVH.DQWDVD¶VXSSRUW·
for his own beliefs (EGP: 60-61).  There are at least two reasons why I think this is mis-
                                                 
28 See Stanley Cavell, IQO: 43-44 and passim. 
29 I shall return to this point in the Conclusion. 
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taken.  Firstly, for all its complexity, the distinction between reason and understanding in 
.DQWZKHUHKHIDPRXVO\¶GHQLHVNQRZOHGJHLQRUGHUWRPDNHURRPIRUIDLWK·FDQEHLn-
WHUSUHWHG DV D FUXWFK IRU.DQW·V own beliefs (and thus Emerson reads him better than 
:HOOHNNQHZ6HFRQGO\DQGPRUHVLJQLILFDQWO\(PHUVRQLVUHVSRQGLQJWR.DQW·VQHJa-
tive philosophy, and utilising its own momentum, turning it into a positive philosophy.  
In this he, almost certainly inadvertently, answers the call put out by Friedrich Schlegel 
in the third Athenaeum Fragment ¶.DQWLQWURGXFHGWKHFRQFHSWRIWKHQHJDWLYHLQWRSKi-
ORVRSK\:RXOGQ·WLWEHZRUWKZKLOHWU\LQJWRLQWURGXFHWKHFoncept of the positive into 
phiORVRSK\DVZHOO"·PF: 18). 
 7KHSDUWRI.DQW·VV\VWHPWKDW(PHUVRQH[SORLWVIRUWKLVSRVLWLYHWXUQDURXQGLV
the way the subject transcends into the world.  The way it exists (from the Latin, existere, to 
step forth or out) and in the way it actively determines the objective world through the 
WUDQVFHQGHQWDOFRQGLWLRQVIRUWKHSRVVLELOLW\RIH[SHULHQFH¶/LIHLVDQHFVWDV\·SE: 385) 
ZULWHV (PHUVRQ LQ WKH HVVD\ ¶)DWH· HFVWDV\ EHLQJGHULYHG IURP WKH VDPH URRW DV H[Ls-
tence, anGLVDVWDQGLQJRXWVLGHRIRQHVHOI¶WKHSDSLOODHRIDPDQUXQRXWWRHYHU\VWDU·
(SE: 384).  The self is literally transcendental and, though lyrical, it remains objectively 
and easily distinguishable from the mysticism it is often mistaken for.  Of course, Emer-
son, more than once, raises this to the level of an epiphany³as with the eyeball³and in 
doing so elevates his own ecstasy, or ecstasis, in ways that Kant would not have con-
GRQHG%XWWKLVLVKLV¶WXUQLQJ·LQWRWKHSRVLWLYHZKLFK,VKDOODUJXHUHmains true to the 
fundamental Kantian insight that knowledge of the world³its objectivity³is dependent 
on the way we are able to see the world, that is, on our finite intuition. 
What remains to be worked through though, and this is one of the main themes 
of the thesis, is what happens when the authority for creating a world is removed from 
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the world in itself, as exterior, and given to (received by) the subject who authors a world.  
That is, when the limits imposed by Kant are turned into a positive instruction to create 
the world out of nothing, out of what cannot be known as the ground of possibility.  We 
will see that the imagination, a recognised romantic trope, is the problem here, in that it 
suggests that creativity is a burden of finitude and its transcendence, and as such the prob-
lem (our finitude) is the solution (our creativity).  These are the lessons that, in later chap-
WHUVQHHGWREHOHDUQHGIURP(PHUVRQ·VFDVXDODELOLW\WRVD\LQ¶,QWHOOHFW·¶WKHWUXWKZDV
in us before it was reflected to us from natural objects; and the profound genius will cast 
WKHOLNHQHVVRIDOOFUHDWXUHVLQWRHYHU\SURGXFWRIKLVZLW·30 (Essays: 189).  This recalls the 
FULWLFDOUHYROXWLRQWKDW$EUDPVORFDWHGLQWKHVXEMHFWLYHVKLIWIURP¶PLUURU·WR¶ODPS·EXW
it is turned through its cycle once more, and the objects of the world become reflective 
of subjective truth.31  This is what I mean here by positive idealism,32 and in it is con-
tained a working through of the romantic revolution, which is a revolution of the subject 
into the world. 
 The subject, though, falls short of this perspective and the revolution seems to 
IDLO+RZWKLV¶IDOOLQJ·WDNHVSODFHZKDWLWPHDQVIRU(PHUVRQWKDW¶KXPDQNLQGLVIDOOHQ·
again is decisive for my reading of Emerson as a romantic and for romanticism in gen-
eral.  Firstly, I need to establish what it is not.  It is not Platonic and it is not recognisa-
bly Christian.  The Platonic and neo-Platonic traditions³which fed the metaphysical 
needs of early Christianity³are based on an emanation theory of the fall.  That is, a de-
FOLQHIURPDFHQWUDOSRLQWRU¶IRUP·FRUUHVSRQGLQJWR*RGRUWKH'HPLXUJHWRDOHVVSHr-
                                                 
30 A passage which seems to run counter to the Kant of the first Critique, but is a positive interpretation of 
his third Critique.  See chapter 3. 
31 The obvious narcissistic qualities of this will be the subject of chapter 2. 
32 I would not want this confused with the later philosophy of Schelling, for example, which was also seen 
as a positive (though critical) response to Hegelian philosophy. 
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fect realm of appearance: from more-Being to less-Being.33  3ODWR·V¶6LPLOHRIWKH&DYH·
is one way that this is interpreted.  The movement from the One, the Good, to the cor-
rupted bodily sphere is how it was understood by Plotinus.  Almost always in Platonism 
the human world of appearance, of mere matter, is interpreted as a degraded copy of a 
purer, more fitting world of forms and spirit.  However, Emerson makes a point of say-
LQJLQKLVHVVD\¶7KH3RHW·WKDW¶7KHUHLVQRGRFWULQHRIIRUPVLQRXUSKLORVRSK\·Essays: 
204).34  And he records part of a conversation with the Swedenborgian Sampson Reed in 
his journal for June 1842, just a few months afWHU WKH ORVV WKDW LQVSLUHV ¶([SHUiHQFH·
¶WKHUHLVQRRWKHUZRUOGKHUHRUQRZKHUHLVWKHZKROHIDFWDOOWKH8QLYHUVHRYHUWKHUHLV
but one thing³this old double, Creator-creature, mind-matter, right-ZURQJ· Journals: 
286).  The idea of Being, or of God, as something elsewhere that can be returned to is 
TXLWHXQDFFHSWDEOH WR(PHUVRQ·VPHWDSK\VLFV DV'HZH\SRLQWHGRXWDQGWRKLV IDLWK
On the contrary, his pre-6RFUDWLFWHQGHQF\LVZHOOH[SUHVVHGLQKLVODWHUHVVD\¶1aWXUH· 
 
And the knowledge that we traverse the whole scale of being, from the 
centre to the poles of nature, and have some stake in every possibility, 
lends that sublime lustre to death, which philosophy and religion have 
too outwardly and literally striven to express in the popular doctrine of 
the immortality of the soul.  The reality is more excellent than the report.  
Here is no ruin, no discontinuity, no spent ball.  The divine circulations 
never rest nor linger.  Nature is the incarnation of a thought, and turns 
to a thought again, as the ice becomes water or gas.  The world is mind 
precipitated, and the volatile essence is for ever escaping again into the 
shape of free thought. 
(Essays: 309) 
 
                                                 
33 For a version of a gnostic reading of Emerson see Harold Bloom, Agon: Toward a Theory of Critical Revi-
sionism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), pp. 3-18, 145-178. 
34 This is a point that seem to have been missed E\6WXDUW*HUU\%URZQZKRZULWHV¶/RRNZKHUH\RXZLOO
LQ>(PHUVRQ·V@ZULWLQJVWKHSRLQWLVWKHVDPH7KHVWDWHPHQWRIDQ\LPSRUWDQWFRQFOXVLRQZLOOEHIRXQG
WRKDYHD3ODWRQLFVRXUFHHLWKHULQWKHFDQRQRI3ODWR·VRZQZRUNRULQWKH1HR-SODWRQLVWV· ¶(PHUVRQ·V
3ODWRQLVP·New England Quarterly (XVIII, 1945), p. 344.  Of course, after Whitehead, to say that any phi-
losophical conclusion has an origin in Plato is something of a tautology. 
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Our difference to the Universe and its guiding principle is not one of kind, but only of 
degree, ZKLFKLQWHUSUHWV.DQW·VWZR-world theory whilst dismissing Platonism.  The sub-
ject partakes of the circulations of the universe, of Being, of God.  There is no decline 
but instead a resurrection of the mind in an unexhausted possibility, a positive Kantian 
(almost Hegelian)35 assertion of its shaping powers and the authority of thought in the 
dialectic of nature and understanding.  And the idea of immortality, the sublimity of 
death is, for Emerson, a remnant of a deeper comprehension of our place in the uni-
verse³a return to the vast circulation of its Being.36 
,GRQRWZDQWWRJRLQWR(PHUVRQ·VUHMHFWLRQRIWKHRUWKRGR[&KULVWLDQYHUVLRQ
of the Fall story here as it is so well documented elsewhere.  It is enough to say with 
:KLFKHUWKDW¶7KH)DOORI0DQZDVDP\WK·FF: 23), but not one that could just be dis-
FDUGHGEHFDXVH(PHUVRQVWLOOQHHGHGWRH[SODLQZK\KXPDQNLQGIHOOVKRUWRILWV¶GLYLQH·
status.  An important part of this, as Whicher goes on to point out, was the spinning of 
a new myth of the fall, a romantic myth.  This myth explains the contradiction in the 
RPQLSRWHQFHIDQWDV\E\(PHUVRQ·VRZQFRXQWHU-claims that man is indeed fallen.  As in 
Nature·V2USKLFSRHW ¶$PDQLVDJRGLQUXLQV·DQG¶0DQLVWKHGZDUIRIKLPVHOI·SE: 
77); or from the Essays ¶0DQ LV IDOOHQQDWXUH LVHUHFW· EssaysDQG ¶,W LVYHU\Xn-
happy, but too late to be helped, the discovery we have made, that we exist.  That dis-
FRYHU\LVFDOOHGWKH)DOORI0DQ·Essays7KHVHDUHDV3DFNHUREVHUYHV¶WKHFRm-
monest ways of DOOHJRUL]LQJ WKHVWRU\RI*HQHVLV·E\HTXDWLQJ ¶VHOI-consciousness with 
WKH)DOO·EF: 148), and by measuring the fall not from the divine but from nature into 
intellect³into understanding as we have seen it in Kant.  However, I would disagree 
                                                 
35 7KRXJKRIFRXUVH+HJHOZRXOGEHGHHSO\FULWLFDORI(PHUVRQ·VURPDQWLF¶LQWXLWLRQLVP·6HH&KDSWHU 
36 7KLVLVVXJJHVWLYHRI)UHXG·VIDPRXV¶RFHDQLFIHHOLQJ·DSRLQWWRZKLFK,UHWXUQLQFKDpters 2 and 4. 
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with Packer DQGWDNH&DYHOO·VSRVLWLRQWKDWVXFKDURPDQWLFJHVWXUHLVQRWDOOHJRULVLQJWKH
Fall but showing what the Fall itself was an allegory or an interpretation of (IQO: 46-
48).37  7KH)DOOLVLQWRFRQVFLRXVQHVVDZD\IURP¶QDWXUH·RUUDWKHULQWRDQXQGHUVWDQGLng 
of nature that is always already alien to nature, into a circle, to use a favourite Emerson-
ian image.  Nevertheless, there remains for Emerson only one world, and whether you 
DUHIDOOHQLQLWGHSHQGVRQZKHWKHU\RXWDNH.DQW·VOLPLWDWLRQVWREHSRVLWLYH or negative.  
:KHWKHUDEVROXWHFRQWDFWZLWK¶QDWXUH·DVWKLQJ-in-itself is desirable, or whether such a 
thing would be a worse punishment than Kantian finitude.  For such finitude may be a 
blessing, in that it allows perception to occur at all: 
 
All persons, all things which we have known, are here present, and many 
more than we see; the world is full.  As the ancients said, the world is a 
plenum or solid; and if we saw all things that really surround us, we should 
be imprisoned and unable to move.  For, though nothing is impassable 
to the soul, but all things are pervious to it, and like highways, yet this is 
only whilst the soul does not see them.38 
(Essays: 334) 
 
The soul in its transcendental ignorance can make of the opaque universe a highway.  
Moreover, and Emerson is consistent in this, human authority lies in this essential fini-
tude, in the contradiction between an easy transport, which displaces all contact, and an 
identification with, a yearning toward, Universal plenitude.  The consequence of this is 
(PHUVRQ·VIDPRXVODPHQWWKDW ¶,KDYHWKLVODWHQWRPQLVFLHQFHFRH[LVWHQWZLWKRPQLJQo-
UDQFH· Journals: 283), when faced with the task of mourning the death of his beloved 
son. 
                                                 
37 &DYHOOLVDFWXDOO\GLVFXVVLQJ&ROHULGJH·V¶5LPHRIWKH$QFLHQW0DULQHU·EXWWKHSRLQWLVFOHDUO\PHDQWWR
stand for Emerson as well.  He makes the link explicit in NYUA: 81 
38 7KHSDVVDJHVWDQGVFRPSDULVRQZLWK6FKHOOLQJ6HH&KDSWHUDQG+HJHO·VFRPPHQWRQ¶WKHQLJKWZKHQ
DOOFRZVDUHEODFN· 
 
 35 
 
III 
 
7KDW¶([SHULHQFH·LVDZRUNRIPRXUQLQJLVJHQHUDOO\WKRXJKRIWHQUHOXFtantly, accepted.  
%XW(PHUVRQ·VXVHRIWKHGHDWKRIKLVVRQDVDVSXUWRSKLORVRSK\WRDTXHVWLRQLQJRI
philosophy, has been widely misinterpreted as a callous gesture exemplifying his distant 
attitude to people and failure to love, or attributed to the numbness caused by the prior 
loss of father, brother, wife.  Yet, if it is read in the wider context of journal entries and 
as an acknowledgement of the path through philosophy I have been taking here, then 
there really is nothing else that the death of his son could have been to Emerson except 
a test to his philosophy³indeed, the highest challenge, against which the claims of phi-
losophy could only fail.  He anticipates this position in a journal entry written almost 
five years before the death of his son. 
 
The event of death is always astounding; our philosophy never reaches, 
never possesses it; we are always at the beginning of our catechism; al-
ways the definition is yet to be made, What is Death?  I see nothing to 
KHOSEH\RQGREVHUYLQJZKDW WKHPLQG·VKDEit is in regard to that crisis.  
Simply, I have nothing to do with it.  It is nothing to me.  After I have 
made my will and set my house in order, I shall do in the immediate ex-
pectation of death the same things I should do without. 
(Journals: 173) 
 
Here then is the oft cited coldness set next to the failure of his philosophy: a Humean 
acceptance that only habit will get us through metaphysical crises, and a Stoical admis-
sion that what will be will be.  So why, then, two years after the death of his son, in 
GRHVKHIRUJR¶KDELW·DQGZULWHWKHFRQVLVWHQWO\DVWRQLVKLQJHVVD\¶([SHULHQFH·RQH
RIWKHPRVWVLQJXODUSLHFHVRIZULWLQJLQ$PHULFDQOHWWHUV":K\GRHVKHXVHWKLV¶HVVD\·
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if that is what it is, to open his philosophy and philosophy in general to the death of his 
VRQ",QVXPZK\GR,ZDQWWRUHDG¶([SHULHQFH·³or why does it demand to be read³
as a work of mourning which enacts a (romantic) working through of idealism? 
 To use, explicitly, the death of an immediate loved one as a call to philosophy is, 
as far as I know, unique³it is certainly unusual.  This is strange on two counts.  Firstly, 
EHFDXVHSKLORVRSK\ LVREVHVVHGZLWKGHDWK IURP3ODWR·VDVVHUWLRQ WKDWSKLORVRSK\ LVD
preparation for death through to modern times with the influence of FrHXG·VGHDWKLn-
stinct³WDNHQXSDVZHVKDOOVHHE\ERWK%URZQDQG0DUFXVH6HFRQGO\EHFDXVH¶Lm-
SHUVRQDO·GHDWKLQWHUPVRIPXUGHUZDUDQGKRORFDXVWIRUH[DPSOHKDVEHHQDFRPPRQ
impulse for philosophy, or for the end of philosophy, during all its history.  Death loi-
ters in the background of philosophy and constitutes one of its most profound ques-
tions, but it rarely, if ever, comes to the fore as personal loss.  The (near) exceptional 
VWDWXV DQG DUJXDEO\ KXEULV WKLV JLYHV WR ¶([SHULHQFH· LV SHUKDSV another reason why 
critics have seen it as a breach of taste, as something Emerson surely could not have 
meant, could not have been in control of³i.e., that he grieved too little or too much.  
Yet, I maintain that such a gesture of beginning (that is, continuing, pursuing) philoso-
SK\ZLWKWKHLQYRFDWLRQRI:DOGR·VGHDWKLVHQWLUHO\FRQVRQDQWZLWK(PHUVRQ·VWKRXJKW
It is in no way a diminution of it, but rather brings it to a peak, where the reflection and 
counter reflection of philosophy upon the everyday and the sacred³what is more eve-
ryday or more sacred than death?³UHDFKHVDFULWLFDOPDVVWKDWHQULFKHVDOORI(PHUVRQ·V
work.  It is, also, to risk bathos, consonant with romanticism. 
 3UHSDUDWRU\ WR UHDGLQJ ¶([SHULHQFH· DV D URPDQWLF WH[W , KDYH WR UHVSRQd to 
6LPRQ&ULWFKOH\·VGHWHUPLQDWLRQWKDWLWLVQRWLQIDFWURPDQWLF7KDWLV,KDYHWRIROORZ
WKURXJKZKDW,FRQVLGHUWREH&ULWFKOH\·VFXULRXVO\XQQHFHVVDU\PLVUHDGLQJRI&DYHOO·V
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UHDGLQJRI(PHUVRQ·V ¶([SHULHQFH·DVD URPDQWLF WH[W LQKLVRWKHUZLVH insightful book, 
9HU\/LWWOH«$OPRVW1RWKLQJ &ULWFKOH\·VPLVUHDGLQJ LVDWILUVWVRGLIILFXOW WRXQGHUVWDQG
that it almost puts the rest of his book into doubt.  Until you realise that what he is do-
ing is not so surprising after all, he is merely enacting, once more, the repression of Em-
HUVRQDVDSKLORVRSKHU,ZLOOEHJLQE\VWDWLQJ&DYHOO·VSRVLWLRQUHYLHZLQJKRZKHPa-
noeuvres Emerson alongside the Jena romantics in a way that causes Critchley³and 
consequently me³such disappointment. 
 Like Critchley, CaYHOO·VUHDGLQJRIWKH-HQDURPDQWLFVDQGWKXVZKDWLWLVWREH
or rather to write as, a romantic derives from Phillipe Lacoue-Labarthe and Jean-Luc 
1DQF\·VLQIOXHQWLDOThe Literary Absolute.  This in turn (as Critchley stresses) is inspired by 
Maurice BlDQFKRW·VVKRUWEXWLPSRUWDQWHVVD\¶7KH$WKHQDHXP·LQKLVThe Infinite Conver-
sation (1969).  Both these texts, and consequently Cavell and Crtichley, limit their defini-
tion of the romantic, initially at least, to the journal The Athenäum, the brief run of which 
lasted from 1798-%XWPRUHSDUWLFXODUO\DJDLQWRWKHVHWVRI¶IUDJPHQWV·WKDWDp-
peared between its covers, the majority of which were in the first volume.  So Cavell is 
dealing with a very narrow, but in its own way exhaustive, definition of romanticism 
which can be summed up, loosely, as a fragmentary response to Kantian philosophy.39 
 Cavell, typically, does not put any stress upon whether Emerson has read The 
Athenäum, either in translation, or in his own limited German.40  Instead, he assumes, 
probably correctly, that the ideas contained therein were part of the intellectual ambi-
                                                 
39 Of course, the fragment does exist in English romanticism, the oEYLRXV H[DPSOHV DUH &ROHULGJH·V
¶&KULVWDEHO· DQG ¶.XEOD .KDQ· ZKLFK LQWHUHVWLQJO\ DUH DOPRVW H[DFWO\ FRQWHPSRUDU\ ZLWK The Athenäum; 
also, to a lesser extent, his philosophical writings³WKRXJKWKH\PD\FRUUHVSRQGPRUHWR%ODQFKRW·VVDWLULF
definition of the fragment given toward the beginning of this introduction, i.e., that he was incapable of 
organising and drawing his thought to a coherent close. 
40 7KRXJK LW LVDSSDUHQWDVZHVDZDERYH WKH(PHUVRQKDGUHDGVRPHWKLQJRI6FKOHJHO·VSKLORVRSKLFDO
fragments and copied them into his journals. 
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ence of the era, both in what came before the journal and in its wake.  After claiming an 
LQLWLDO FRUUHODWLRQ EHWZHHQ WKH URPDQWLFV DQG D SDVVDJH IURP ¶7KH $PHULFDQ 6FKRODU·
(NYUA: 7-KHJRHVRQWREULQJRXWZK\KHWKLQNV¶([SHULHQFH·VKRXOGEHUHODWHGWR
the thinking through of Kant that is happening in The Athenäum. 
 
Accepting the thesis presented by Lacoue-/DEDUWKHDQG1DQF\«WKDWWKH
idea of literature becoming its own theory³literature in effect becoming 
philosophy while contrariwise philosophy becomes literature³is what 
constitutes romanticism (in its origin in the Athenaeum), and beginning to 
VHH(PHUVRQ·VUHVSRQVLYHQHVVWRWKDWPDWHULDORUWRLWVVRXUFHVRUits af-
WHUPDWKP\ZRQGHUDW(PHUVRQ·VDFKLHYHPHQWLVJLYHQDQHZWXUQ$V
LI,KDGIRUDOOP\SHUKDSVDJJUHVVLYHVDWLVIDFWLRQVZLWK(PHUVRQ·VZRUN
myself sometimes given in to the weight of opinion that his works leave 
something (specifiable) undone, as if specifically unaccomplished, as if 
ZKDW,GHVFULEHDV(PHUVRQ·VFDOO IRUSKLORVRSK\ZHUHQRWDOUHDG\SKi-
losophy happening.  So I should like to record my impression that, 
PHDVXUHGDJDLQVWVD\)ULHGULFK6FKOHJHO·VDSKRULVWLFRUUDWKHUIUDgmen-
tary, call for or vision of the union of poetry and philosophy, EmerVRQ·V
work presents itself as the realization of that vision. 
(NYUA: 20-21) 
 
7KLV LQKLVH[WUDRUGLQDU\YDFLOODWLQJSURVH LV&DYHOO·VZD\RIVD\LQJ³by almost trying 
not to say³that Emerson, and LQSDUWLFXODU ¶([SHULHQFH· LV WKH ¶UHDOL]DWLRQ·RI WKH Uo-
mantic project envisioned by the authors of The Athenäum (much will come to hang on 
MXVWZKDW&DYHOOLVWDNHQWRPHDQE\¶UHDOL]DWLRQ· 
Let us take this one step at a time.  What does it mean for literature to become 
its own theory, and for this to occur through the integration of philosophy and poetry?  
To put it somewhat crudely, the aim is to overcome systematic philosophy with the ex-
pressive excess of poetry, but to retain them both (the inauguration of a dialectical ma-
QRHXYUH6FKOHJHOZULWHV¶,W·VHTXDOO\IDWDOIRUWKHPLQGWRKDYHDV\VWHPDQGWRKDYH
QRQH,WZLOOVLPSO\KDYHWRGHFLGHWRFRPELQHWKHWZR·PF: 24).  In this there is a rejec-
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tion of system for the sake of system (which Jacobi called nihilism),41 that is, a self-
grounding system, such as was attempted, for example, by Spinoza and later by Hegel, 
but also a recognition that some kind of systematisation is essential to existence.  (Per-
KDSVZHVKRXOGDOVRUHFDOO(PHUVRQ·V ¶:HZant in every man a long logic; we cannot 
SDUGRQWKHDEVHQFHRILWEXWLWPXVWQRWEHVSRNHQ·7KLVUHPQDQWRIDQXQVSRNHQ
system is the fragment.  As a literary form, the fragment is said to constitute its own 
theory through this ambiguity surrounding its system, a process that comes to mean that 
its very form is its theory, or at least strives to be.  How this works is what Lacoue-
Labarthe and Nancy spend much of their book explaining, locating the fragment in a 
complex matrix of radical incompletion, formal ambiguity and the disparate traits of wit 
and irony. 
 The fragment, they argue, is the romantic genre par excellence (LA: 40).  It re-
sponds to the denial of system through the impossibility of completion, the exigency of 
incompletion³its icon is the ruin, the sign of instability, impermanence, and transition.  
That certain philosophical texts have only come down to us as fragments, such as those 
of Heraclitus and Parmenides,42 also provides a clue to the fragment.  It is a remainder, 
or remembrance (&DYHOOSRLQWVRXWWKHVLJQLILFDQFHRIWKH¶PHPEHU·LQUH-membrance³
and dis-membering [NYUA: 21]), that indicates our limited perspective.  This was re-
ferred to above as our fallen state.  Here it is the fall into individuality into division, into 
fragments 7KLV IRUPXODWLRQRI WKH LPSRVVLELOLW\RI WKHV\VWHP LV WKH ILUVW ¶KLVWRULFDO·
step that the fragment takes to its own theorisation. 
                                                 
41 See Andrew Bowie, RCT: 31ff and passim., also Franks in CCGI: 95-116. 
42 6FKOHJHO ¶0DQ\RI WKHZRUNVRI WKHDQFLHQWVKDYHEHFRPHIUDJPHQWV 0DQ\PRGHUQZRUNVDUH IUDg-
PHQWVDVVRRQDVWKH\DUHZULWWHQ·PF: 21). 
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The second, and more important step, is the restless momentum of the project: 
the future.  Incompletion, they argue entails completion, or at least suggests as a possibil-
ity (a key word) the relentless surge into the future where such a completion may take 
place.  In this open-ended quest for a closed-circle, the fragment locates itself as essen-
tially progressive.  This idea of the fragment as a cat chasing its own tail43 corresponds to 
the observable difference between idealism and romanticism, the circularity of their pur-
VXLWRISKLORVRSK\$V$QGUHZ%RZLHSXWVLWDIWHU0DQIUHG)UDQN ¶7KHGLIIHUHQFHRI
the Romantic view IURP WKH ,GHDOLVWYLHZ«OLHV LQ WKH5RPDQWLFV· HYHQWXDOFRQYLFWLRQ
that a self-grounding system of philosophy is impossible: the aim of German Idealism is 
such a sysWHP·RCT: n312). 
Why I believe it to be circular is simple enough.  If the romantics can recognise 
that a closed system is impossible, then they must have been searching for it, must have 
tried to assert it, in order to fail to do so.  If the idealists feel the need to search for such 
a system they must have found it lacking, or continue to be unable to assert it, to fail to 
provide the system.  The one position is the crisis of the other.  The fragment, in all its 
paradox, is content to take on both perspectives³EXWDWWKHFRVWRIQHYHU ¶realising· Lt-
self.  This then, is why I think the fragment, as literature and as the call for a literature, is 
said to provide its own theory.  Its very limitation³its finitude, we might say with 
Critchley³always points elsewhere, to the possibility and the impossibility of the sys-
                                                 
43 I FKRVHWKLVLPDJHEHFDXVHLWUHFDOOVDQLPDJHXVHGZLWWLO\RUUDWKHUWUDJLFRPLFDOO\E\(PHUVRQLQ¶(x-
SHULHQFH·WRILJXUHWKHH[WUDRUGLQDU\VWDWHRIVXEMHFWLYLW\¶'R\RXVHHWKDWNLWWHQFKDVLQJKHURZQWDLO",I
you could look with her eyes, you might see her surrounded with hundreds of figures performing complex 
dramas, with tragic and comic issues, long conversations, many characters, many ups and downs of fate,³
and meantime it is only puss with her tail.  How long before our masquerade will end its noise of tambou-
ULQHVDQGODXJKWHUDQGVKRXWLQJDQGZHVKDOOILQGLWZDVDVROLWDU\SHUIRUPDQFH"·Essays: 248-249).  The 
solitary is, of course, the fragmentary, rather than, say, the solipsistic. 
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tem, to the possibility and impossibility of its own conditions for existence as a frag-
ment³a phrase which deliberately recalls Kant and the disappointment with his legacy. 
 To take up his next point, in what way does Cavell see Emerson as responding 
to this romantic material?  Firstly, he is clearly surprised, and somewhat abashed, to see 
so much of what he finds in Emerson foreshadowed in Jena romanticism.  His own 
prior work, in The Senses of Walden and In Quest of the Ordinary had already been on the 
Kantian trail, but through the familiar Coleridge, rather than The Athenäum.  So it is not 
the spectre of Kant that surprises him, but that he has a second frame of reference for 
(PHUVRQ·VURPDQWLFLVP³a happy confirmation.  What Cavell can do now in his reading 
RI(PHUVRQ·V¶([SHULHQFH·Ls bring together Kant and the idea of the fragment, and pro-
GXFH DQ XQGHUVWDQGLQJ RU UDWKHU EHJLQ WR XQGHUVWDQG KRZ (PHUVRQ·V HVVD\ DFWXDOO\
ZRUNV)RU&DYHOODQ(PHUVRQLDQHVVD\SDUWDNHVRIWKHIUDJPHQW·VFRPSURPLVHGLnsu-
larity and self-reflexive theoULVDWLRQLQWKDWLW ¶DQQRXQFH>V@DQGSURYLGH>V@FRQGLWLRQVRI
LWVRZQFRPSUHKHQVLRQ·NYUA: 20) (in more Kantian terms, announces the conditions 
for its own possibility, that is its own experience.  Cavell says as much later on [NYUA: 
103]) which, he argueVLVWKH¶UHDOL]DWLRQ·RI6FKOHJHO·VFDOO¶IRUDYLVLRQRIWKHXQLRQRI
SRHWU\DQGSKLORVRSK\·+RZWKLVZRUNVRXWRUKRZ,ZDQWWRZRUNLWRXW,ZLOOOHDYH
LQDEH\DQFHIRUQRZEHFDXVHLWLVWKLVZRUG¶UHDOL]DWLRQ·WKDWFRQVWLWXWHVWKHZKROHPLs-
taken contretemps between Critchley and Cavell. 
 As may have already become apparent, romanticism, if we take the fragment as 
LWV IRUP FDQQRW ¶UHDOL]H· LWVHOI  ,QGHHG LWV YHU\ HVVHQFH RU DV %ODQFKRW SXWV LW ¶QRQ-
HVVHQFH·>IC: 359]) is this incompletion.  VHU\PXFKKDQJVWKHQRQZKDWRQHWDNHV¶Ue-
DOL]DWLRQ· WR PHDQ  &ULWFKOH\ FOHDUO\ WDNHV &DYHOO WR PHDQ ¶FRPSOHWLRQ· VRPH NLQG RI
FORVXUHRUDUUHVWLQJRIPRYHPHQW:KLOVWKHGRHVQRWLQWHQGWKDW&DYHOO·V(PHUVRQLVLQ
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any way systematic (i.e., nihilistic) in the sense described above, he does take it to mean 
that Cavell believes Emerson to have resolved³realized³the relationship between po-
etry and philosophy and to have fulfilled the romantic genre.  For Critchley this is a fatal 
mistake that oversteps the bounds of romanticism, indeed, is fundamentally unromantic. 
He attributes this error to a claim made by Cavell in his In Quest of the Ordinary, 
garnered, apparently, from Thoreau.  Philosophy, or a good philosophy book at least, 
¶ZRXOGEHZULWWHQZLWKQH[WWRQRIRUZDUGPRWLRQRQHWKDWFXOPLQDWHVLQHDFKVHQWHQFH·
(IQO: 18).  Critchley takes this to mean that Emerson realizes the fragment because his 
sentences enact this type of closure, this denial of forward momentum.  He uses two 
expression for this, oQHERUURZHG IURP6WHSKHQ0XOKDOO LV ¶ODFNRIPRPHQWXP· WKH
VHFRQG KLV RZQ LV ¶LQHUWLD· VLAN: 123).  It is, I think, important to point out that 
these concepts are not the same, and thus he is mixing his metaphors and misreading 
&DYHOO·VRZQ¶next to QRIRUZDUGPRWLRQ· ,W LV LPSRUWDQWEHFDXVHWH[WVGRQRW¶PRYH·
on their own, quickly or slowly.  There is someone next to³i.e., reading³WKHP¶DWD
EHQWDUPV OHQJWK· DV&DYHOO VD\VRI7KRUHDX $Q LPDJHERWKRIVWUROOLQJDUP LQDUP
and of holding a book),44 and their inertia, their constancy, is no aid to the reader; it just 
keeps step.  It is the reader, then, who overcomes the periodic inertia, not the diminish-
ing momentum of the text.  It is the reader who turns the text into a progression (suc-
cession), makes it progressive, and not the writer.  It is the writer, the text, that is 
¶ZDUSHGRXWRI LWVRUELW· UHFDOOLQJ ¶7KH$PHULFDQ6FKRODU· SE: 88), and opened to its 
                                                 
44 7KHZKROHSDVVDJHUHDGV¶7KHUHDGHU·VSRVLWLRQKDVEHHQ specified as that of the stranger.  To write is to 
DFNQRZOHGJHWKDWKHLVRXWVLGHWKHZRUGVDWDEHQWVDUP·VOHQJWKDQGDORQHZLWKWKHERRNWKDWKLVSUHs-
ence to these words is perfectly contingent, and that choice to stay with them continuously his own; that 
they are his points of departure and origin.  The conditions of meeting upon the word are that we³writer 
and reader³learn how to depart from them, leave them where they are; and then return to them, find 
ourselves there again.  We have to learn to admit the successiveness of words, their occurrence one after 
WKHRWKHUDQGWKHLUSHUPDQHQFHLQWKHIDFHRIRXUVXFFHVVLRQV·SW: 62-63. 
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IXWXUH $V(PHUVRQ IDPRXVO\ZULWHV LQ WKH VDPHHVVD\ ¶2QHPXVWEHDQ LQYHQWRU WR
reaGZHOO«7KHUHLVFUHDWLYHUHDGLQJDVZHOODVFUHDWLYHZULWLQJ·SE: 90). 
Perhaps this becomes clearer if we read the appropriate pages of The Senses of 
Walden, where Cavell first talks about this.  It suggests that from the beginning, Emer-
VRQ·VWH[WDVZHOODV7KRUHDX·VWKDWKHFLWHVLVQRWDQLQDGHTXDWHURPDQWLFLVPEXWLVD
successful interpretation of it³D¶UHDOL]DWLRQ· 
 
Writing, at its best, will come to a finish in each mark of meaning, in 
each portion and sentence and word.  That is why in readinJLW¶ZHPXVW
laboriously seek the meaning of every word and line; conjecturing a lar-
JHUVHQVH«· 
(SW: 27-28) 
 
Where writing stops, reading begins³reading as writing again, as an essential response: 
a responsibility³to the written text.  Realization does not mean completion, it means 
putting to work WKHURPDQWLFIUDJPHQW $QGLWHVWDEOLVKHVWKHIUDJPHQW·VSODFHLQDGLa-
logue³as one side of an ongoing dialogue.  Now, this might just sound like a definition 
of reading, but what sets it apart is that certain texts (fragments) are more open to inter-
pretation, are in fact deliberately RSHQWRLW,WLVDOVRUHODWHGWRWKH¶ELUWK·RIVHOI-reflexive 
literature with romanticism³literature that talks to itself about its own failure.  For one 
of the debts of The Athenäum fragments is to the Socratic dialogue and to its irony, and 
thus to the complex location of answerability, the demand of responsibility in the re-
VSRQVH %ODQFKRWREVHUYHV ¶WKH IUDJPHQW LQPRQRORJXHIRUP LVDVXEVWLWXWH IRUGLa-
logical communicatiRQ VLQFH ´a dialogue is a chain or garland of fragmentsµ 6FKOHJHO DQG
more profoundly, an anticipation of what one could call plural writing; the possibility of 
DZULWLQJ WKDW LVGRQH LQ FRPPRQ· IC %ODQFKRW·V HPSKDVLV  ,ZDQW WR VXJJHVW
that this writing in common, rather than being the anonymous collective of the Jena ro-
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mantics, can correspond to the practice of proper reading, of reading being part of a 
creative collective act which is responsible to and for WKHZULWWHQWH[W¶ODERULRXVO\VHHk[ing] 
WKHPHDQLQJRIHYHU\ZRUGDQGOLQH· 
7KLVKDVWREHDXJPHQWHGE\&DYHOO·VFODLPFLWHGDERYHWKDWSKLORVRSKLFDOZULt-
LQJLVWKH¶UHVSRQVLELOLW\IRURQH·VRZQGLVFRXUVH·&DYHOOXVHVDQLPSRUWDQW(PHrsonian 
word for the coming together of these two LGHDV¶FRQGLWLRQ·IQO: 37-38; NYUA: 81).  
+H SOD\V ZLWK WKH HW\PRORJ\ ¶FRQ-GLWLRQ· RU VSHDNLQJ WRJHWKHU  6XJJHVting that it 
SRLQWV WR WKH FRQGLWLRQV ¶XQGHU ZKLFK ZH FDQ VD\ DQ\WKLQJ DW DOO WR RQH Dnother, the 
terms or costs of each of our terms; as if philosophy is to unearth the conditions of dic-
WLRQDOWRJHWKHU· NYUA &DYHOO·V LQVLJKW LV WKDWWKLVFRQGLWLRQ WKLVFRnfluence of 
YRLFHVHPHUJLQJIURPWKHZULWWHQWH[W LVDZD\RILQWHUSUHWLQJ.DQW·VXVHRIWKHZRUG
FRQGLWLRQ LQ ¶FRQGLWLRQV IRU WKHSRVVLELOLW\RIH[SHULHQFH· +HUH WKHQ ODnguage as an 
ongoing dialogue between writing and reading, as a response that demands a responsibil-
ity, provides the a priori FRQGLWLRQVIRUH[SHULHQFH7KHUHVSRQVLELOLW\IRURQH·VRZQGLs-
FRXUVHRQH·VIUDJPHQtary part in the garland of dialogue is always a response to and a 
call to an open-ended realisation RIH[SHULHQFH(PHUVRQ·V¶FDOO·IRUSKilosophy is, then, 
WKH LQLWLDWLRQ RI D GLDORJXH WKH DQQRXQFHPHQW RI D IUDJPHQW WKH ¶KDpSHQLQJ· RI SKi-
losophy as the question of, the questioning of, experience. 
 Cavell, in fact, is working through this in This New Yet Unapproachable America.  It 
just seems frustrating that Critchley did not read him sufficiently, did not follow the 
Cavellian injunction of responsibilLW\WRWKH¶FRQGLWLRQV·RIWKHWH[W&DYHOOZULWHVTXLWH
cateJRULFDOO\LPPHGLDWHO\DIWHUFODLPLQJ(PHUVRQ·VHVVD\LVDUHDOL]DWLRQRIWKHIUDJPHQW 
 
,GRQRWPHDQWKDW(PHUVRQ·VZRUNLVQRW¶IUDJPHQWDU\·,QGHHGLWVHHPV
to me that the puzzle of the Emersonian sentence must find a piece of its 
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solution in a theory of the fragment: maintaining fragmentariness is part of Emer-
VRQ·VUHDOL]DWLRQRIURPDQWLFLVP. 
What presents itself to me as its completion of a call for a certain 
work is epitomized in taking ¶([SHULHQFH·DVDFRQWULEXWLRQWRRUSUHVHQWa-
tion of, precisely a theory of the fragment. 
(NUYA: 21; emphasis added) 
 
And a page earlier: 
 
In claiming an Emersonian essay to announce and provide conditions of its 
RZQFRPSUHKHQVLRQ«I am not claiming that these conditions are presented as com-
plete and as realized, but that their completion and realization are questions for each es-
say³otherwise the description of an Emersonian essay as constituting a 
theory of what it is to be an Emersonian essay would not be a description 
of its essential work but of an ungrounded selection of some images and 
figures for the whole. 
(NYUA: 20; emphasis added) 
 
Cavell, writing as he does, could not have made it clearer that the Emersonian essay is a 
working through of the realization called for by Schlegel, not, in fact its ¶realization·,WLVWUDQVi-
tive not substantive.  Moreover, it is the very question of what stops an essay from real-
ising itself³what surpasses its conditions of possibility, say the (missed) confrontation 
wLWK KLV VRQ·V :DOGR·V GHDWK ZKLFK LV WKH RFFDVLRQ IRU ¶([SHULHQFH·  $QG ZKLFK
emerges paradoxically, as the conditions for its own possibility, which we might call lan-
guage, and in its final impossibility, which we might call death.  A conversion³Cavell 
PLJKWERUURZ(PHUVRQ·VZRUGDQGVD\¶DYHUVLRQ·³of Kant, which, I continue to show, 
is romantic. 
 6RQRZZHFDQEHJLQWRRYHUWXUQ&ULWFKOH\·VUHDGLQJRI(PHUVRQDQGVHHZKHUH
it agrees with, rather than contradicts, one of the points he makes³namely, that ¶URPDn-
WLFLVPIDLOV·VLAN: 94, 105).  Jena romanticism fails, he argues, because it cannot con-
trol the divergent manner of its creation, the paradoxical framings of wit and irony that 
are typical of the perfect fragment, that are demanded by its form.  Wit is already dou-
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bled in the romantic conception in that it means both humour and knowledge, and it is 
an attempt to combine the two, one in terms of the other (the pun stands in the German 
etymology, Witz, Wissen, and in English).  But wit is to be distinguished from the under-
standing; it is un-systematic knowledge that brings together two distinct thoughts in a 
flash ex nihilo  6FKOHJHO ZULWHV ¶0DQ\ ZLWW\ LGHDV DUH OLNH WKH VXGGHQ PHHWLQJ RI WZR
IULHQGO\WKRXJKWVDIWHUDORQJVHSDUDWLRQ·PF: 23).  These thoughts, though, never quite 
come together, cannot overcome their initial distance from each other, because they 
should also be pervaded by irony. 
Irony holds apart the two thoughts and does not allow their satisfactory comple-
tion.  It is, Critchley argues, something of a negative dialectic, in that it refuses the iden-
WLW\RIWKHLGHDVEURXJKWWRJHWKHULQWKHIUDJPHQW6FKOHJHOZULWHV¶$QLGHDLVDFRncept 
perfected to the point of irony, an absolute synthesis of absolute antitheses, the contin-
ual self-FUHDWLQJ LQWHUFKDQJHRI WZRFRQIOLFWLQJ WKRXJKWV· DQGDJDLQ ¶,URQ\ LV WKHFOHDU
FRQVFLRXVQHVVRIHWHUQDODJLOLW\RIDQLQILQLWHO\WHHPLQJFKDRV·PF: 33, 100).  This type 
of irony, hardly surprisingly, is not funny; it is, rather, arch, elitist, often driven by phi-
lological puns and occasionally supercilious.  An example of such a fragment was given 
DERYHZKHQ6FKOHJHOZULWHV¶,W·VHTXDOO\IDWDOIRUWKHPLQGWRKDYHDV\VWHPDQGWRKDYH
QRQH,WZLOOVLPSO\KDYHWRGHFLGHWRFRPELQHWKHWZR·$VDQHxemplification of the 
essence of the fragment, this stands up well.  It is witty in that it brings together two dif-
ferent, even opposed, ideas, that of system and non-system, and ironic in that it holds 
them in an un-reconcilable duality³how can the mind decide to combine the two?  
0RUHRYHUZKHUH LV WKLVFRPPRQJURXQGIRU ¶GHFLVLRQ·" 7KHIUDJPHQWHOXGHV LWVRZQ
answer, and is contained only in its own incompletion, its own negativity³the scepti-
cism that disbelieves in absolutes. 
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One of the dominant themes of The Athenäum fragments is to play out this nega-
tivity in the relationship between poetry and philosophy (as non-system and system re-
spectively) and to assert, whilst refusing, their claims upon each other.  Though 
Critchley sets this up in opposition tR &DYHOO·V (PHUVRQ KLV SRLQW FDQ QRZ EH PDGH
with Emerson in mind: 
 
on my account, Jena Romanticism is rooted in the acute self-
consciousness of its unworking or failure, the exploration of the lack of 
final synthesis in a continual process of self-creation and self-destruction 
and the quasi-GLDOHFWLFVRIZLWDQGLURQ\«-HQD5RPDQWLFLVPLVURRWHG
in essential ambiguity, which is the ambiguity of the genre of the frag-
ment itself.  The ambiguity of the fragment is continually directed and 
open to the future, a future underwritten by a lack of final synthesis.  I 
would argue that it is the very futuricity of fragments that explains why 
we carry on reading them, and why their reading is not, as Cavell sug-
gests, characterized by lack of momentum or inertia, but rather by a re-
lentless and vertiginous forward motion without destination. 
(VLAN: 124) 
 
That last point can now be turned around and the futuricity of the fragment can be di-
UHFWO\OLQNHGWRWKH¶QH[WWR·RIWKH¶QH[WWRQRPRPHQWXP·³i.e., the reader.  The relent-
less forward motion (which could still be inertia) is directed toward the reader, and it is 
the reader who produces the vertigo, who experiences the pull forward, is directed inde-
terminately onward by the demands of reading the Emersonian word, sentence, essay, 
IUDJPHQW7KLVLVWKH¶UHOHQWOHVV·IRUFHRIURPDQWLFLVP·VIDLOXUH 
 
 
IV 
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Romanticism fails for Emerson (fails Emerson) because it cannot answer the questions 
that practical experience puts to genius³WKLV¶URPDQFH·VWLOOUHPDLQVXQIXOILOOHG at the 
end of the essay.  That romanticism is this need to think the everyday through the cate-
gories of philosophy and to call those categories into question in the question itself is 
announced in the self-reflexive open gesture of the fragment.  That it fails to put to-
gether the pure and practical, to reclaim the everyday in the light of the transcendental³
that is to locate the transcendent³LV WUDJLFDOO\ H[HPSOLILHG LQ (PHUVRQ·V DWWHPSW WR
¶URPDQWLFLVH· WKHGHDWKRI WKLV VRQ 2UPRUHSUHFLVHO\ LQ WKDt his attempt to realise it 
ends up romanticising it.  What follows is the foremost of many crucial passages from 
¶([SHULHQFH· ZKLFK GHVFULEHV WKLV SUREOHPDWLF  ,W LV ZKHUH (PHUVRQ LQIDPRXVO\ Dn-
nounces the death of this son. 
 
People grieve and bemoan themselves, but it is not half so bad with 
them as they say.  There are moods in which we court suffering, in the 
hope that here, at least, we shall find reality, sharp peaks and edges of 
truth.  But it turns out to be scene-painting, and counterfeit.  The only 
thing grief has taught me is how shallow it is.  That, like all the rest, plays 
about the surface, and never introduces me into the reality, for contact 
with which, we would even pay the costly price of sons and lovers.  Was 
it Boscovitch who found out that bodies never come in contact?  Well, 
souls never touch their objects.  An innavigable sea washes with silent 
waves between us and the things we aim at and converse with.  Grief, 
too, will make us idealists.  In the death of my son, now more than two 
years ago, I seem to have lost a beautiful estate,³no more.  I cannot get 
it nearer to me.  If to-morrow I should be informed of the bankruptcy of 
my principal debtors, the loss of my property would be a great inconven-
ience to me, perhaps, for many years; but it would leave me as it found 
me,³neither better nor worse.  So it is with this calamity: it does not 
touch me: something which I fancied was a part of me,³which could 
not be torn away without tearing me, nor enlarged without enriching me, 
falls off from me, and leaves no scar.  It was caducous.  I grieve that grief 
can teach me nothing, nor carry me one step into real nature.  The In-
dian who was laid under a curse, that the wind should not blow on him, 
nor water flow to him, nor fire burn him, is a type of us all.  The dearest 
events are summer rain, and we the Para coats that shed every drop.  
Nothing is left to us now but death.  We look to that with a grim satis-
faction, saying, there at least is reality that will not dodge us. 
 49 
(Essays: 230-231) 
 
If romanticism, as I have named it here, is the attempt to bridge the gap between the 
pure and the practical, to recognise in the transcendental conditions of the possibility of 
H[SHULHQFH WKH WUDQVFHQGHQW ¶H[SHULHQFH· LQ LWVHOI WR PDNH WKHP DQVZHUDEOH WR HDFK
other, responsible for each other, then this passage is a dramatic recognition of this failure.  
Death here is quite literally transcendence, the movement from the realm of intuitable 
experience to its other side, the unknowable, the noumenal.  The experience of death is 
ineluctably ideal; death itself is impossibly real. 
¶*ULHIWRRZLOOPDNHXVLGHDOLVWV·$SKUDVHXVXDOO\DVVRFLDWHGZLWKDWUDJLF³but 
homely³wisdom, can on this reading be elevated to its full philosophical height.  Grief 
too will make us idealists (we always already were idealists, grief) or rather the impossibil-
LW\RIJULHI·VREMHFW³just brings a new clarity to human finitude, both in mortal and in 
transcendental terms.  This leads to a bitter ironic reflection in the romantic sense of the 
duality of wit: the comparing of his son to a beautiful estate³how are we to take that?  
It is usually what appals the critics, perhaps understandably so.  I take it as a fragment, as 
a concept that cannot grasp its object.  An estate is an empty signifier (after Marx we 
might call it a fetish) which corresponds to the essential absence of Waldo, the absence 
RIKLVQDPHIURP¶([SHULHQFH·+HFDQQRWEHQDPHGRQO\WKHIDLOXUHWRQDPHKLPWR
understand him as an estate, is testament to this.  We can compare this to the more posi-
tive Emerson of Nature: 
 
The charming landscape which I saw this morning is indubitably made 
up of some twenty or thirty farms.  Miller owns this field, Locke that, 
and Manning the woodland beyond.  But none of them owns the land-
scape.  There is a property in the horizon which no man has but he 
whose eye can integrate all the parts, that is, the poet.  This is the best 
SDUWRIWKHVHPHQ·VIDUPV\HWWRWKLVWKHLUZDUUDQW\-deeds give no title. 
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(SE: 38) 
 
In Nature Emerson holds on tRWKHLQWHJUDWLYHSRZHURIWKH¶H\H· ,Q¶([SHULHQFH·WKH
poet misses his object, which was a subject, Waldo; and who, without even the proper-
ties of an estate to which he may have title, slips over the horizon.  The irony, then, is 
that in the drawing together of the two ideas, the estate and Waldo, an innavigable abyss 
RSHQVXSDQGKHH[SODLQV¶,FDQQRWJHWLWQHDUHUWRPH· 
 Grief, then, exposes Emerson to the truth of idealism: it fails, and its failure be-
FRPHV URPDQWLFLVP ZKLFK LQ WXUQ IDLOV  ¶, JULHYH· KH ZULWHV ¶WKDW JULHI FDQ WHDFK PH
QRWKLQJQRUFDUU\PHDVWHSLQWRUHDOQDWXUH·,WWHDFKHVKLPQRWKLQJWKDWKHGRHVQRW
already know³which is, the lesson learned from death, that despite³or maybe because 
of³WKHQRWRULRXVHSLSKDQ\RIWKH¶WUDQVSDUHQWH\HEDOO·QDWXUHLVHOVHZKHUH:HDUHOHIW
with the subjective illusion of Temperament,45 and the overblown image of the eyeball, 
transcending the body, illuminating and integrating the wood, becomes tragic when its 
shaping power ossifies with grief.  $QG(PHUVRQUHDOL]HVWKDW¶/LIHLVDWUDLQRIPRRGV
like a string of beads, and, as we pass through them, they prove to be many-colored 
OHQVHVZKLFKSDLQW WKHZRUOG WKHLURZQKXHDQGHDFKVKRZVRQO\ZKDW LV LQ LWV IRFXV·
(Essays: 231).  Grief colours the world, shows how the power invested in the transparent 
eyeball, the creative romantic image, has a hard edge that pushes nature away, and leaves 
WKH VXEMHFWXQWRXFKHGE\ WKHREMHFW LQVXODU $V%DUEDUD3DFNHUJULPO\REVHUYHV ¶WKH
price you pay for invuOQHUDELOLW\LVLQYXOQHUDELOLW\·EF: 170). 
6RWKHOHVVRQRI¶([SHULHQFH·LVQRWDUHWUHDWIURPLGHDOLVPLQWRHPSLULFLVPEXW
from idealism into romanticism, into the failure of experience to grasp its object, the 
                                                 
45 :KLFKDV&DYHOOSRLQWVRXWIRUHWHOOV+HLGHJJHU·V¶HSLVWHPRORJ\RIPRRGV·SW: 125). 
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XQKDQGVRPH¶OXEULFLW\RIDOOREMHFWVZKLFh lets them slip through our fingers then when 
ZHFOXWFKKDUGHVW· Essays: 231).  There is a series of familiar philosophical puns here.  
To clutch hard is to grasp, in German Griff (which gives ergreifen: to seize, and begreifen: to 
comprehend³DV LQ ¶SUHKHQVLOH· IURPZKLFKFRPHV Begriff, which translates back into 
English as concept, in the Kantian sense of applying experiences to rules in the under-
standing³LQWKHVHQVHRIKDYLQJ¶DJUDVS·RQVRPHWKLQJVD\DQREMHFW46  Our concepts 
fail us when we clutch hardest, objects really do slip away and philosophy as idealism 
DQGURPDQWLFLVPLVWKHGLVFORVXUHRIWKLV¶HYDQHVFHQFH·Essays: 231).  The secret of this, 
as Cavell points out, is that we must learn not to clutch too hard.  But, in acknowledging 
the absence, we emerge wiser from the disjunctions of irony. 
 7KLV WKHQ LV DQRWKHU OHVVRQ RI JULHI IRU ZKLFK (PHUVRQ KDV SDLG WKH ¶FRVWO\
SULFHRIVRQVDQG ORYHUV· 3KLORVRSK\ZKLFKEHJLQV LQ ORVV IDLOVDQGHQGV WRR LQWKH
tragic acceptance of loss.  In his journals, Emerson is even more explicit about the role 
of grief.  As early as 1823, Emerson writes, in the youthful voice of his dramatised soli-
WXGHWKDW¶WKH\HOORIWKHLUJULHI³LWWRXFKHVQRFRUGLQPH·Journals: 38).  The death of 
his first wife EllHQ7XFNHULQZDVLQGHHGDFDXVHRIPXFK¶JULHI·WKHELWWHUQHVVRI
which is more typical, less philosophical.  But the fact never was that Emerson does not 
                                                 
46 Cavell responds to the same SDVVDJHVRPHZKDWGLIIHUHQWO\ ¶/RRNDW WKH ILUVWFRQQHFWLRQEHWZHHQWKH
hand in unhandsome and the impotently clutching fingers.  What is unhandsome is I think not that objects 
for us, to which we seek attachment, are as it were in themselves evanescent and lubricious; the unhand-
some is rather what happens when we seek to deny the standoffishness of objects by clutching at them; 
which is to say, when we conceive thinking, say the applications of concepts in judgements, as grasping 
something, say synthesizinJ 7KH UHODWLRQEHWZHHQ WKLQNLQJDQG WKHKDQG LV HPSKDVL]HG LQ+HLGHJJHU·V
What is Called Thinking? DVZKHQKHZULWHV´7KLQNLQJ LVKDQGLFUDIWµE\ZKLFK ,VXSSRVHKHPHDQVERWK
that thinking is practical (no doubt pre-industrial), fruitful work, which must be learned, and also to em-
phasize that it is work that only the creature with hands can perform³and most fatefully perform as a 
mode of necessary, everyday violence.  (I assume that Emerson wants the autoerotic force projected with 
this connection of hanG DQG REMHFWV DQG , JXHVV WKDW +HLGHJJHU GRHV QRW  , OHW WKLV SDVV IRU QRZ·
NYUA: 86.  Cavell sets this next to the type of thinking that allows objects to come to us, passively, as we 
receive and acknowledge them.  See also Martin Heidegger (trans. J. Glenn Gray), What is Called Thinking? 
1HZ<RUN+DUSHU&ROOLQV¶/HFWXUH6XPPDU\DQG7UDQVLWLRQ·S 
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grieve over the death of his son.  It is that he can only grieve over the death of his son.  
This is as much to say that he can only write and that we can only read his grief from 
which Waldo is absent.  Grief, as a mood or temperament, shows through as illusion 
beFDXVHRILWVLQDGHTXDF\WRLWVREMHFW¶PRRGVLQZKLFKZHFRXUWVXIIHULQJLQWKHKRSe 
WKDWKHUHDW OHDVWZHVKDOO ILQGUHDOLW\VKDUSSHDNVDQGHGJHVRIWUXWK·GHOLYHURQO\DQ
increased awareness of subjectivity that touches the edges of solipsism. 
,QDFRQYHUVDWLRQZLWK-RQHV9HU\UHFRUGHGLQKHZULWHV¶,VDZFOHDUO\WKDW
if my wife and child, my mother, should be taken from me, I should still remain whole 
with the same capacity for cheap enjoyment from all things.  I should not grieve enough, 
DOWKRXJK,ORYHWKHP·Journals: 204-205).  And stronger still, eight months after WaldR·V
GHDWK ¶,QWHOOHFW DOZD\V SXWV DQ LQWHUYDO EHWZHHQ WKH VXEMHFW 	 WKH REMHFW  $IIHFWLRQ
would blend the two.  For weal or for woe I clear myself from the thing I contemplate: I 
JULHYHEXW,DPQRWJULHI,ORYHEXW,DPQRWORYH·Journals: 288).  This, in turn, must be 
WKRXJKWRIQH[WWRWKHIDPRXVOHWWHUWR&DUROLQH6WXUJLVZULWWHQMXVWGD\VDIWHU:DOGR·V
death:  
 
Alas!  I chiefly grieve that I cannot grieve; that this fact takes no more 
deep hold than other facts, is as dreamlike as they; a lambent flame that 
will not burn playing on the surface of my river.  Must every experi-
ence³those promised to be dearest and most penetrative,³only kiss my 
cheek like the wind & pass away? 
(RG: 20) 
 
7KHWH[WXDOHFKRDQGUHYHUVDOEHWZHHQ¶,JULHYHWKDW,FDQQRWJULHYH·DQG¶,JULHYHEXW,
DPQRWJULHI· LV ,EHOLHYH LPSRUWDQW LQ ILJXULQJ WKH OHVVRQVRIJULHIZKDWJULHI LV VXp-
posed to do, what it may actually do, and certainly what it fails to do.  To give oneself 
over to grief, to public grief, is to lose, in a sense, the responsibility for grieving, to fail 
(in) it, to refuse its work and to miss its lesson.  This is not a lesson of attachments lost, 
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but of ineluctable distance.  There are, Cavell observes (NYUA: 107), at least two ways 
to make this mistake, one is religion; another might be called philosophy.  Both of them, 
DV¶([SHULHQFH·PDNHVDOOWRRFOHDUDUHLOOXVLRQVJULHIDVDWHPSHUDPHQWLVQRWVXVWDLn-
able (save through the deeper illusion of melancholia).  Philosophy, at least in its roman-
tic form, however, provides an answer (which is, deliberately, no answer) by opening 
itself up to what refuses it, its own completion, a completion which could only take the 
form, or at least the name, of Waldo. 
 
V 
 
At the beginning of this introduction, I referred to Lacoue-/DEDUWKHDQG1DQF\·VFRn-
WHQWLRQWKDWWKHXQLW\RIWKHIUDJPHQWZDV¶FRQVWLWXWHGLQDFHUWDLQZD\RXWVLGHWKHZRUN
E\WKHVXEMHFWWKDWLVVHHQLQLW·,QRZZDQWWRH[SODLQZKDWLVPHDQWE\WKLV³and how 
I see Waldo as this central subject, this absent romantic subject described in the Literary 
Absolute. 
 
For the romantics, the work never ceases to imply the fundamental motif 
of completion.  Indeed, they raise this motif to a peak of intensity [as] 
IUDJPHQWHG¶SRHWU\DQGSKLORVRSK\·ZKRVHYHU\FRPSOHWLRn remains in-
complete.  The work in this sense is absent from works³and fragmenta-
tion is also the sign of this absence.  But this sign is at least ambivalent, 
according to the constant logic of this type of thought, whose model is 
negative theology.  The empty place that a garland of fragments sur-
rounds is a precise drawing of the contours of the Work. 
(LA: 47) 
 
This passage condenses what I want to put forward here, that the centre of the work, its 
point of negativity or absence³its incompletion, is also the circumference of the work, 
its limit³WKHLGHDOLW\RILWVFRPSOHWLRQ7KHWHQVLRQEHWZHHQWKHWZRLVWKHZRUN·Vreali-
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zation.  The image is abyssal, paradoxical: a central hole that also provides the shape and 
extent of the essay.  This ambivalence providHVWKHFRQWRXUVRI:DOGR·VVKDGRZDVLWLV
cast across the essay. 
The absence of Waldo is something that has challenged other critics, in particu-
ODU&DYHOO LQKLV ¶)LQGLQJ DV)RXQGLQJ· NYUA: 77-118) and Sharon Cameron in her 
¶5HSUHVHQWLQJ *ULHI (PHUVRQ·V ´([SHULHQFHµ· EXW , VKDOO GUDZ VXEVWDQWLDOO\ GLIIHUHQW
conclusions here.  For Cavell, and I barely understand what he means when he says this, 
:DOGR·VDEVHQFHLVRYHUFRPHLQWKDWDFORVHUHDGLQJRIWKHLPDJHU\RI¶([SHULHQFH·Ue-
veals that Emerson is using the essay to give birth to his son (and through him to a new 
America), to found him and to find him.  Cameron, on the other hand, uses a sophisti-
cated psychoanalytic reading to locate Waldo in the very text of the essay.  For her, writ-
ing is mourning, writing is disavowal of loss and, finally, there is satisfaction derived 
from the interment of Waldo in the text.  These readings, both profound and complex, 
miss for me the work that the essay is doing, in exploring the genre of the fragment and 
engaging with its failure to realize its impossible object: death.  Death as the absence of 
that which keeps us from the world.  Both birth and disavowal seem to repeat them-
selves in a secondary disavowal of the task of the essay, WKHLPSRVVLELOLW\RIGHDWK·VH[SHUience 
as a working through of experience itself. 
 Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy go on, and this sums up much of the foregoing dis-
cussion: 
 
The fragment figures³but to figure, bilden and gestalten, is here to work 
and to present, darstellen³the outside-the-work [KRUV G·RHXYUH] that is es-
sential to the work.  It functions as the exergue in the two sense of the 
Greek verb H[HUJD]ŇPDL; it is inscribed outside the work, and it completes 
it.  The romantic fragment, far from bringing the dispersion or the shat-
tering of the work into play, inscribes its plurality as the exergue of the 
total, infinite work. 
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 This is no doubt also because the infinite is presented only through 
its exergue and because, if the Darstellung of the infinite after and despite 
Kant, constitutes the essential preoccupation of idealism, then romanti-
cism, through literature in the fragment, forms the exergue of philoso-
SKLFDOLGHDOLVP«3XUHO\WKHRUHWLFDOFRPSOHWLRQLVLPSRVViEOH«EHFDXVH
the theoretical infinite remains asymptotic.  The actual infinite is the 
work of art. 
(LA: 48) 
 
If by the infinite we understand, as we have been doing thus far, death³that which is 
on the other side of human finitude, rather than a numerical or quantifiable infinite³
WKHQ:DOGR·VGHDWKILJXUHVWKHH[HUJXHWKHOLPLWand the completion, sought for in ideal-
ist philosophy which strives to answer Kant, but which eventually falls into the essential 
failure, or non-HVVHQFH RI URPDQWLFLVP  %\ WKLV , PHDQ WKDW LI (PHUVRQ·V HVVD\ DV D
work of mourning, strives to (re)present (darstellen:DOGR·VGHDWKWKURXJKLWVREVHUYDEOH
impact, then this accounts for the failure of idealism.  The placing of its limits such that 
Waldo can only be represented³stood in for³by the very representation of failure, 
which is the essay itself.  The impossibility of Waldo, the absence of his name in the es-
VD\LVGLVVHPLQDWHGLQWRWKHZRUNDVD¶ZKROH·XQLI\LQJWKHensemble without completing 
it. 
 
But there is another reading of the infinite, that would appeal more to Cavell, 
and that is the infinLWH UHVSRQVLELOLW\ WKDW LV HOLFLWHGE\ WKH IUDJPHQW·V LQFRPSOHWLRQ DV
writing.  On the one hand the pseudo-VXEOLPHIDLOXUHWRQDPHKLVVRQLIZHUHFDOO.DQW·V
reading of the Hebrew injunction on the representation of God).  But more concretely 
the appeal WRWKHUHDGHUWRSXUVXH(PHUVRQ·VIUDJPHQWDU\UHVSRQVHWRWKHLPSRVVLELOLW\
of Waldo, through philosophy³idealism, romanticism, empiricism³and thus, in the act 
RI UHDGLQJ HQJDJH ZLWK SKLORVRSK\·V IDLOXUH DV D call to philosophy and as a work of 
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mourning, ZKLFKFDOOVIURPVRPHZKHUH¶GHHSHU·WKDQSKLORVRSK\LWVHOI,QWKLVZD\Uo-
manticism is realized, philosophy domesticated, grounded in its continuing struggle to 
UHJLVWHUWKHHYHU\GD\$SURFHVVWKDWFRXOGEHGHVFULEHGDV(PHUVRQ·VXQZRUNLQJRI
.DQW·VFULWLFDOHQWHUSULVH¶IURPKRZZHDUHVXFKWKDWZHcan H[SHULHQFH·WR¶KRZZHDUH
because of what we cannot H[SHULHQFH·IURPLGHDOLVPWRURPDQWicism. 
,V:DOGR·VGHDWKWKURXJKLWVUHSUHVHQWDWLRQDIDLOXUHWRH[SHULHQFH¶H[SHULHQFH·
a work of art, or is it a work of art because on these terms the representation falls short 
of its object?  That depends very much on what the work of art is taken to be, and 
moreover, how it is said to represent the infinite.  Cavell, for example (and it is a state-
ment that &ULWFKOH\VKRXOGQHYHUKDYHPLVVHGVD\VWKDW¶DQ(PHUVRQLDQHVVD\LVDILQLWH
REMHFWWKDW\LHOGVDQLQILQLWHUHVSRQVH·NYUA: 101).  Is this an adequate definition of 
the work of art?  Art discloses the infinite, say death, through an appeal to the limits of 
finitude, which are the conditions for the possibility of experience and which are also 
the limits of representation, of meaningful disclosure³.DQW FDOOV WKLV WKH ¶DHVWKHWLF
LGHD· 47  (PHUVRQ·VZRUNRIPRXUQLQJLVDZRUNRIDUWEHFDXVHKLVDSSHDOLVWR grief as 
the expression of the unworking of grief, as its radical disjunction from its object in 
:DOGR·VGHDWK7KXVDUHDGLQJRIWKHHVVD\DVDZRUNRIDUWLVHQWLUHO\FRQVRQDQWZLWK
the Kantian problematic of reason and the understanding.  Reason will HYRNH¶LGHDV·E\
crossing the boundaries of sense, reason will not answer to the understanding, and nor 
will the work of art, which is here also a work of mourning.  This represents the very 
failure of philosophy given the limitations placed on it by Kant.  (This is why in the early 
URPDQWLFPDQLIHVWRWKHDQRQ\PRXV¶(DUOLHVW6\VWHPV3URJUDPPH·>F@¶WKHKLJKHVW
                                                 
47 6HHWKHGLVFXVVLRQRI0DUFXVH·VDHVWKHWLFVLQ&KDSWHU 
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DFWRIUHDVRQ«LVDQDHVWKHWLFDFW·48  7KHILQLWXGHWKDWLVDWVWDNHWKHQLVQRW:DOGR·V
EXW(PHUVRQ·VZKRZDVDOVRFDOOHG:DOGR+LVUeason is attaching itself to the impos-
sibility of the infinite (its non-identity) through the completion of the fragment, but his 
understanding³his idealist subjectivity³is bounded. 
:DOGRWKHQILJXUHVERWKWKHDEVHQWDUFKēDQGWHORVRIWKHIUDJPHQWRI(Per-
VRQ·VRZQILQLWXGHLWVSODFHLQDQRSHQVHULHVZKLFKFDQEHUHFHLYHGEXWQRWDFFRXQWHG
for.  The empty image of Waldo as an estate is reprised by Emerson, precisely on these 
terms, toward the end of essay, but is shifted into the economy of the gift.  And con-
VLGHUWKHLURQ\WKDWHQYHORSVWKHZRUG¶)RUWXQH· 
 
All I know is reception; I am and I have: but I do not get, and when I 
have fancied I had gotten any thing, I found I did not.  I worship with 
wonder the great Fortune.  My reception has been so large, that I am not 
annoyed by receiving this or that superabundantly.  I say to the Genius, 
if he will pardon the proverb, In for a mill, in for a million.  When I receive 
a new gift, I do not macerate my body to make the account square, for if 
I should die, I could not make the account square.  The benefit overran 
the merit the first day, and has overran the merit ever since.  The merit 
itself, so-called, I reckon part of the receiving. 
(Essays: 250-251) 
 
7KHUH LVQR VLPSOH ¶HTXLYDOHQFH· WR WKHGHDGRU WR Wheir life, and his reception, Cavell 
might say acknowledgement, is the wisdom gained through the ongoing work of mourn-
LQJ :LWKWKLV LQPLQGHYHQ(PHUVRQ·VDVVHUWLRQFLWHGHDUOLHU WKDW ¶1RWKLQJ LV OHIWXV
now but death.  We look to that with grim satisfaction, saying, there at least is reality that 
ZLOOQRWGRGJHXV·PXVWQRWEHWDNHQWRPHDQDOHYHOOLQJRIWKHDFFRXQWEXWUDWKHUDQ
HQGWRKLVSDUWLQWKHGLDORJXHKLVIUDJPHQWDU\UROH¶,DPDIUDJPHQW·KHZULWHV¶DQG
                                                 
48 Though it is often attributed to either or both of Schelling and Hegel.  Translated by Andrew Bowie, 
Aesthetics and Subjectivity from Kant to Nietzsche (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1990), p. 266. 
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WKLVLVDIUDJPHQWRIPH·49 (Essays¶WKLV·GHQRWLQJWKHHVVD\¶([SHUiHQFH·EXWFRn-
noting, that is failing to denote, Waldo. 
 
VI 
 
So, romanticism fails.  Its hubris and naïveté, its over extension of idealism through the 
very working of idealism, is the essence of its failure.  Romanticism is a dialectic without 
V\QWKHVLVDQDUWIRUPZLWKRXWZRUNVRQO\IUDJPHQWV)RU%ODQFKRW¶WKLVLVEHFDXVHLWLV
essentially what begins and what cannot but finish badly: an end that is called suicide, 
PDGQHVVORVVIRUJHWWLQJ·IC: 352-3).  The burden of its idealism, the objectivity of sub-
jectivity, falls short of the disclosure of the world³the very attempt, through art, is seen 
to be naïve.  The transparent eyeball gives a finite horizon, which cannot illuminate 
death and cannot locate an origin.  This sounds dissatisfying, disappointing, as if we are 
EDFNZKHUHZHEHJDQRQDVWHSLQWKHPLGGOHRI¶DVHULHVRIZKLFKZHGRQRWNQRZWKH
H[WUHPHV DQG EHOLHYH WKDW LW KDV QRQH·  $V LI WKH /HWKH (PHUVRQ VD\V LV JLYHQ XV WR
drink on entry into the world was a kind of poison.  But it seems pertinent to recall here 
WKHOHVVRQRI%RUJHVVWRU\¶)XQHVWKH0HPRULXV·WKDWH[WUDRUGLQDU\DQGWUDJLFSDURG\RI
Proustian memory.  Lethe relieves our subjectivity of the burden of absolute objectivity, 
the limitations it places on knowledge are what allows knowledge to come into being 
DQGIRUWKHUHWREHDQ\NLQGRIZRUOGDWDOO,WVKRXOGDOVRUHFDOO(PHUVRQ·VZRUGVRQ
the Plenum that is the universe, its oneness: if our subjectivity were infinite, were not of a 
                                                 
49 &I%ODQFKRW·VFLWDWLRQRI6FKOHJHO¶:KHQZLWKJUHDWIUDQNQHVVKHZULWHV¶I can conceive for my personality no 
other pattern than a system of fragments, because I myself am something of this sort; no style is as natural to me and as easy 
as that of the fragment·KHGHFODUHVWKDWKLVGLVFRXUVHZLOOQRWEHDGLV-course, but a reflection of his own dis-
corGDQFH·IC: 359). 
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different degree to it, it would be opaque; it would be the universe.  So romantic failure, its 
fragmentation, is something of a blessing.  From it comes the possibility of creativity, in 
fact, of possibility itself. 
 Fragmentary romanticism entails what Blanchot calls an unworking (désoeuvre-
ment) at the heart of itself, the constant brushing up against its internal and external lim-
LWV  7KLV LV LQ IDFW LWV VWUHQJWK QRW LWV ZHDNQHVV DQG ¶URPDQWLFLVP KDV WKH NHHQHVW
knowledge of the narrow margin iQZKLFKLWFDQDIILUPLWVHOI·IC: 356) within an ongo-
ing, open-ended, clearly naïve dialogue with what is not itself.  Critchley sums this up 
when he writes: 
 
The fact that romanticism does not work, rather than being a proof of 
weakness, will be interpreted instead as a sign of its strength.  Its very 
ZHDNQHVVLVLWVVWUHQJWK«6XFKDURPDQWLFLVPZLOOVWLOOEHQDwYHEXWLW
will be rooted in self-conscious naïveté.  That is, an acute awareness of 
failure and the limitedness of thought. 
(VLAN: 98) 
 
For CrLWFKOH\ZKRVHVWUHVV LVDOVRRQ LQHOXFWDEOH ILQLWXGH URPDQWLFLVP·VSRZHU LV WKDW
EHFDXVHRILWVIDLOXUHWR¶DEVROXWLVH·LWVREMHFWLWVIDLOXUHWRZRUNLWVHOILWDOZD\VOHDYHVLW
open for reworking, for a novel interpretation³for it to be otherwise.  So ¶ZKHUHZH
ILQGRXUVHOYHV·WRDQVZHU(PHUVRQ·VTXHVWLRQLVLQWKHPLGGOHRIDGLDORJXHRIZKLFK
we do not know the extremes, but can only bear the responsibility for our fragment.  
Which returns me to the point I made earlier about the location of romanticism, in the 
mid-world, the no-SODFHRI XWRSLD &DYHOO·V VNHSWLFLVP  5RPDQWLFLVP LV WKH QR-place 
named by utopia, the possibility of possibility, of otherness, of non-identity, of the new, 
of the imagination, of the aesthetic, of Eros³it has been called many things, often in 
the name of political hope.  But utopia has, for me, no physical space just as I cannot 
locate romanticism in New England or America, or Europe but only in a dialogue be-
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tween them, of which they are fragments (monologues).  This, then, is what Emerson 
PLJKWPHDQE\ ¶WKLVQHZ\HWXQDSSURDFKDEOH$PHULFD· WKDWKHKDV ¶IRXQGLQWKHZHVW·
(EssaysWKHLPSRVVLEOHUHFHGLQJREMHFWRISKLORVRSKLFDOKRSHDQGRIURPDQWLFLVP·V
deepest naïveté. 
 That I should want to see this as a location worthy of inheritance by Brown and 
0DUFXVHPD\VHHPRGG%XWWKHLUQDwYHWpLVURPDQWLFLVP·VQDwYHWpWKHLUIDLOXUHURPDn-
WLFLVP·VIDLOXUHDQGWKHLUVXFFHVVLVURPDQWLFLVP·VSRVVLELOLW\LWVFRQWLQXLW\7KLVLVQRW
to say that romanticism tries to fail.  Quite the contrary, it is rather that it plays with its 
own failure to meet its claims because these claims are the impossible other to the way 
the world is³thus the structure of hope in the midst of despair.  Romanticism necessar-
ily oversteps itself, whiFKLVZK\&DYHOOVD\VWKDW¶IRUHDFKRQHZKRZDQWVWREHDUoman-
WLFWKHUHLVVRPHRQHHOVHZKRZLVKHVKLPWRRXWJURZLW·QO: 44).  My reading of Mar-
cuse and Brown will turn on this open-HQGHGQHVVRIURPDQWLFSKLORVRSK\·VEHTXHVW LQ
crucial ways: the centUDOLW\RI.DQW·VILQLWHVXEMHFWDQGKRZWKLVRSHQVXSDFUHDWLYHVXb-
jectivity of the imagination; indeterminacy and essential incompletion; responsibility as a 
praxis both in reading and in writing; authority and autonomy of artworks; formal ex-
perimentation (the fragment); the everyday; and finally, the space opened up by romanti-
cism in which all these are located: the in between of poiesis, of creation, that may or may 
not be named America. 
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³³Chapter Two³³ 
The Dialectics of Eros: Life Against Death and 
Eros and Civilization 
 
3HUKDSVWKHPRVWUHPDUNDEOHWKLQJDERXW)UHXG·VDQDO\WLFDOO\SHVVLPLVWLFHVVD\ ¶%H\RQG
the Pleasure-SULQFLSOH·LVWKDWLWKDVJLYHQULVHWRVXFKDGLVWLQFWLYHERG\RIXWo-
pian speculation.  In situating the origin of neurosis in the very instinctual biology of 
humanity³the ambivalent struggle between life and death³)UHXG·V PHWDSV\FKRORJ\
displaced psychoanalysis from a method of cure to one of mere damage limitation and 
adjustment.  A pessimistic shift that ultimately lead to a widespread rejection of, or bland 
OLS VHUYLFH WR KLV UHYROXWLRQDU\ WKHRULHV E\ WKH QRUPDWLYH VFKRROV RI ¶HJR-SV\FKRORJ\·
DQG¶QHR-)UHXGLDQLVP·.DUHQ+RUQH\DQG(ULFK)URPPIRUH[DPSOHUHMHFWHGELRORJ\
in favour of an aetiology of social conditions; and even the otherwise revolutionary ex-
WUHPLVW:LOKHOP5HLFKZDVJUDWHIXOWKDWKHKDGUHFHLYHG¶SHUPLVVLRQ·IURP)UHXGWRGLs-
count his instinct theory.  Reich, unusually, is typical here.  His Freudian reading of Marx 
and Engels recognised the oedipal structure of family life as the beginning of both sexual 
repression and authoritarianism³for Reich the family was a potential fascist state in 
miniature.1  Thus, it was always the social, based on the pattern of the authoritarian fam-
ily, which created the destructive impulse in humanity.  It was imposed as a secondary 
process through Oedipal tensions and sexual repression (psycho- and actual-neuroses 
respectively)³it was never primary or instinctual.  The ideas brought to psychoanalysis 
E\ )UHXG·V ¶VSHFXODWLYH· 7KDQDWRV OHIW WKH DQDO\WLF FRPPXQLW\ ¶ILJKWLQJ· XQEHDWDEOH Ln-
stincts rather than material social causes.  For Reich this was simply a return to meta-
SK\VLFVLWVHHPHGWRVWDQG+HJHOEDFNRQKLV¶KHDG·DQGGLVSODFHDOORI0DU[·VDFKLHYe-
                                                 
1 See The Mass Psychology of Fascism, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983, pp. 104-114 and passim. 
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ments.2  He went so far as to see Freud to ask whether the death instinct was vital to 
FOLQLFDOWKHRU\¶,WZDV´PHUHO\DK\SRWKHVLVµ>)UHXG@VDLG,WFRXOGMXVWDVZHOOEHRPLt-
WHG·3  +RZHYHU5HLFK·VFDVXDOHOLVLRQEHWZHHQKLPVHOIDQG)UHXGLQWKRVHWZRVHQWHQFHV
is perhapVPLVOHDGLQJ1HYHUWKHOHVV)UHXG·VZDLYHUJDYH5HLFKWKHVHOI-confidence³the 
approval of the Father³to proceed with his research outside of the metapsychological 
instinct paradigm.  Destructiveness, he could then conclude, is not a matter of instincts 
beFDXVH¶the destructiveness bound in the character is nothing but the rage the person feels, owing to his 
frustration in life and his lack of sexual gratification·FO5HLFK·VHPSKDVLV 
 ,Q DGGLWLRQ WR 0DUFXVH DQG %URZQ D ZHOFRPH WR )UHXG·V LQVWLQFW theory was 
given by the utopian theorist and educationalist Paul Goodman.  He criticised Horney 
and Fromm for dismissing the instincts and accused Reich of being naïve and Rousseau-
vian.  As Richard King observes: 
 
*RRGPDQ«ZDVQRW ¶DVVHUWLQJ WKDW WKH OLEHUation of instincts will of itself 
SURGXFHDKHDYHQRQHDUWK«%XW«WKHUHSUHVVLRQRIWKHLQVWLQFWVPDNHV
JRRGLQVWLWXWLRQVXQDWWDLQDEOH·,QRWKHUZRUGVLQVWLQFWXDOOLEHUDWLRQZDVD
necessary though not sufficient condition for a new society.4 
 
This was the dichotomy that Brown and Marcuse inherited: either an outright rejection 
RI)UHXG·VVSHFXODWLRQRUDTXDOLILHGDFFHSWDQFHRI LWV UROH +RZHYHUQHLWKHURI WKHP
deals with either Reich or Goodman, and they dismiss neo-Freudianism out of hand5 as 
                                                 
2 7KHPHWDSK\VLFDOEDVLVRIKLVRZQ¶VFLHQWLILF·ZRUNZDVQRWVRPHWKLQJKHGZHOWRQ 
3 Wilhelm Reich (trans. V. R. Carfagno), The Function of the Orgasm (London: Souvenir, 1983), p. 128.  Here-
after referred to as FO in the text. 
4 Richard H. King, The Party of Eros: Radical Thought and the Realm of Freedom (New York: Delta, 1973), p. 85.  
.LQJ·VERRNSURYLGHVDJRRGFULWLFDODFFRXQWRIWKHUHODWLRQVKLSEHWZHHQMarcuse and Brown and Freud 
which is a useful adjunct to the philosophical dimension I pursue in this chapter.  See pp. 116-172. 
5 Marcuse does provide a fairly extensive critique of neo-Freudianism in an epilogue to his Eros and Civili-
zation: A Philosophical Inquiry into Freud (London: Routledge, 1998), pp. 238-274.  Hereafter referred to as 
EC in the text. 
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a timorous and conventional reading of psychoanalysis appropriate to the trend of con-
servatism and conformity in post-war American social thought. 
In this chapter I am not going to pursue these therapeutic readings of Freud; 
rather, having articulated in the last chapter how I see utopian spaces emerging from 
romantic dissatisfaction, I want to show how Herbert Marcuse and Norman O. Brown 
occupy this speculative no-place, through readings of Freud and of idealist philosophy.  
In section one, I shall present the case for my reading of utopia in this context, and then, 
LQ VHFWLRQ WZR H[DPLQH)UHXG·V PHWDSV\FKRORJ\  , VKDOO VSHQG WKH QH[W WZR VHFWLRQV
developing the way Marcuse and Brown respectively try to re-UHDG )UHXG·V LQVWLQFWXDO
dualism through Hegel, as a dialectic of desire (Eros).  In the last section, I shall critically 
appraise what this means in terms of their deliberate rethinking of narcissism. 
 
I 
 
My strategic diminishment of utopia to a dialogue between philosophy and place³in 
this context between European philosophy and America as a romantic location³is both 
DSSURSULDWHDQG LQDSSURSULDWH WR+HUEHUW0DUFXVH·VEros and Civilization: A Philosophical 
Inquiry into Freud DQG1RUPDQ2%URZQ·VLife Against Death: The Psychoanalytical 
Meaning of History (1959).  It is appropriate because the cultural origins of both Marcuse 
and Brown are European.  Marcuse absorbed the very best from a German philosophi-
cal education, eventually studying for his Habilitation under Martin Heidegger at Freiburg 
im Breisgau from 1928-1932.  The difficult work he produced in these years, +HJHO·V2n-
tology and the Theory of Historicity, published in 1932, went un-submitted: the political cli-
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mate was no longer appropriate for a Jewish academic.6  However, it remains an impor-
tant touchstone for his subsequent development.  Eventually Marcuse made his way to 
America with the relocation of the Frankfurt School to Columbia.7  He remained there 
in various universities for most of the next fifty years.  Brown, though born in Mexico, 
was educated in England, and studied classical philology and history at Oxford.  In 1936, 
he came to America to do his graduate work at Wisconsin.8  His first book was a socio-
logical interpretation of the Hermes myth, Hermes the Thief: The Evolution of a Myth (1947), 
IROORZHGE\DWUDQVODWLRQRI+HVLRG·VTheogony (1953).  These works gave little clue, aside 
IURP¶KHrPHWLFLVP·WRZKDWZDVWRFRPH 
Here there is a clear process of the translation of European philosophy and cul-
WXUHWRDQHZ¶VSDFH·³a no-space or not-yet-space.  That which had happened for Em-
erson a century earlier occurred in the inter-war years with Brown and Marcuse.  How-
ever, this is why my reading of utopia is inappropriate, because it restricts it to a kind of 
abstraction.  There is no process of concrete realization, the no-place does not become 
some-place, say America³LWUHPDLQVKHOGLQDEH\DQFH¶LQWKHRU\·LQERWKWKHHYHU\GD\
                                                 
6 Herbert Marcuse (trans. Seyla Benhabib), +HJHO·V 2QWRORJ\ DQG WKH 7KHRU\ RI +LVWRULFLW\ (Cambridge, Mass: 
MIT Press, 1987).  Hereafter referred to in the text as HO.  Benhabib comments on the fate of the disser-
tation on pp. ix-[RIKHU ¶7UDQVODWRU·V ,QWURGXFWLRQ· 7KRXJK ,KDYHGUDZQH[WHQVLYHO\RQ WKLVZRUN LQ
writing this chapter, due to its technical density I have been reluctant to cite from it; in preference I shall 
merely point to parallels and supporting remarks in footnotes.  Much of the work is itself paralleled in 
0DUFXVH·VPXFKPRUHDFFHVVLEOHERRNReason and Revolution: Hegel and the Rise of Social Theory (Human-
ity Press: Amherst, 1999; hereafter referred to as RR in the text), so I have quoted from this source in-
VWHDG)RUDQLQWHOOLJHQWUHDGLQJRI0DUFXVH·VUHODWLRQVKLSWR+HLGHJJHUDQG+HJHODQGRIHO to RR see 
5REHUW % 3LSSLQ ¶0DUFXVH RQ +HJHO DQG +LVWRULFLW\· The Philosophical Forum (Vol. XVI, No. 3, Spring 
1985), pp. 180- +HUHDIWHUUHIHUUHGWRDV0++LQ WKHWH[W 3LSSLQDUJXHVWKDW0DUFXVH·VUHDGLQJRI
+HJHO LVKHWHURGR[EXWQRWRXWRINHHSLQJZLWKWUHQGV LQ+HJHO·VWKRXJKW0++ 6HHDOVR0Dr-
FXVH·VHDUO\DrtLFOH¶&RQWULEXWLRQVWRD3KHQRPHQRORJ\RI0DU[LVP·Telos (Vol. 4., Fall 1969), pp. 3-
DOVR3DXO3LFFRQHDQG$OH[DQGHU'HOILQL¶+HUEHUW0DUFXVH·V+HLGHJJHULDQ0DU[LVP·Telos (Vol. 6, Fall 
1970), pp. 36-DQG3DXO3LFFRQH¶3KHQRPHQRORJLFDO0DU[LVP·Telos (Vol. 9, Spring 1971), pp. 3-31. 
7 )RUPRUHRQ0DUFXVH·VELRJUDSK\VHH%DUU\.ĆW]Herbert Marcuse and the Art of Liberation (London: Ver-
son, 1982).  For his early years in America see pp. 111-139. 
8 There is very little biographical information on Brown.  See the interview in Sam Keen ed.Voices and Vi-
sions (New York: Harper and Row, 1974), pp. 25-41, hereafter referred to as VV in the text, and the two 
ODWH SLHFHV FROOHFWHG LQ%URZQ·V Apocalypse and/or Metamorphosis (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
¶5HYLVLRQLQJ+LVWRULFDO,GHQWLWLHV·SS-DQG¶'LRQ\VXVLQ·SS-200. 
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and the technical senses of that phrase.  America as a concrete historical location is 
largely wiped out.9  In the 1960s, when Marcuse develops a more committed relationship 
to America, it is not immediately related to what was going on in Eros and Civilization; 
indeed, his political stance disavows much of what goes on in that book.  And Brown, 
moving in the opposite direction, will go so far as to write his fragmentary work, /RYH·V
Body (1966), in order to distance himself from any involvement with the youth move-
ments of that decade.10 
At least two things need to be taken into consideration if we are to take their 
speculative, occasionally troubling, books seriously.  Firstly, that in the European tradi-
tion, as Marcuse makes clear, theory precedes and dominates practice.  In his first major 
work in English, Reason and Revolution: Hegel and the Rise of Social Theory (1941), he writes: 
¶,Q*HUPDQ\LGHDOLVWLFSKLORVRSK\FKDPSLRQHGWKHULJKWRIWKHRU\WRJXLGHSUDFWLFH«
The subsequent development of European thought cannot be understood apart from its 
LGHDOLVWRULJLQV·RR: 102).  There is no doubt that Marcuse understands both Marxism 
and psychoanalysis as belonging to this trend in European thought and his Hegelianism 
in particular is something that will be borne out in this and subsequent chapters.  In-
deed, I would go so far as to say that when Marcuse speaks of Freud in Eros and Civiliza-
tion, it is not a Cold War cipher for Marx, as has been implied,11 but actually means 
+HJHO 2Q WKLVSRLQW DW OHDVW ,PXVW DJUHHZLWK3KLOLS5LHII·V JHQHUDOL]DWLRQ WKDW ¶1R
                                                 
9 ,UHWXUQWRWKLV¶LGHD·RI$PHULFDLQWKH&RQFOXVLRQ 
10 Indeed, it is fascinating to read in VV the way Brown distances himself from the counter-culture (33), 
from drugs (35) and from the gushing personality of the interviewer in particular. 
11 For example: Theodore Roszak, The Making of a Counter-Culture (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
 5RV]DN·VHVVD\¶7KH'LDOHFWLFVRI/LEHUDWLRQ+HUEHUW0DUFXVHDQG1RUPDQ%URZQ·SS-123) 
on Marcuse and Brown is limited most of all by his attention to Marxism.  Indeed, it becomes an essay on 
Marx rather than on Marcuse and Brown.  See also, Paul Robinson, The Freudian Left: Wilhelm Reich, Geza 
Roheim and Herbert Marcuse (Ithica: Cornell University Press, 1990).  Hereafter referred to as FL in the text.  
7KRXJK5RELQVRQLVVHQVLWLYHWR0DUFXVH·V+HJHOLDQLVPDQGWKHWUDMHFWRU\RILWLQKLVODWHUZRUNKHVWLOO
attributes Eros and Civilization to Marxism (p. 201). 
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German ever escapes Hegel; a German Marxist is suspect of saying Marx when he 
PHDQV +HJHO·12 adding only that when Marcuse speaks of Marx or Freud he is really 
VSHDNLQJRI+HJHO /RRNLQJDW0DUFXVH·V WUDMHFWRU\ LW LVDSSDUHQW WKDWKLV WRXFKVWRQH
remains Classical German philosophy, and that he uses whatever discipline is modish to 
express that position.  In the late 1920s, it is phenomenology; in the 1930s, after the re-
GLVFRYHU\ RI WKH ¶ 0DQXVFULSWV· LW LV 0DU[ DQG LQ WKH V ZLWK WKH IDLOXUH RI
Marxism to posit the revolutionary subject, it is psychoanalysis.  They are his ciphers for 
an unfashionable mode of thought as well as the corollary of his omnivorous, though as 
will be shown, ultimately negative, dialectics. 
7KHVHFRQGFRQVLGHUDWLRQLVWKDWQHLWKHU0DUFXVHQRU%URZQZDQWHGWREH¶ULJKW·
in any conventionally accepted sense of the term.  In the preface to Life Against Death, 
Brown quite clearly states: 
 
(FFHQWULFLW\LVXQOLNHO\WREH¶ULJKW·EXWQHLWKHULVWKLVERRNWU\LQJWREH
¶ULJKW·  ,W LV WU\LQJPHUHO\ WR LQWURGXFHVRPHQHZSRVVLELOLWLHVDQd new 
problems into the public consciousness.  Hence the style of the book: 
paradox is not diluted with the rhetoric of sober qualification.  I have not 
KHVLWDWHG WR SXUVXH QHZ LGHDV WR WKHLU XOWLPDWH ¶PDG· FRQVHTXHQFHV
knowing that Freud too seemed mad.13 
 
Brown is, of course, disingenuous here.  There is, to the modern eye at least, and despite 
his preference for conclusion over argument, a substantial amount of sober qualification 
in Life Against Death, which proceeds in always tolerable, occasionally brilliant, academic 
SURVHLWVDUJXPHQWVVXSSRUWHGZKHUHQHFHVVDU\7KLVLVQRWWRVD\WKDW%URZQ·VFRQFOu-
VLRQVDUHQRWH[WUHPHDQGRIWHQSDUDGR[LFDODVZHVKDOOVHH0DUFXVH·VZRUNLVHTXDOO\
                                                 
12 Philip Rieff, The Triumph of the Therapeutic: Uses of Faith After Freud (London: Chatto and Windus, 1966), p. 
153. 
13 Norman O. Brown, Life Against Death: The Psychoanalytical Meaning of History ,2nd edn., (Hanover and Lon-
don: Wesleyan University Press, 1985), p. xx.  Hereafter referred to as LAD in the text.  
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determined not to conform³he insists that the very process of philosophy is non-
conformity.  In Reason and Revolution ¶WKHVWUXJJOHDJDLQVWFRPPRQVHQVHLVWKHEHJLQQLQJ
RI VSHFXODWLYH WKLQNLQJ DQG WKH ORVV RI HYHU\GD\ VHFXULW\ LV WKH RULJLQ RI SKLORVRSK\·
(RRDQG¶.QRZOHGJHEHJLQVZKHQSKLORVRSK\GHVWUR\VWKH H[SHULHQFHRIGDLO\OLIH·
(RR: 103); but, of course, without leaving the everyday behind.  (Both of these ideas are 
familiar from the preceding reading of Emerson and may be considered romantic 
tropes.)  What arises from this is that the hopes of Marcuse DQG%URZQ WKH ¶KRSHVRI
KXPDQLW\ >WKDW@ VWDQGDJDLQVW WKHSUHYDLOLQJ UHDOLW\SULQFLSOH· EC DQG ¶KRSLQJDOO
WKLQJVDFFRUGLQJWR6W3DXO·LAD: 84)) are not attached to any gradual reform of extant 
society, but on the dream of an epochal or eschatological revolution in sensibility.  Nev-
ertheless, as good Freudians, they both know that dreams are very real. 
,W LV WKH OLPLWHG UHDFK RI WKH ZRUG ¶KRSH· KRZHYHU UDWKHU WKDQ ¶GUHDP· WKDW
firmly locates them within my restricted sense of utopia.  That is, a place of thought 
rather than of action.  There was, certainly at the time of writing their books in the 
V OLWWOHEXWKRSHIRUVXFK LGHDV 7KH OHIWKDGZDQHGVLQFH:DOODFH·VFDPSDLJQ LQ
1948, exacerbated by the subsequent paranoia of the Red Scares.  Though the intensity 
of the cold war might have diminished by the time the books were published, they were 
nevertheless composed in a difficult decade.  As Joel Whitebook has observed, the tim-
ing of Eros and Civilization, and by extension Life Against Death¶LVRQHRIWKHLQVWDQFHVRI
WKHQRWXQFRPPRQFRQQHFWLRQEHWZHHQXWRSLDQVSHFXODWLRQDQGSROLWLFDOGHVSDLU·14  In-
deed, it says something about the speculative integrity of these works that the darker the 
issues investigated, right down to the primal urge to die, the more they see it as a nega-
                                                 
14 Joel Whitebook, Perversion and Utopia: A Study in Psychoanalysis and Critical Theory, (Cambridge MA: MIT 
Press, 1996), p. 24-25.  Hereafter referred to as PU in the text. 
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tion of contemporary existential conditions³and thus as an affirmation of what could 
EH¶1DWXUH³RUKLVWRU\·ZULWHV%URZQLQWHUPV,ZLOOH[SORUHLQGHWDLO¶LVQRWVHWWLQJXV
a goal without endowing us with the eTXLSPHQW WR UHDFK LW· LAD: 36), and Marcuse 
FRQFXUV ¶QHJDWLYLW\«UHPDLQV WKH VRXUFH DQG WKH PRWLYH SRZHU RI WKH >GLDOHFWLFDO@
PRYHPHQW(YHU\IDLOXUHDQGVHWEDFN«SRVVHVVHVLWVSURSHUJRRGDQGLWVSURSHUWUXWK
(YHU\FRQIOLFW LPSOLHV LWVRZQVROXWLRQ· RR: 92-93).  In this, they recall an important 
IUDJPHQW IURP)ULHGULFK+|OGHUOLQ·V ¶3DWPRV· F  OLQHV IRUZKLFK+HLGHJJHUHx-
SUHVVHVJUHDWIRQGQHVV¶%XWZKHUHWKHGDQJHUWKUHDWHQV7KDWZKLFKVDYHVIURPLWDOVR
JURZV·15  The influence of the romantic idea that utopia emerges from dissatisfaction, 
that hope is intimate with despair, is preserved in the writings of Marcuse and Brown. 
In many respects, then, Eros and Civilization and Life Against Death share parallel 
means and ends.  Paramount amongst these is the positioning of psychoanalysis as the 
keystone to modern thought: it can gather and support intellectual pursuits divided by 
the disciplinary practices of the contemporary university; it can mediate between the so-
cial and the individual; and it has, ultimately, located the missing source of happiness in 
civilization.  This bringing together of the micro and the macro, the political and the 
psychological, the poetic and the philosophical, the soul and the body, occurs to a 
greater or lesser extent LQERWKWKHLUSUHIDFHV0DUFXVHZULWHV¶7KLVHVVD\HPSOR\VSVy-
FKRORJLFDOFDWHJRULHVEHFDXVHWKH\KDYHEHFRPHSROLWLFDOFDWHJRULHV·DQG¶3V\FKRORJLFDO
problems therefore turn into political problems: private disorder reflects more directly 
than before the disorder of the whole, and the cure of personal disorder depends more 
GLUHFWO\ WKDQ EHIRUH RQ WKH FXUH RI WKH JHQHUDO GLVRUGHU· EC: xi).  Brown recognises 
                                                 
15 Friedrich Hölderlin (trans. Michael Hamburger), Poems and Fragments (London: Anvil, 1994), pp. 483, 
499. 
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¶SV\FKRDQDO\VLV DV WKH PLVVLQJ OLQN EHWZHHQ D YDULHW\ RI PRYHPHQWV LQ PRGHUQ
thought³in poetry, in politics, in philosophy³all of them profoundly critical of the 
inhuman character of modern civilization, all of them unwilling to abandon hope of bet-
WHUWKLQJV·LAD[[,QWKLVWKH\FRQILUPWKHLUFRQWHPSRUDU\SHHU3KLOLS5LHII·VSRLQW
that the true analyst is not a doctor but an interpreter of culture: 
 
)UHXG·VSK\VLFLDQZDVWREHDVWXGHQWRIKLVWRU\UHOLJLRQDQGWKHDUWV6Xb-
jects having no connection with medicine, and which never enter the physi-
FLDQ·VSUDFWLFHVXFKDV¶KLVWRU\RIFLYLOL]DWLRQ mythology, the psychology of 
UHOLJLRQDQGOLWHUDWXUH·ZHUHWREHVWRUHKRXVHVIURPZKLFKWKHSV\FKRDQDO\VW
could borrow select pieces of truth in defining symptoms.  The first and perma-
nent Freudian task was not empirical research but interpretative rearrangement of the in-
tricate jumble of data accumulated by the cultural sciences. (Emphasis added)16 
 
As Rieff observes, Freud did not want analysts necessarily to be MDs, a point on which 
the Psychoanalytic Association vetoed him.  For Rieff, as for Brown and Marcuse, psy-
choanalysis is primarily a cultural hermeneutic.  Also, for these three figures Freud is a 
negative or critical spirit, someone whose thought stands against the prevailing idea of 
reality even whilst explaining it.  Even so, as a parallel contribution to the understanding 
RI)UHXGLQ$PHULFD5LHII·VFreud: The Mind of the Moralist (1960) stands opposed to the 
radical interpretations of psychoanalysis by Brown and Marcuse on many points. 
 For example, Rieff does not believe in the continued significance of the roman-
tic dialectic of hope and despair that is at the very core of their utopianism.  Though he 
is well aware of the romantic heritage of psychoanalysis, his own reading aims rather at 
H[SODLQLQJWKHFRQWHPSRUDU\QLKLOLVPRI¶SV\FKRORJLFDOPDQ·ZKRKDVV\PSWRPVUDWKHU
than beliefs.  It is apparent that Rieff here follows the Nietzschean edict that philosophy 
                                                 
16 Philip Rieff, Freud, the Mind of a Moralist (London: Victor Gollancz, 1960), p. 301.  Hereafter referred to 
as FMM in the text. 
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should become psychology.17  Thus, Rieff refuses to find in Freud the consolations pro-
vided by religion and philosophy³which are at thHFRUHRI%URZQ·VUHDGLQJDQGDWWHn-
GDQWXSRQ0DUFXVH·VUHYROXWLRQDU\+HJHOLDQLVP+HLVGHWHUPLQHGUDWKHUWRSUREHWKH
FRQGLWLRQVRIQLKLOLW\QRW WR VHHN LWVRYHUFRPLQJ  ,Q WKLVKH LV WKH ¶REMHFWLYH· WKRXJK
undoubtedly Nietzschean) sociologist.  Nevertheless, there is in his reading of Freud as 
an un-programmatic moralist, the cold comfort³a kind of consolation³for the loss of 
faith in modernity, for the dissipation of cohesive cultural forms, for the death of god 
and for the end of the family: the knoZOHGJHWKDWRXU¶GDUNQHVV·LVLQHYLWDEOH$OVREe-
FDXVH5LHII·V)UHXG LV WKHFXOWXUDOFRQVHUYDWLYHQRW WKH LQVWLQFWXDO UDGLFDOKH IROORZVD
Hobbesian trend in opposition to the substantively Rousseauvian path of Brown and 
0DUFXVH  $V VXFK 5LHII·V WKRXJKt does not turn dissatisfaction into hope but merely 
into toleration (though not apathy).  Even so, as I shall show below, Rieff, like Lionel 
Trilling before him, retains the touch of romanticism in his reading of Freud, a peculiarly 
American romanticism, perhaps, in the autonomy of the instincts. 
The line taken in Eros and Civilization and Life Against Death, where the mythical 
and philosophical aspects of Freud are worked through to their radical conclusions, sug-
JHVWV WKDW WKRXJK)UHXG·V LQVWLQFW WKHRU\Pay not cohere within the clinical positivism 
his metapsychology strove to pioneer, it does cohere within a metaphysical tradition in-
herited from classical German philosophy and romanticism.  It is only with this difficult 
and often precarious reading of Freud as a philosopher and a reading of philosophy 
through Freud, that Brown and Marcuse can come to many of their conclusions.  They 
take psychoanalysis as a moment in the European philosophical tradition, which, unlike 
                                                 
17 The direction of this thesis is the opposite: to address the philosophical and romantic origins of psy-
chology, here psychoanalysis. 
 
 71 
science, always moves both forwards and backwards.  That this does a violence to Freud 
the therapist is indubitable, but that revealing the metaphysical nature of his metapsy-
chology is exciting and important is also indubitable.  Thus, despite risk and paradox, 
these two books strive to unearWK )UHXG·V SKLORVRSKLFDO DQG P\WKLF VXEVWUXFWXUHV³
%URZQ FDOOV LW ¶WKH XQFRQVFLRXV FRQQHFWLRQ EHWZHHQ SV\FKRDQDO\VLV DQG WKH URPDQWLF
PRYHPHQW·LAD: 86)³and to bring Freud back from the pessimistic brink, that is, to 
find the saving power at the heart of his despair. 
This gives us the two dominant ways in which Freud is read by both Marcuse 
and Brown, though with different results.  The first way is to read him with Hegel, to 
EULQJWKHSKLORVRSKHU·VGLDOHFWLFRIKLVWRU\WREHDURQ)UHXG·VLQVLJKWVZKLOHWKe second 
way is to draw out the mythico-SRHWLFDOIRXQGDWLRQRI)UHXG·VWKRXJKWRSHQLQJLWXSWR
romanticism.18  Of course, reading Freud with Hegel was en vogue in the mid twentieth-
century.  Roughly simultaneous with their work is that of Jacques Lacan under the influ-
ence of Kojève, and in the 1960s, Paul Ricoeur publishes Freud and Philosophy: An Essay 
on Interpretation,19 explicitly engaging with Marcuse.  These writers concur that Freud is an 
appropriate vehicle for philosophical speculation and that FreXGLVDOUHDG\ ¶GRLQJ·SKi-
ORVRSK\0DUFXVHZULWHV¶,QLWVPRVWDGYDQFHGSRVLWLRQV)UHXG·VWKHRU\SDUWDNHVRI>D@
SKLORVRSKLFDOG\QDPLF·ECDQG5LFRHXUDUJXHVWKDW ¶)UHXG·VHQWLUHZRUN³both 
the metapsychology and the theory of culture³takes on a very definite philosophical 
WRQH·FP: 442).  It is his curious position between rationalism and romanticism that, in 
:KLWHERRN·V ZRUGV ¶VRXJKW WR GR MXVWLFH WR WKH 2WKHU RI UHDVRQ· PU: 8) that gives 
                                                 
18 This latter way is dealt with at length in the next chapter. 
19 Paul Ricoeur (trans. Denis Savage), Freud and Philosophy: An Essay on Interpretation (New Haven: Yale Uni-
versity Press, 1977).  Hereafter referred to as FP in the text.  Given as lectures in 1961 and published in 
English translation in 1970.  I will be drawing on Ricoeur later in this chapter. 
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Freud his philosophical flavour.  It is the middle ground between rationalism and ro-
manticism occupied by much of his more speculative work that ally him, unwittingly, to 
utopian readings. 
 
II 
 
Freud is quite clear in Beyond the Pleasure Principle WKDW¶:KDWIROORZVLVVSHFXODWLRQRIWHQ
far-fetched speculatiRQ·20 DQG5LFRHXUUHPLQGVXVWKDW¶WKHUHLVDQH[FHVVRIK\SRWKHVLV
FRPSDUHG ZLWK >WKH HVVD\·V@ IUDJPHQWDU\ DQG SDUWLDO YHULILFDWLRQV· FP: 282).  Freud is 
following hunches and intuition, flights of fancy into Greek myths and ancient philoso-
phies.  Despite the lengthy discourse on the repetition compulsion as seen in migrating 
animals, and the scientific evidence used to back it up, the essay retains the evocative 
presence of myth.  Perhaps it is the universal and foundational claims made by his drive 
theory and the Greek names attached to them, Eros and Thanatos.  Perhaps it is also the 
UHWXUQRIIDWHDQGQHFHVVLW\$QDQNēWRDGLVFRXUVHWKDWKDVVFLHQWLILFSUHWHQVLRQV21  In-
GHHGDV)UHXGVD\V LQKLVFRUUHVSRQGHQFHZLWK$OEHUW(LQVWHLQ LQ ¶%XWGRHVnot 
                                                 
20 Sigmund Freud (trans. and eds. J. Strachey and A. Richards), Beyond the Pleasure Principle, in On Metapsy-
chology: The Theory of Psychoanalysis (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1991.) p. 243.  Hereafter referred to as BPP in 
the text. 
21 But then, maybe there ought to be no surprise in any of this.  For, as Alfred North Whitehead observed 
in his Science and the Modern World  ¶7KHSLOJULPIDWKHUVRIWKHVFLHQWLILFLPDJLQDWLRQDVLWH[LVWVWR-
day are the great tragedians of ancient Athens, Aeschylus, Sophocles, Euripides.  Their vision of fate, re-
morseless and indifferent, urging a tragic incident to its inevitable issue, is the vision possessed by science.  
)DWHLQ*UHHN7UDJHG\EHFRPHVWKHRUGHURIQDWXUHLQPRGHUQWKRXJKW·$OIUHG1RUWK:KLWHKHDGScience 
and the Modern World (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1938), p. 21.  So when any science attempts to pursue 
itself to its own ground, it might well raise the spectre of these pilgrim fathers in whom the idea of deter-
PLQLVPLVLPPDQHQW,QWKLV,ILQGLWQHFHVVDU\WRGLVDJUHHZLWK5LHIIIRUZKRP)UHXG·VVFLHQWLILFP\WKRl-
ogy of fate is not tragic but DPHOLRUDWLYHLHWKHUDSHXWLFDQGLVQRW¶WUDQVFHQGHQW·LHSURWRW\SLFDOEXWLV
SDUWRIWKH¶UHYROWDJDLQVWWUDQVFHQGHQFH·FMM,EHOLHYHWKDW5LHII·VFRQFHUQZLWKWKHFRQWHm-
poraneous in psychoanalysis prevents him from seeing what Freud and Whitehead really mean, that fate 
and tragedy remain the very prototype of deterministic science. 
 73 
HYHU\VFLHQFHFRPH LQ WKHHQG WRDNLQGRIP\WKRORJ\"·22  As further evidence Brown 
FLWHV)UHXG·VSRLQWWKDW¶7KHLQVWLQFWVDUHP\WKLFDOEHLQJVVXSHUELQWKHLULQGHILQLWHQHVV·
DQGWKDW)UHXGJRHVRQWRUHPLQGXVFRQWUDGLFWLQJ5HLFKWKDW¶ZHFDQQRWIor a moment 
RYHUORRNWKHP·LAD: 66-5LFRHXUDOVRLQGLFDWHV¶WKHTXDVL-mythological nature of 
WKLVPHWDELRORJ\· FP: 312).  The instincts then, are mythical, occupying the space be-
tween the known and the unknown, the psychic and the somatic; and as a quest of ori-
JLQV)UHXG·VGULYHWKHRU\EeORQJVLQWKLV¶URPDQWLF·23 no-place. 
 How Freud came to his late theory of instincts, as it is set out in Beyond the Pleas-
ure-principle, The Ego and the Id (1923)24 and Civilization and its Discontents (1930),25 is well 
known.  I shall restrict myself to the barest definitions.  In The Ego and the Id Freud de-
ILQHV(URVDVDQHQHUJ\ WKDW ¶E\EULQJLQJDERXWPRUHDQGPRUH IDU-reaching combina-
tions of the particles into which living substance is dispersed, aims at complicating life 
DQGDWWKHVDPHWLPHRIFRXUVHDWSUHVHUYLQJLW·EI: 381-)UHXGVDZWKLVDVD¶SUe-
VHUYLQJ· LQVWLQFW ZKHUHDV SUHYLRXVO\ (URV KDV EHHQ FRQVLGHUHG DV D IRUFH IRU FKDQJH
The death instinct, or Thanatos (a term Freud rarely used), strives to bring about the 
LPPHGLDWHUHOHDVHRIWHQVLRQWKURXJKGHDWKWKHUHWXUQWRWKHLQRUJDQLF¶$WWKLVSRLQW·
he writes in Beyond the Pleasure Principle: 
 
we cannot escape a suspicion that we may have come upon the track of a 
universal attribute of instincts and perhaps of organic life in general 
which has not hitherto been clearly recognized or at least not explicitly 
stressed.  It seems, then, that an instinct is an urge inherent in organic life to restore 
an earlier state of things which the living entity has been obliged to abandon 
under the pressure of external disturbing forces; that is, it is a kind of or-
                                                 
22 6LJPXQG)UHXGWUDQVDQGHGV-DPHV6WUDFKH\DQG$OEHUW'LFNVRQ¶:K\:DU"/HWWHU)URP)UHXG·LQ
Civilization, Society and Religion (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1991), p. 358. 
23 ,GLVFXVV6FKLOOHU·VWKHRU\RITrieben in the next chapter. 
24 In Sigmund Freud (trans. and eds. J. Strachey and A. Richards), On Metapsychology: The Theory of Psycho-
analysis (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1991) pp. 339-408.  Hereafter referred to a EI in the text. 
25 In Sigmund Freud (trans. and eds. James Strachey and Albert Dickson), Civilization, Society and Religion 
(Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1991), pp. 243-340.  Hereafter referred to as CD in the text. 
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ganic elasticity, or, to put it another way, the expression of the inertia in-
herent in organic life. 
(BPP: 308-)UHXG·VHPSKDVLV 
 
The difficult mDQRHXYUHIRU)UHXG LV WR ORFDWHDGXDOLVP LQ WKH ¶K\SRWKHVLV WKDWDOO Ln-
VWLQFWV WHQG WRZDUG WKH UHVWRUDWLRQRI DQ HDUOLHU VWDWHRI WKLQJV· BPP: 310).  And it is 
ZKDWDOORZV0DUFXVH·VDQG%URZQ·VWKHRULHVWRDSSURSULDWHKLP,ILWLVFRQVHUYDWLYHWR
live, to preserve life, and it is conservative to die, to extinguish life, what, then, differen-
tiates Eros from Thanatos?  This is where a third term enters, because nature, AnDQNē
the necessary external forces of sun and earth, interferes with this simple relaxation of 
organic matter to an inorganic state.  The first organic life, Freud hypothesises, would 
have been so close to its death that its glimmer of life, the tension that arises between it 
and the external world, would have been barely noticeable.  External influences, how-
ever, over time obliged these fleeting existences to diverge ever further from their famil-
iar passage to death.  Thus Eros emerged as the preserver not of life per se, but of a par-
ticular route to death, via an intimate and evolving interaction with nature. 
 This common nature of the instincts is, arguably, a hangover from, or an attempt 
WRUDWLRQDOLVHIXUWKHU)UHXG·VHDUOLHUVHFRQGWKHRU\RILQVWLQFWV, the libinidal monism of 
narcissism.  In fact many thinkers, Marcuse and Whitebook for example, choose this 
SRLQW WKHHVVD\ ¶2Q1DUFLVVLVP$Q,QWURGXFWLRQ·26 as the philosophical turning 
point, or rather the turning into SKLORVRSK\RI)UHXG·VWKHRry.  Narcissism is as close as 
Freud got to abandoning his preference for a dualism and admitting the dominance of a 
single force or energy from which both the ego and its objects come into being: the li-
bido.  The libido, at this stage, is entirely sexual³LQ )UHXG·V H[WHQGHG VHQVH RI WKH
                                                 
26 In Sigmund Freud (trans. and eds. J. Strachey and A. Richards), On Metapsychology: The Theory of Psycho-
analysis (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1991) pp. 59-98.  Hereafter referred to as NI in the text. 
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term³LQWKDWLWFRUUHVSRQGVWRWKHG\QDPLFHPHUJHQFHRIWKHVXEMHFW·VSOHDVXUH,QWKLV
second instinct theory, the pleasure principle remains the primordial regulator of the 
subject.  The quandary for Freud was how autoerotic or subjective pleasure became ob-
jective pleasure, or, rather, how the subject was able to turn outward into the world and 
confirm itself as an ego among objects.  Though, again largely familiar, I want to discuss 
this in some detail because what Freud suggests is crucial for an understanding of how 
Marcuse and Brown utilise Hegel in their readings of narcissism. 
 $WLWVRULJLQ)UHXGSRLQWVRXWWKHVXEMHFWFDQQRWEHVDLGWRSRVVHVVDQ¶HJR·WKDW
is in any way divided from the world, which is, rather, a monad of autoerotic satisfac-
tion.  Something has to disrupt this simple kernel of, Freud assumes, mother or substi-
WXWHDQGEDE\LQRUGHUWRVWDUWWKHHJR·VIRUPDWLRQ7KLVILUVWVWDJHRIVXEMHFWLYLW\ZLWh-
out a subject) Freud terms primary narcissism.  What is important for Marcuse and 
Brown is that Freud was vague and self-consciously speculative in the answers he pro-
vides on the early development of the subject.  For it is this point of primary narcissism 
which forms a nodal point for both their readings of Freud.  The evidence for primary 
narcissism obviously cannot come from direct empirical observation, which for Freud 
means that it cannot be scientific in the strict sense.  Instead it comes from intuitive in-
sight, anthropological studies and the treatment of neurotic patients³LW LV LQ 5LHII·V
sense, a cultural symptom.  The conclusions Freud draws run as follows.  Firstly, it is 
VXJJHVWHGWKDWWKH¶RPQLSRWHQFHRIWKRXJKWV·NI: 67) in primitive peoples and in chil-
dren³the connection betrays the prejXGLFHRI)UHXG·VWLPH³is a vestige of the primal 
pleasure of the monad.  Belief in magic, an over-estimation of the power of mental acts, 
 76 
and animism are the symptoms here.27  Secondly, there is the necessity for the subject to 
recognise that the world does QRWUXQDFFRUGLQJWRLWVGHVLUH7KDWFHUWDLQ¶IHHOLQJV·ZLOO
DOZD\VRU UHJXODUO\EHSUHVHQW FHUWDLQ ¶IHHOLQJV·ZLOO QRWEHFDXVH WKH\ DUHSURYLGHGE\
DQRWKHU WKHPRWKHURU D VXEVWLWXWH )URP WKLVSHUFHSWLEOHGLIIHUHQFH WKH FKLOG·V HJR
gradually emerges along with the knowledge of objects.28  That which is pleasurable is 
internalised, that which is unpleasurable is externalised.  Libido is apportioned as ego-
libido and object-libido respectively.  Thus there remains in the child an attachment to 
things WKDWDUHLQ¶UHDOLW\·RWKHUEXWZKLFKJDYHSOHDVXUH7KHVHDUHDQDFOLWLFIURPWKH
*UHHN ¶WR OHDQ RQ· DWWDFKPHQWV ZKHUH WKH VH[XDO LQVWLQFWV ¶OHDQ RQ· WKH HJR RU VHOI-
preservation instincts, and objects subsequently are chosen on the model of those who 
nourished those ego-instincts, ultimately the breast and mother, but also the father who 
protects. 
But there is another type of object choice, which Freud did not expect to find, 
and this is narcissistic object-choice, where instead of forming relations through attach-
ment, object-FKRLFHLVDIIL[HGWRWKHVXEMHFW·VRZQVHOI5DWKHUWKDQORYLQJWKHRWKHUDV
an object, narcissistic object-FKRLFHORYHVWKHVHOIEHFDXVHLWLVWKHREMHFWRIWKHRWKHU·V
ORYH,WVWULYHVWR¶LGHQWLI\·,WKLQNZHFDQVD\WKDWanaclitic object-choice corresponds 
to a vestige of primary narcissism, whereas narcissistic object-choice corresponds to 
secondary narcissism.29  It was secondary narcissism, and its connection with perversion 
and homosexuality, that concerned Freud.  I shall return to this point. 
                                                 
27 For Freud the ontogenic maturation was a parallel miniature of the phylogenic maturation: ¶WKHDQLPLVWLF
phase would correspond to narcissism both chronologically and in its content; the religious phase would 
correspond to the stage of object-FKRLFHRIZKLFK WKHFKDUDFWHULVWLF LVFKLOG·VDWWDFKPHQW WRKLVSDUHQWV
while the scientific phase would have an exact counterpart in the stage at which an individual has reached 
maturity, has renounced the pleasure principle, adjusted himself to reality and turned to the external world 
IRUWKHREMHFWRIKLVGHVLUHV·&LWHGLQ5LHIIFMM, p. 47. 
28 As we shaOOVHHLQ&KDSWHU&RUQHOLXV&DVWRULDGLVDUJXHVDJDLQVWVXFKD¶JUDGXDOLVW·Dpproach. 
29 We will see below that Brown takes a revised approach to this problem. 
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Perhaps the most important and justly famous factor arising from primary nar-
cissism, one cited by both Brown and Marcuse, is in Civilization and its Discontents and 
runs as follows: 
 
originally the ego includes everything, later it separates off an external 
world from itself.  Our present ego-feeling is, therefore, only a shrunken 
residue of a much more inclusive³indeed, an all embracing³feeling 
which corresponds to a more intimate bond between the ego and the 
world about it. 
(CD: 225) 
 
This intimate bond, which we have already seen in Emerson (and indeed, that is only 
significant because of its long philosophical pedigree), remains with the subject in a 
PRUHRUOHVVVLJQLILFDQWPDQQHU,WLVWKHIDPRXV¶2FHDQLFIHHOLQJ·WKHPHPRUy of pri-
PDU\QDUFLVVLVP)UHXGVHHVLWDV WKHRULJLQRIP\VWLFLVPDQGDVVRFLDWHG¶UHOLJLRXV·Hx-
periences.30  For Brown and Marcuse, though in different ways, this oceanic feeling be-
FRPHVWKHORFXVRIXWRSLDQKRSH,QWKHLUH[WUDSRODWLRQVIURP)UHXG·VGULYe-theory, this 
single speculative idea, that there was at some time, even if only briefly, a total immer-
VLRQLQWKHZRUOGSULRUWRWKHGHPDQGVRI$QDQNēZKHUHWKHLQVWLQFWVZHUHEDODQFHGLV
enough to fuel Eros and Civilization and Life Against Death.  For this original unity suggests 
that something real H[LVWVEHIRUHWKHGRPLQDQFHRI)UHXG·VGXDOLVPVEHIRUHWKHUHDOLW\-
principle, and that this state³ZKLFK )UHXG UHFRJQLVHV DV WKH HJR·V GHDUHVW ZLVK DQG
deepest fear³can be returned to.  To this end, Marcuse and Brown between them em-
ploy almost the full weight of the Western philosophical tradition, from Anaximander to 
:KLWHKHDG EXW WKH PRVW LPSRUWDQW LGHD LV +HJHO·V GLDOHFWLFDO SKHQRPHQRORJ\  $V
                                                 
30 5LHIIVHHVWKLVTXLWHULJKWO\DV)UHXG·VGLVPLVVDORIDQ\VXFKUHOLJLRXVIHHOLQJVDV¶FKLOG-OLNH·RU¶UHJUHVVLYH·
(FMM: 266-267).  However, as we shall see, this only increases its significance for Brown and Marcuse.  
The difference is that for Rieff the oceanic feeling displays a dependence on parental figures and is thus a 
sign of immaturity, whereas for Brown and Marcuse, the oceanic holds on to the promesse du bonheur. 
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%URZQZULWHVSV\FKRDQDO\VLVQHHGV¶LQVWHDGRIDQLQVWLQFWXDO dualism, an instinctual dia-
OHFWLF·LAD: 82, 83). 
 
III 
 
3DXO 5LFRHXU LV TXLWH FOHDU WKDW ZKHQ UHDGLQJ )UHXG ¶D GLUHFW +HJHOLDQ WUDQVODWLRQ· LV
VRPHWKLQJZH ¶PD\GRRQRXURZQDWRXURZQULVNEXWQRWDV LQWHUSUHWHUVRI)UHXG·
(FP: 317).  At least one of WKHLPSOLHGWDUJHWVRIWKLVZDUQLQJLV0DUFXVH·VEros and Civili-
zation ZKLFK DV D ¶SKLORVRSKLFDO LQTXLU\· LQWR )UHXG PDNHV H[WHQVLYH XVH RI +HJHOLDQ
techniques.31  )RU5LFRHXU+HJHODQG)UHXGDUHGLIIHUHQW¶FRQWLQHQWV·DQGDQ\UHDGLQJRI
one in terms of the other, any colonial aspirations, would have to be viewed as violence, 
WKH RXWFRPH RI ZKLFK ZRXOG EH D ¶IDFLOH EXW DEVXUG HFOHFWLFLVP· FP: 461).  His own 
practice is to compare Freud with Hegel, to point to homologies, but not use one to 
change, improve upon or critique the other.  Both Marcuse and Brown, however, see it 
as an important utopian move to go beyond any hermeneutic exercise, however adroit.  
They recognise in Freud, despite or perhaps because of its absurdity, the realization³or 
at least the next stage³of a vital contribution to the possibility of freedom initiated by 
+HJHO·VGLDOHFWLFRIKLVWRU\ 
 2QHRIWKHPRVWSHUWLQHQWDQGSHUVXDVLYHIRXQGDWLRQVIRU5LFRHXU·VWUHSLGDWLRQ
LV WKDW)UHXGLDQ WKHRU\ LV ¶DQDO\WLF·DQGUHVXOWV LQDQ ¶HFRQRPLFV·ZKHUHDV+HJHO·VSKi-
ORVRSK\LV¶V\QWKHWLF·DQGOHDGVWRD¶GLDOHFWLF·)UHXG·VDQDO\WLFRIWKHOLELGRIRUH[Dm-
ple, takes it apart and considers the dynamic between these energies as something like a 
                                                 
31 ,QD VLJQLILFDQWQRWH5LFRHXUZULWHV ¶7KLV HQWLUH FKDSWHU >¶'LDOHFWLF$UFKHRORJ\ DQG7HOHRORJ\·@ LV DQ
internal discussion or debate with Herbert Marcuse, Eros and Civilization, J. C. Flugel, Man, Morals and Soci-
ety; and Philip Rieff, Freud, the Mind of the Moralist·FP: 4). 
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hydraulic system of pressures in which effects can be traced back to causes.  This estab-
lishes an always-finite exchange of energies, strictly analogous to the economic prejudices 
of the nineteenth-FHQWXU\DQG)UHXG·VPRGHORIVFDUFLW\$QDQNē5LFRHXUDUJXHVWKDW
this tends to solipsism, where intersubjectivity is played down and a figurative map of 
the individual (systems Cs., Pcs., Ucs., or id, ego, superego) dominates (FP: 476). 
Synthetic philosophy, on the contrary, tends to bring things together, to expand 
outwards to the infinite, aligning seeming contradictories³such as other people³into 
relations of mutual necessity, it is dialectical.  It is, however, clear to Ricoeur, that the 
predilection of Freudian theory for binarisms is always on the verge of a collapse into 
synthesis.  Freud often finds it hard to keep to the two terms he wants (as for example 
with the conservative nature of the instincts) and occasionally introduces a third mediat-
LQJWHUPWRNHHSWKHPIURPGLVVROYLQJVXFKDV$QDQNē5LFRHXUDOVRVWUHVVHVWKDWWKH
analytic situation itself is fundamentally synthetic and that transference relies upon inter-
subjectivity (FP)UHXGKRZHYHU¶H[SUHVVO\VWDWHVWKDWWKHGLVFLSOLQHKHIRXQGHGLV
not a synthesis but an analysis³i.e., a process of breaking down into elements and of 
tracing back to origins³and that psychoanalysis is not to be completed by a psychosyn-
WKHVLV·FP: 460).  In spite of such warnings, Marcuse and Brown make of Freudian the-
ory a dialectic.  But it is almost certainly because of them that they make their claims far 
away from the therapeutic field, for Marcuse in philosophy, for Brown in history. 
 Now, some have argued that Marcuse in particular suffers from being tied to 
)UHXG·VRXWGDWHGHFRQRPLFPRGHO32 and on first glance it does seem odd to use an eco-
                                                 
32 Douglas Kellner, for example, expresses surprise that Marcuse should exploit such an obviously limited 
bio-mechanical model.  He argues that Marcuse LVXVLQJ¶QDWXUH·LQVWLQFWVWRIRXQGWKHUHYROXWLRQDU\VXb-
MHFW :KLOVW WKLV LVDQDSSURSULDWH UHDGLQJ , VHHNKHUH WR VWUHVV0DUFXVH·VRYHUFRPLQJRI WKHHFRQRPLF
model³and of nature³in the dialectic, and to position Marcuse with Hegel rather than Marx. See Doug-
las Kellner, Herbert Marcuse and the Crisis of Marxism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), p. 162.  
$OVR $QWKRQ\ :LOGHQ DUJXHV WKDW WKH ¶RXWGDWHG· HFRQRPLF PRGHO ERUURZHG IURP )HFKQHU VKRXOG EH
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nomic structure for what are substantively synthetic ends.  I would argue, however, that 
it is precisely in his revision RI WKLV PRGHO WKDW 0DUFXVH·V +HJHOLDQLVP FRPHV WKURXJK
Marcuse does not accept the limitations placed upon the economic model³what Wil-
den would call iWV¶FORVHGV\VWHP·³but rather historicizes it and reveals it to be an open 
process.  Take for example Marcuse use of the ambivalent word Trieb, instinct or drive.  
Freud considered this word to be one of the triumphs of the German language, as it has 
a fle[LELOLW\WKDWWKHVWDQGDUG(QJOLVKWUDQVODWLRQ¶LQVWLQFW·GRHVQRW7KH*Hrman word 
Instinkt, which Freud uses only rarely, has the same connotations as the English instinct 
LQWKHVHQVHRI¶LQQDWH·DQG¶LQKHULWHG·ELRORJLFDOVWUXFWXUHVTrieb, however, is defined by 
)UHXGDV¶ERGLO\QHHGVLQDVPXFKDVWKH\UHSUHVHQWDQLQFHQWLYHWRPHQWDODFWLYLW\·33  It is 
that crossover from mere bodily or reflexive hungers to the mental, or the reflective³
the creative³WKDWLVFUXFLDOLQ)UHXG·VXVHRIWKHWHUPDQGLQ0DUFXVH·VDSSURSULDWLRQRI
it.34  7KH RWKHU FRPPRQ (QJOLVK ZRUG ¶GULYH· LV RIWHQ XVHG LQWHrchangeably with in-
stinct.  Whilst it has some of the dynamic connotations of Trieb, it still does not connect 
it to mental and creative activity.  It is because of these nuances that it is easier to his-
toricise Trieb WKDQLQVWLQFWRUHYHQGULYH7KXV0DUFXVHFDQFRQFOXGHWKDW¶´,QVWLQFWµLQ
DFFRUGDQFHZLWK)UHXG·VQRWLRQRI Trieb UHIHUV WR WKHSULPDU\ ´GULYHVµRI WKHKXPDQ
organism which are subject to historical modification; they find mental as well as somatic 
UHSUHVHQWDWLRQ·EC0DUFXVH·VHPSKDVLV 6RWKHZRUGLQVWLQFWLVSUeserved despite 
                                                                                                                                           
replaced with a systems theory model base on feedback mechanisms and communications theory.  Of 
course, thirty years on, this quasi-VWUXFWXUDOLVWPRGHOVHHPVHTXDOO\PRULEXQG1HYHUWKHOHVV:LOGHQ·VDUWi-
FOH UHPDLQV IDVFLQDWLQJ $QWKRQ\ :LOGHQ ¶0DUFXVH DQG WKH)UHXGLDQ0RGHO(QHUJ\ ,QIRUPation, and 
Phantasie·Salmugundi (No. 10-11, Fall-Winter 1969-1970), pp. 196-245.  Hereafter referred to as MFM in 
the text. 
33 )UHXGFLWHGLQWKHHGLWRUV·¶*ORVVDU\·WR)ULHGULFK6FKLOOHUWUDQVDQGHGV(OL]DEHWK:LONLQVRQDQG/$
Willoughby), On the Aesthetic Education of Man: In a Series of Letters, English and German Facing (Oxford: 
&ODUHQGRQ3UHVVS6FKLOOHU·VPRUHH[SDQVLYHXVHRITrieb will be discussed in the next chapter. 
34 ,WLVDOVRLPSRUWDQWWRUHPHPEHUWKDWWKLV¶VSDFH·EHWZHen psyche and soma was where Freud positioned 
the speculative and mythological basis of his instinct theory. 
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the argument for other translations.  But it is necessary to recall its full range of connota-
tions which cross from the mental to the bodily, because in this revision the instincts 
break down the distinction between nature and culture.  Thus, for Marcuse, an instinct is 
not a fixed quantum of libidinal energy traversing the subject, but is the direct manifesta-
tion of the VXEMHFW·VUHODWLRQVKLSWRQDWXUHWKDWHPHUJHVIURPDQGDVKLVWRU\DVDGLDOHFWi-
cal process.35  Instincts are as variable as the historical circumstances in which they are 
found. 
It is also worth observing that Marcuse is only referring to the life and death in-
stincts.  Whereas, for Freud, instincts are multiple, and include destructive instincts, in-
stinct to mastery, aggressive instincts, which come and go with the phases of ontogenesis 
or, like the aggressive or self-preservation instincts, are (earlier) versions of the life and 
GHDWKLQVWLQFWV0DUFXVH·VVROHFRQFHUQZLWK(URVDQG7KDQDWRVVKRZVILUVWO\WKDWWKH\
are the most important because the most fundamental.  Secondly, that nothing less than 
the historical (Geschichtlich) mutability of these instincts is what is at stake in the alteration 
of civilization. 
The Hegelian theory that Brown and Marcuse employ is complex and wide rang-
LQJDQG,RQO\ZDQWWRWRXFKRQLWVHOHFWLYHO\KHUH,IROORZ0DUFXVH·VRZQUHDGLQJRI
the Phenomenology and the Science of Logic (1812) in his +HJHO·V2QWRORJ\, Reason and Revolution 
and Eros and CivilizationDQGH[SDQGLQJRQ%URZQ·VOHVVIUHTXHQWEXWHTXDOO\VLJQLIicant, 
references to Hegel in Life Against Death and elsewhere.  What is important is not to ex-
KDXVW+HJHO·V system but to explain how parts of it can help a reading of the instinct 
                                                 
35 History, for Marcuse is always Geschichte and never Historie.  GeschichteLQ0DUFXVH·V+HJHOLDQYRFDEXODU\
is derived from Geschehen, event, happening, or process.   History is something that occurs, it is the happen-
ing of every-thing that is.  What I think this means is that history is not something that happened in the 
past, nor is it something that can be written about, i.e., historiography, but it is, as a cumulative process, 
the present.  This is the subject of HO, and I refer the interested to it for further guidance on this.  I return 
to it briefly in my discussion of memory in Chapter 3. 
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theory and thus of the books in question.  I shall trace how the dialectic emerges from 
the contradiction between subjects and objects in order to explain the role of the dialec-
tic in the life and death instincts and how this is transformed in an original understand-
LQJRIQDUFLVVLVP2QWKHZD\,VKDOORSHQXSZKDW0DUFXVHPHDQVE\¶QDWXUH·¶UHDVRQ·
¶HVVHQFH·DQG ¶UHDOLW\·FRQWUDVWLQJ%URZQ·VYLVLRQRIDQHVFKDWRORJ\ZLWK0DrFXVH·s ra-
tional telos. 
 $QXQGHUVWDQGLQJRIWKHGLDOHFWLFDV0DUFXVHUHDGVLWEHJLQVZLWK$QDQNēKHUH
interpreted as the human struggle with nature and the consequent experience of nature 
as susceptible to domination, mastery and control.  Marcuse traces the origin of this 
WKLQNLQJWR$ULVWRWOHRUUDWKHUWR¶WKHFDQRQL]DWLRQRI$ULVWRWHOLDQORJLF·EC: 111) and 
WKHFRQFHSWRI¶Logos·ZKLFKH[HPSOLILHVWKHWDVNRIRUGHULQJFODVVLI\LQJDQGPDVWHULQJ
according to the dictates of reason.  This is also the point where the difference between 
the reality principle and the pleasure principle becomes philosophically significant.  
Those faculties and attitudes which resist ordering and classifying, and retain the de-
mands of the pleasure-principle, become considered irrational, dysfunctional, somehow 
¶ORZHU·  5HDVRQ EHFRPHV LQFUHDVLQJO\ HIIHFWLYH DW SURGXFWLRQ DQG OHVV DQG OHVV FRn-
FHUQHGZLWKUHFHSWLRQDNH\ZRUGRI0DUFXVH·VDHVWKHWLFVDQGWLPHLWVHOIEHFRPHVRr-
dered according to the dictates of rational productioQ (YHQWXDOO\ ¶7KH/RJRV VKRZV
forth as the logic of domination.  When logic then reduces the units of thought to signs 
and symbols, the laws of thought have finally become techniques of calculation and ma-
nipuODWLRQ·EC: 111-112). 
However, the domination of the reality principle, reified as reason, does not an-
QLKLODWHLWVRWKHU0DUFXVHDUJXHVWKDWWKH¶LQQHUKLVWRU\RI:HVWHUQPHWDSK\VLFV·EC: 
112) is epitomized by the dynamic of reason and its irrepressible (or only repressible) 
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other.  This othernesV LV WKH ¶V\QWKHWLF· RU ¶GLDOHFWLFDO· XUJH ¶7KH UHVWOHVV ODERU RI WKH
transcending subject terminat[ing] in the ultimate unity of subject and object: the idea of 
´EHLQJ-in-and-for-LWVHOIµ H[LVWLQJ LQ LWV RZQ IXOILOOPHQW· EC: 112).  For Aristotle this 
only existed for God, nous theos.  God as the pinnacle of the hierarchy of being could not 
be the object for a subject or the subject for an object.  The nous theos always returns to 
itself in otherness³LWLVWKHPRPHQWRISXUHWKRXJKW¶WKLQNLQJ·LWVHOIWKH circle of being 
UHWXUQLQJWRLWVRZQRULJLQLQIXOILOOPHQW7KLVVKRXOGEHUHPLQLVFHQWRI(URV·VUROHDIWHU
primary narcissism, the desire for a primal synthesis sustained in unity and growth.  It is, 
Marcuse argues, this initial Aristotelian conception that is retained by the subsequent 
philosophical attempts to think through the problem of subject and object in terms of 
IXOILOOPHQW7KHPRVWVLJQLILFDQWRIWKHVHDWWHPSWVLV+HJHO·VWKRXJKDVZHVKDOOVHHLQ
the next chapter, it owes much to problems raised by Kant in particular). 
 Marcuse reads the Phenomenology DV WKHEHJLQQLQJRI+HJHO·V V\VWHPDWLFDWWHPSW
WRUHFRQFLOH WKHWZRSRVLWLRQ MXVWRXWOLQHGILUVWO\ WKHRWKHUQHVVRI ¶QDWXUH·DV$QDQNē
secondly, the god-like notion of thought thinking itself.  In Hegel, reason (Vernunft)³a 
modern interpretation of logRV YLD WKH /DWLQ ¶ratio·³becomes interpreted dialectically.  
Rather than asserting the dominance of a subject over an object, reason is the way in 
which the philosopher can understand the interconnected and reciprocal relationship be-
tween the subject and nature (as the world of objects) in a rational process which un-
folds as (not in) history.  The subject comes to know itself by knowing the world it 
PDNHV OLNH$ULVWRWOH·VJRG 0DUFXVHZULWHV ¶7KLV UDWLRQDOLW\ LVPDGHSRVVLEOH WKURXJK
WKHVXEMHFW·VHQWHULng into the very content of nature and history.  The objective reality is 
WKXVDOVRWKHUHDOL]DWLRQRIWKHVXEMHFW·RR: 8).  Unlike the canonized interpretations of 
Aristotle, objects are not treated as substances that can be analysed into elements and 
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categorised (ultimately exploited), but they actually emerge into their being along with the proc-
ess of subjectivity. 
7KLV LV FDSWXUHG 0DUFXVH DUJXHV E\ +HJHO·V H[SUHVVLRQ ¶VXEVWDQFH LV VXEMHFW·
ZKLFK¶FRQFHLYHVUHDOLW\DVDSURFHVVZKHUHLQDOOEHLQJLVWhe unification of contradictory 
IRUFHV  ´6XEMHFWµ GHQRWHV QRW RQO\ WKH HSLVWHPRORJLFDO HJR RU FRQVFLRXVQHVV EXW D
mode of existence, to wit, that of a self-GHYHORSLQJXQLW\LQDQDQWDJRQLVWLFSURFHVV·RR: 
  $ ¶VXEMHFW· LV D PRGH RI EHLQJ ZKLFK VXVWDLns itself in the face of contradiction.  
Thus, it is not a substance that persists throughout its changes (e.g., eidos); it is that which 
changes throughout its persistence.  This does not belong merely to human subjectivity³
hence the phrase substance is subject³but to all beings.  To use the familiar example, the 
flower is WKHFRQWUDGLFWLRQRIWKHEXGWKHVHHGRIWKHIORZHUDQGWKHSODQW·VOLIHFRQVLVWV
LQWKHGHYHORSPHQWRIWKHVHFRQWUDGLFWLRQV LW¶XQIROGV· LQWKHP+RZHYHUWKHUHLVQR
underlying form to which the plant obtains.  Moreover, a plant remains unable to com-
prehend its life-process actively, a capacity that belongs solely to the self-realizing power 
RIKXPDQFRQVFLRXVQHVVWKDWLVWRUHDVRQ$V0DUFXVHSXWVLW¶WKHKLJKHVWIRUPRIGe-
velopment is reached only when self-consciousness exercises mastery over the whole 
process.  The life of the thinking subject is the only one that may be called self-
UHDOL]DWLRQLQWKHVWULFWVHQVH·RR: 238) 
 Reason, Hegel argues, is not something abstract (tKDW LV ¶UHPRYHG· DEVWUDFW LQ
WKHVHQVHRIVRPHWKLQJ¶WDNHQRXW·LWHPHUJHVDVWKHWHORVRIWKHPRYHPHQWRIKLVWRU\
on its ineluctable route to the realization of human freedom.  History which operates to 
this end in spite of itself (the so-FDOOHG¶FXQQLQJRIUHDVRQ·IRU0DUFXVHWKRXJKDVZH
shall see, this route to freedom is not so self-evident.  Though reason may only be de-
scribed metaphysically, it is not in itself metaphysical, but is the process of a subject to-
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wards its reality, by which Hegel means, its freedom.  In the first instance it agrees with 
the role accorded to it by the Aristotelians, to shape nature through knowledge of it, and 
thus to master it and to release the subject from its bondDJHWR$QDQNē7KHGLIIHUHQFH
here is that the subject, nature and history all emerge through the same process: as such, 
$QDQNēLVKLVWRULFDO$V0DUFXVHH[SODLQVLWLQKLVHVVD\RQ0DU[·VEconomic and Philoso-
phical Manuscripts¶0DQLVQRWin nature; nature is not the external world into which he first 
has to come out of his own inwardness.  Man is QDWXUH1DWXUHLVKLV´H[SUHVVLRQµ´KLV
ZRUNDQGKLVUHDOLW\µ·36  The power to shape reality emerges along with that reality it-
self³otherwise it would not be open to change³¶´ZRUOGKLVWRU\µLV´WKHHPHUJHQFHRI
QDWXUHIRUPDQµ·SCP: 24).37  Thus: 
 
Subject and object are not sundered by an impassable gulf, because the 
object is in itself a kind of subject and because all types of being culmi-
QDWH LQ WKH IUHH ¶FRPSUHKHQVLYH· VXEMHFW ZKR LV DEOH WR UHDOL]H UHDVRQ
Nature thus becomes a medium for the development of freedom. 
(RR: 9-10) 
 
What is generally called objective reality, in Freudian terms that which sustains 
the reality-testing of the reality-principle³which is, of course, a tautology³is not, for 
Hegel, something over against the subject, or that in the last analysis escapes it (as it 
does for Freud and Kant), but is necessarily a part of the subjectivity that perceives it, 
                                                 
36 ¶7KH)RXQGDWLRQVRI+LVWRULFDO0DWHULDOLVP· pp. 1-48 in Herbert Marcuse (trans. Joris De Bres), 
Studies in Critical Philosophy %RVWRQ%HDFRQ3UHVVS0DUFXVH·VHPSKDVLV+HUHDIWHUUHIHUUHGWR
as SCP LQ WKH WH[W 7KHFLWDWLRQVDUH IURP0DU[·V UHDGLQJRI+HJHO $VZLOOEH VKRZQ WKRXJK ¶ZRUN·
GURSVRXWRI0DUFXVH·VFRQFHSWLRQLQEC.  Or, in HO¶2QO\KXPDQH[LVWHQFHDQGDOOWKHREMHFWVIRUPHG
created and animated by Dasein >+HLGHJJHU·VWHUPIURPKXPDQbeing] in its existence, are historical accord-
LQJWRWKHLUEHLQJ·FLWHGLQ0++85). 
37 In +HJHO·V2QWRORJ\ 0DUFXVHH[SUHVVHVLWWKXV¶´7KHZRUOGµWKHJLYHQPDQLIROGRIEHLQJVLVQRWDQREMHFW
(Gegenstand) of the human I; it is not something which stands over against it (entgegen-stehendes) in some on-
tologically appropriate form.  ThHZRUOG´EHORQJVµTXLWHIXQGDPHQWDOO\WRWKHEHLQJRIWKH,)RULWLVWKH
negativity through which the I can first be positivity; for it is the manifold through whose synthesis the I 
can first come to be·HO: 36). 
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adapts it and overcomes it or succumbs to it.  Subjectivity is this very process of overcom-
ing and succumbing. 
Every subject must come to understand the world³hence the importance of the 
philosopher and of philosophy as the basis of science for Hegel³in order to compre-
hend its essence and to bring it in line with human essence, which is the comprehension 
DQGUHDOL]DWLRQRIIUHHGRP+HJHOFDOOVWKLVWKHDSSURSULDWLRQRIWKHREMHFW·V¶XQLYHUVDl-
LW\· (DFKQHZSLHFHRINQRZOHGJHDERXW WKHZRUOG·VSKHQRPHQD LVJDWKHUHG LQWR WKH
increasing authority of the subject and adds to her mastery.  This is the movement from 
what is merely actual, that is phenomena as they exist under conditions of error (com-
mon-sense, mere appearance: Schein), to what is real, that is phenomena as they are 
brought under the dominance of reason (mediated appearance, Erscheinung), under which 
FRQGLWLRQV WKH VXEMHFW LV ¶IUHH· EHFDXVH KH RU VKH KDV $EVROXWH NQRZOHGJH LV IDPLOLDU
which each particular in its universality.  For Marcuse it is the movement of conscious-
ness in the gathering of knowledge³its negativity³that is key, not the telos itself.  On 
his terms, the Absolute is not the telos, put the process of historical becoming (see HO: 
305-318; MHH: 192).  As an historical phenomenon, this is what Hegel calls Geist, spirit. 
,Q0DUFXVH·V UHDGLQJVSLULW OLNHUHDVRQ LVQRWDEVWUDFWEXW LVZKDWHPHUJHVDV
the concrete (that is, the aggregate totality) of the self-movement of subjectivity toward 
the knowledge demanded by the telos of freedom: Absolute Spirit.  Again, it is crucial to 
understand that for Marcuse, the movement [Bewegtheit] is more important that the end.  
0DUFXVHLVTXLWHFOHDUWKDW+HJHO·VZRUNVKRXOGQRWEHWDNHQDVDQREWXVHPHWDSK\VLFV
(difficult, yes, obtuse no).  Earlier stages of knowledge, usually caOOHG¶FRPPRQVHQVH·RU
WKH¶HYHU\GD\·DUHnegated such that the subject can retain itself against the contradictions 
RIRWKHUQHVVWKDWLVLWFDQXQIROGLQWRLWVHVVHQFHDVIUHHGRP7KLVLVDQ¶LQILQLWH·SURc-
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ess whereby every object is the contradiction of every other object, related through their 
QHJDWLRQVRIHDFKRWKHULQRUGHUWRSHUVLVWDVWKHPVHOYHV¶(YHU\WKLQJKDVWREHXQGHr-
stood in relation to other things, so that these relations become the very being of that 
WKLQJ·RR: 68).  The condition of consciousness when this is properly recognised, at the 
end of the Phenomenology, emerges as Absolute Spirit. 
This process of negation, however, becomes particularly acute when it is not an 
object that is being negated by a subject but another subject.  It is impossible, Hegel ar-
gues, for a subject to be content with the dominance, the understanding in their univer-
sality, of mere objects.  An ego (Ich), he argues, can only be satisfied by another ego.  In 
Eros and Civilization Marcuse explains it as followV ¶WKHHJRLVILUVWdesire: it can become 
FRQVFLRXVWRLWVHOIRQO\WKURXJKVDWLVI\LQJLWVHOILQDQGE\DQ´RWKHUµ6XFKVDWLVIDFWLRQ
inYROYHVWKH´QHJDWLRQµRIWKHRWKHUIRUWKHHJRKDVWRSURYHLWVHOIE\WUXO\´EHLQJ-for-
LWVHOIµagainst DOO´RWKHUQHVVµ· EC 7KHDVVHUWLRQRI WKHHJR·V IUHHGRPLVDOZD\V
challenged by the freedom of other egos as they attempt to negate each other in order to 
attain their freedom.  Desire38 is what Hegel calls this movement from subject to subject: 
the need to abolish the other recognisably equivalent self-consciousness in its otherness.  
¶>6@HOI-FRQVFLRXVQHVV·+HJHOZULWHV¶LVDesire LQJHQHUDO·39  (It is worth sign-posting here 
WKDW%URZQ·V UHDGLQJRI WKHGLDOHFWLFEDVHG LQGHVLUH LV DQ LQWHUSUHWDWLRQRI+HJHO YLa 
)UHXG>QDUFLVVLVP@UDWKHUWKDQDGHFLVLYHEUHDNZLWKKLP7KHNH\WR%URZQ·VUHDGLQJ
ZLOOEHWKHWUDQVODWLRQRI+HJHO·VHPEDWWOHGGHVLUHLQWR¶ORYH·6HHQH[WVHFWLRQ7KXV
the ego has continually to win its freedom from the other.  The ego will only gain this 
                                                 
38 In Hegel desire is Begierde.  According to Laplanche and Pontalis, Freud mainly uses Wunsch, but some-
times Begierde or Lust.  J. Laplanche and J.-B. Pontalis, Vocabulaire de la psychanalyse (Paris: Quadridge PUF, 
1997), p. 120. 
39 G. W. F. Hegel (trans. A. V. Miller; foreword & analysis J. N. Findlay), Phenomenology of Spirit (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1977), p. 105.  Hereafter referred to as PS. 
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satisfaction when the other ego, the other self-conscious subject, acknowledges its mas-
tery, that is, makes itself an object.  This is the familiar scenario of master and slave, the 
unequal battle of recognition, which for Hegel fuels human history.  Moreover, what is 
key here is that for each stage to be realised, the subject has to risk negation.  That is, the 
master risks his or her life in order to subdue the slave; the slave risks his or her life in 
order to overcome the master.  Only through this process of risking life can the position 
of universal recognition³equality³arise, as Hegel thought it had in the decisive revolu-
WLRQDU\¶VSLULW·RIKLVRZQWLPH 
 These two movements, then, the first the domination of objects, the second the 
struggle for mutual recognition, are what comprises dialectic.  It is not the merely logical 
dissolution of pairs into a third term (thesis, antithesis, synthesis).  Dialectic is the real 
overcoming (sublation, Aufhebung) of contradictions that imperil the stability of subjects 
as substance, and, moreover, it is the historical spirit (Geist) of this self-movement 
(Bewegtheit). 
 How, and in what sense, then, are Eros and Thanatos dialectically engaged?  
Neither Marcuse nor Brown make this explicit but as I have come to understand it, they 
are meaningfully dialectical as part of the ongoing conflict between essence and exis-
WHQFHWKDW LVDW WKHURRWRI+HJHO·V WKRXJKWDQGFRQWLQXHVWKURXJK LQWR0DU[LVP 7R
put it simply, there exists a contradiction between what humans are, their essence, and 
how they live, their existence.  We have just already seen this, briefly, in the dialectic of 
master and slave.  It maps onto the instincts in a complex manner.  They are engaged in 
such a way that instinctual struggle belongs to our essence whereas the reality principle 
and the pleasure principle belong to our existence.  And it is how the instincts are mani-
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fested in the pleasure principle and the reality-principle, how essence manifests as exis-
tence, in its contradictory forms of life and death, that is at stake. 
 It is important, particularly under prevailing intellectual conditions, to under-
VWDQGMXVWZKDWLVPHDQWE\DZRUGOLNH¶HVVHQFH·ZKLFKKDVFRPHWRVWDQGIRUDYDULHW\
of reactionary postures.  Essence is not the exSUHVVLRQRIVRPHWKLQJ·VLPPXWDEOH ¶ELo-
ORJLFDORSHUDWLRQ·RULWVUHLILHG¶VWDWXV·RU¶UDFH·DQGLWGRHVQRWEHORQJWR¶HVVHQWLDOism·³
though unfortunately it can be interpreted as such.  The essence of something is not how 
it exists; the essence of something is the contradiction of its existence.  To follow the 
German, Wesen RUHVVHQFHGHULYHVIURPWKHSDVWSDUWLFLSOHRIWKHYHUE¶WREH·Gewesen or 
¶LWZDV·)RUERWK+HJHODQG0DUFXVHWKLVGHVFULEHVKRZHVVHQFHLVKLVWRULFDOWKDWZKLFK
is now has come to be RU ¶WKDW ZKLFK EHLQJ DOZD\V DOUHDG\ ZDV· HO: 69; MHH: 191-
192).40  The trouble with so-called common-sense, Hegel argues, is that it mistakes exis-
tence, the misunderstood phenomena (Schein), for essence, the actualizing of some-
WKLQJ·V³DEHLQJ·V³potenWLDOLW\7KLVGLIIHUHQFHRUFRQWUDGLFWLRQLVWKH¶JHQXLQHGLDOHc-
WLFDO·PRYHPHQWRIDOOEHLQJDV0DUFXVHSXWVLW¶WKHQHFHVVDU\SUHOXGHWRLWVUHDOLW\·RR: 
  ¶:KHQVRPHWKLQJWXUQV LQWR LWVRSSRVLWH+HJHOVD\VZKHQLWFRQWUDGLFWV LWVHOI LW
expressHVLWVHVVHQFH«7KHFRQWUDGLcWLRQLVWKHDFWXDOPRWRURIWKHSURFHVV·RR: 148-
149).  This process (Geschehen) is history (Geschichte). 
 1RZDV0DUFXVHREVHUYHVLQKLVHVVD\RQ0DU[¶(VVHQFHDQGH[LVWHQFHseparate 
LQ >PDQ@KLV H[LVWHQFH LV D´PHDQVµ Wo the realization of his essence, or³in estrange-
ment³KLVHVVHQFHLVDPHDQVWRKLVPHUHSK\VLFDOH[LVWHQFH·SCP: 29).  There is, as with 
all beings, a gap between essence and existence; the difference with humans is that this 
                                                 
40 6HHDOVR0DUFXVH·VHVVD\ ¶7KH&RQFHSWRI(VVHQFH· Negations (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1972), 
pp. 43-88, especially pp. 67-69.  Hereafter referred to as Neg in the text. 
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gap becomes ossified.  In animals or plants, the distinction between essence and exis-
tence is ongoing, but they never rest content, they do not adapt to their factical condition 
LI LWPHDQV FRQWUDGLFWLQJ WKHLU ¶HVVHQFH· +XPDQV WKRXJKEHFDXVHRI WKHGLDOHFWLF RI
self-consciousness, can actually mistake their existence for their essence.  It is the task of 
philosophy³IRU 0DU[ LW LV WKH WDVN RI UHYROXWLRQDU\ SUD[LV UHPHPEHULQJ ¶7KHVLV
(OHYHQ·³to educate people as to their essence: freedom.  As Marcuse puts it, again in 
the Marx essD\ ¶,W LVSUHFLVHO\ WKLVXQHUULQJFRQWHPSODWLRQRI WKHHVVHQFHRIPDQ WKDW
EHFRPHVWKHLQH[RUDEOHLPSXOVHIRUWKHLQLWLDWLRQRIUDGLFDOUHYROXWLRQ·SCP: 29).  The 
disjunction between existence and essence as expressed in Hegel and Marx, then, is an-
other way of registering romantic discontent.  Possibly amongst the last ways achieved, 
as the distinction has since been set aside by Heideggerian phenomenology, where exis-
tence and essence are the same thing, and by Sartrean existentialism,41 where existence 
precedes HVVHQFH7KHSUREOHPKDVEHHQFKDQJHGWRRQHRIOLYLQJDQ¶DXWKHQWLFOLIH·42 
8QGHU WKHSUHVHQW ¶SHUIRUPDQFH-SULQFLSOH·0DUFXVH·V WHUPIRU WKHFXUUHQWKLs-
torical form of the reality-principle, which is in excess of repression demanded by scar-
city, ¶7KHKXPDQH[LVWHQFHLQWKLVZRUOGLVPHUHVWXIIPDWWHUPDWHULDOZKLFKGRHVQRW
KDYHWKHSULQFLSOHRI LWVPRYHPHQW LQ LWVHOI· EC: 104).  This condensed expression of 
0DUFXVH·V +HJHOLDQLVP FRQILUPV WKDW H[LVWHQFH LV RXW RI NLOWHU ZLWK HVVHQFH DQG WKLV
forms the state of alienation to which we have adjusted our existential conditions.  The 
                                                 
41 6HH0DUFXVH·V¶6DUWUH·V([LVWHQWLDOLVP·SCP, pp. 157-190. 
42 One redoubtable critic of this change is Theodor Wiesengrund-Adorno.  See, for example Negative Dia-
lecticsZKHUHKHEODPHV1LHW]VFKH·VVXSSUHVVLRQRIHVVHQce for the dominance of positivism³what we are 
left with is mere H[LVWHQFH ZKLFK RIIHUV QR ¶QHJDWLYH· SRLQW RI FULWLTXH  7KHRGRU $GRUQR WUDQV ( %
Ashton), Negative Dialectics (London: Routledge, 1973), pp. 169-170; see also pp. 122-124.  Marcuse deals 
ZLWKWKLVEULHIO\DQGSROHPLFDOO\LQKLVHVVD\¶7KH6WUXJJOH$JDLQVW/LEHUDOLVPLQWKH7RWDOLWDULDQ9LHZ
RIWKH6WDWH·Neg: 3-42, especially pp. 31-6HHDOVR¶7KH&RQFHSWRQ(VVHQFH· 
 ,WFRXOGEHDUJXHGWKDW5LHII·VZRUNFRUUHVSRQGVWRMXVWVXFh a positivism; in particular the rejec-
tion of the dialectic of hope and despair, leaving a position without critique. 
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relation to the world that would better express historical human being (Geist) has be-
come attenuated.  However, in a remarkable post-Marxist gesture, Marcuse argues that 
technology, the current and damning state of the performance/reality-principle, contains 
both the principle of this ossification and the solution.  He states that not only are the 
conditions of scarcity enIRUFHGE\$QDQNēPHW43 but that the very idea of labour is no 
longer a significant part of human existence.  It is no longer, as it was for Marx, a key to 
human essence. 
 
The ideology of scarcity, or the productivity of toil, domination, and re-
nunciation, is dislodged from its instinctual [i.e., Freud] as well as rational 
[i.e., Hegel and Marx] grounds.  The theory of alienation demonstrated 
the fact that man does not realise himself in his labor, that his life has 
become an instrument of labor, that his work and its products have as-
sumed a form and a power independent of him as an individual.  But the 
liberation from this state seems to require, not the arrest of alienation, but its con-
summation, not the reactivation of the repressed and productive personality but its abo-
lition.  The elimination of human potentialities from the world of (alien-
ated) labour creates the preconditions for the elimination of labor from 
the world of human potentialities. 
(EC: 105; emphasis added) 
 
/DERXULVQRORQJHUD¶KXPDQ·LVVXHQRORQJHUDQLVVXHIRUKXPDQHVVHQFHV7KH¶SUo-
GXFWLYHSHUVRQDOLW\·³0DU[·VUHYROXWLRQDU\VXEMHFW³is abolished, negated by the affirma-
tion of its own alienation.  The division of labor has proceeded so far that we are divided 
from labour.  This is one of the most striking conclusions of Eros and Civilization and what 
FDQEHXQGHUVWRRG IURP LW LV WKDW WKHDOLHQDWLRQRI ¶PDQ· IURP ¶KLV· ODERXU LV WKHYHU\
                                                 
43 7KLVLVREYLRXVO\DFRQWHQWLRXVFODLP,DPQRWJRLQJWRJDLQVD\LWKHUHDVP\LQWHUHVWLVZLWK0DUFXVH·V
romantic utopian trajectory rather with anything empirical.  For more see, for example, PU, pp. 25ff; and 
for a sideways sneer at Marcuse see Alasdair MacIntyre, Marcuse (London: Glasgow, 1970), pp. 46-47.  For 
a broader and more economically informed reading of the empirical details, with relevant graphs and 
analysis, see John Fry, Marcuse³Dilemma and Liberation: A Critical Analysis (Sussex: The Harvester Press, 
 VSHFLILFDOO\FKDSWHUVDQG ¶)XUWKHUFRQVLGHUDWLRQVRI WKH)XQGDPHQWDO(FRQRPLF3URSRVLWLRQV
DQG ,PSOLFDWLRQV· ¶7KH&ULWLTXHRI WKH)XQGDPHQWDO6RFLDO DQG3ROLWLFDO3URSRVLWLRQVDQG ,PSOLFDWLRQV·
pp. 68-146 and passim. 
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condition of his potential freedom.  Subjects are alienated from labour because toil is no 
longer necessary.  The expansion of WHFKQē is so far advanced that it has achieved a kind of 
LQGHSHQGHQWFRQWURORI$QDQNē44  What is at stake here, then, is the significance of Mar-
FXVH·VDVVXPSWLRQWKDWVFDUFLW\RQO\H[LVWVEHFDXVHLW LVorganised to protect the interests 
RI¶DSDUWLFXODUJroup or individual in order to sustain and advance itself in a privileged 
SRVLWLRQ·EC: 36).  This state of organisation, the performance-principle, acts over and 
DERYHWKHUHWKRXJKWSUREOHPRI$QDQNēDQGH[DFWVIURPSDUWLFXODUVRFLDOJURXSVPRUH
than is required by the modified idea of the reality-principle³that is, surplus repression 
(the debt to Marxism is apparent here).  In Eros and Civilization, with the reality-principle 
corrected and thus with surplus-repression obviated, it becomes possible for the pleas-
ure-principle to become the principle of civilization.  The differential, which comprises 
UHSUHVVLRQLVUHGXFHGWRDSRLQWZKHUHLWLVDEOHWRVXSSRUW¶SOHDVXUH·RULQVWLQFWXDOHx-
pression as a viable existential choice.  Ultimately, what replaces the dialectic of labour in 
Hegel and Marx is the new dialectic of the instincts, of love and of death, which I have 
begun to describe here.  History, the repressive outcome of the dialectic and impetus for 
its continuance, is fuelled by the contradiction between Eros and Thanatos.  Thus, Mar-
cuse does not just revise Freud, but also Marx.45 
                                                 
44 I should note that Marcuse takes a more Heideggerian position on technology in his later writings.  In 
One-Dimensional Man (1964), for example, he is concerned that our very response to nature is already condi-
tioned by an a priori  technological way of Being which disenables the subject from recognising her own 
part in the creation of that technology, and thus the possibility of mutual transformation.   Rather than 
being a way of reconciling subject and object, technology has become predicated on production which cir-
cumscribes the world, objectifying it as raw material.  Nature disappears behind technology rather than 
being disclosed by it.  Herbert Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man, (London: Routledge, 1998), pp. 153ff.  Cf. 
Robinson, FL: 236. 
45 Whether this is a radical critique of Marx, or rather an acceptance of the consummation of communism, 
would depend on the position taken with regard  to an ontology based on labour.  Most Marxists would be 
less than sanguine about giving it up. 
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 From these points, the contradiction between essence and existence, the obvia-
tion of surplus repression, the refutation of labour as necessary to human essence and 
the existential possibility of pleasure, emerge further clues to the role of instincts in a 
dialectic.  Firstly, the fact that humans have a tendency to adapt to their existences, 
rather than to their essences.  Secondly, that this occurs when priority is yielded to the 
Zweckrationalität of the reality-(performance-)principle: the domination of nature under 
the rubric of production, beneath which a limited pleasure principle is all but quashed.  
Thirdly, that this crisis reveals the very paradigm on which freedom could be based: 
WHFKQē.  In the Hegelian sense, we are misled by common-sense away from reason.  But in 
this Freudian sense, we are misled by the reality-SULQFLSOHDZD\IURPLQVWLQFWXDO¶WUXWKV·
which would be better served by the existential choice of the pleasure-principle³which 
on this point, as a negating force, equates directly with reason. 
 It is an interesting aside to notice here a resonance with the American trend in 
the comprehension of the instincts, where both Lionel Trilling and Philip Rieff take an 
DOPRVW(PHUVRQLDQVWDQFHRQWKHUROHRIDPHOLRUDWLYHDQGRSSRVLWLRQDOUROHRI¶QDWXUH·
attributed to the instincts.  Considering the instincts, Trilling writes:  
 
Now, Freud may be right or he may be wrong in the place he gives to biol-
ogy in human fate, but I think we must stop to consider whether this em-
phasis on biology, correct or incorrect, is not so far from being a reaction-
ary idea that it is actually a liberating idea.  It proposes to us that culture is 
not all-powerful.  It suggests that there is a residue of human quality be-
yond the reach of cultural control, and that this residue of human quality, 
elemental as it may be, serves to bring culture itself under criticism and 
keeps it from being absolute.46 
 
                                                 
46 /LRQHO7ULOOLQJ¶)UHXG:LWKLQDQG%H\RQG&XOWXUH·Beyond Culture (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1967), p. 
106. 
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Rieff echoes this very point, which is primarily a critique of neo-Freudiansim.  Freud, he 
DUJXHV¶WUDQVIRUPHGWKHPHFKDQLVWQRWLRQRILPSHUVRQDOREMHFWLYHIRUFHVZLWKLQWKHLn-
GLYLGXDO KH PDGH WKHVH IRUFHV WKH LQVWLQFWV WKH LQGLYLGXDO·V FKLHI PRGH RI GHIHQFH
against the world, by defining an individual as the agent of his instincts, seeking a means 
RI H[SUHVVLRQ IRU WKHP· FMM: 28).  In this way, the instincts act over against culture.  
7KH\DUHLQ7ULOOLQJ·VZRUGVEH\RQGFXOWXUH2IFRXUVHZHKDYHDOUHDG\VHHQWKDWQHi-
WKHU ¶QDWXUH· QRU ¶FXOWXUH· UHDOO\ KDV WKLV NLQG RI PHDQLQJ IRU 0DUFXVH RU IRU %URZQ
where they are rather the very process of human becoming, one example of which is the 
instincts (Trieben).  Where I think Rieff and Trilling retain their critical force, however, is 
in thH UHFRJQLWLRQ WKDW ¶QDWXUH· LVDNLQGRIQHJDWLQJSUHVHQFHZLWKLQ WKHVXEMHFW  ,QD
sense they provide an analogous resource to the myth of the frontier thesis, here inter-
QDOLVHGDV DQDWXUDO ¶YLUJLQ ODQG· DQGDV VXFK WKH LQVWLQFWV FRQWUDGLFW WKH ¶FXOWXUDO· DQG
civilising demands of the reality principle.  They maintain, I would argue, an agonal dia-
lectic to the conventional or common sense conception of reality: they hold onto a 
promise. 
0DUFXVH·VTXHVWLRQLQJRIWKHUHDOLW\-principle raises the problem oIMXVWZKDW¶Ue-
DOLW\·FRXOGEHVDLGWRPHDQZLWKLQD+HJHOLDQUH-reading of Freud.  For Hegel reality is 
not what is³the factical conditions to which the reality principle adheres³but what 
ought to be.  Like essence, reality is a privative concept; it points to what is not, or at least 
not yet.  We can be sure now, I think, that this trope belongs to romanticism, to roman-
tic dissatisfaction.  It is in this way that it opens the space for utopian thinking.  The true 
meaning of reality can be accorded only to that which belongs to reason, for which rea-
VRQKDVVWULYHQDQGDWWDLQHG+HJHOFDOOVWKLVWKH¶&RQFHSW·Begriff.47  Reality is not the 
                                                 
47 2IWHQWUDQVODWHGDV¶1RWLRQ· 
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stable world in which we find ourselves³or where, as Emerson points out, we struggle 
to find ourselves³EXW¶DG\QDPLFLn which all fixed forms reveal themselves to be mere 
DEVWUDFWLRQV·RR: 26).  Here we find the familiar philosophical dualism between appear-
ance and reality, phenomena and noumena.  The difference with Hegel, and why he is 
important for utopian thought, is that he is convinced that reality can be grasped, that it 
does not elude human reason, in fact, that it is human reason.  The change is from an 
LQVXSHUDEOHGXDOLVPDVLQ.DQWRU)UHXGWRDGLDOHFWLF 7KXV+HJHO·VSURQRXQFHPHQW
¶WKHUHDOWirklich) is tKHUDWLRQDO·:KDWVHHPVDWILUVWOLNHDWHUULEOHSRVLWLYLVWLQMXQFWLRQ
and has been taken as such,48 comes rather to mean something like: the real is that which 
continues to negate and dissolve all stable perceptions and concepts of objects.  The real 
exists as the possiblePDNLQJLWVZD\WRZDUGWKH¶DFWXDO·WRXQLWHZLWKLWDQGWKXVWR¶Ee-
FRPH·LQ-and-for-LWVHOI,Q0DUFXVH·VLQWHUSUHWDWLRQUHDOLW\OLNHHVVHQFHDQGUHDVRQLVD
negative force which strives to overcome the alienation between subject and object and 
thus reach a place in thinking where all antagonisms are resolved and Concepts revealed.  
+HJHOFDOOVWKLV¶WKH$EVROXWH· 
With this dialectic of existence and essence in mind, let us recall where we left 
the instincts in section two.  Firstly, Freud defined them as fundamentally conservative, 
drawing their energy from the tension of life that desires to relapse into the entropic 
simplicity of the inorganic.  Thanatos is the instinct to die directly; Eros is the instinct to 
die the death of thHVSHFLHV,QWKHLUFRPEDW)UHXGFDOOHGLW ¶WKHEDWWOHRIWKH*LDQWV·
(FP: 452), Eros can only stay an inevitable fate.  In so doing Eros forces the subject to 
make use of nature and others to protect the path to death laid down for it.  Thus Eros 
                                                 
48 For a famous attack on the right-wing reading of this aphorism, see Frederick Engels, Ludwig Feuerbach 
and the End of Classical German Philosophy (Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1976), pp. 5ff. 
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expands out into the world, joins objects and subjects, and demands of nature its due 
allotment³death.  Yet, Thanatos must be repressed by the institutions Eros creates, but 
because of its unconscious presence these institutions are stained with its daemonic 
(FrHXG·VZRUGIRUFH)UHXG·VODWHGULYH-theory emerged in the twentieth-century just in 
time to be confirmed as the tragic destiny of civilization.  How do the positions offered 
E\%URZQDQG0DUFXVHUHIXWH)UHXG·VSHVVLPLVPDQGLQZKDWZD\GRHV+HJHOJLYHVteel 
to their utopian visions? 
Marcuse begins by associating the death instinct not with dying per se, but with 
the regressive requirement to dissipate tension, that is, with the Nirvana principle (EC: 
29).  Because he makes this qualification, anything that releases tension, say the over-
FRPLQJRI$QDQNē WKURXJK WHFKQRORJ\FRXOGKHOS WRPRGLI\ WKLV LQVWLQFWZKLFKXOWi-
mately is historical (Geschichtlich) not eternal.  Now, though this reading of death as a nega-
tive force in the Hegelian sense rather than in the mortal sense does tie in to Freudian 
WKHRU\LWLVDPDMRUUHYLVLRQRILW)UHXGGRHVQRWDGPLWWKDWWKH¶LPPRUWDODGYHUVDU>LHV@·
(CD: 340) of life and death are historically variable in the way that Marcuse is proposing.  
Yet, if as he suggests, both death and life come together in the pleasure-principle, it 
would be theoretically defensible to argue that anything that makes existence more 
pleasurable, such as the reduction in instinctual renunciation necessitated by labour, 
would also mean that less instinctual energy is diverted toward destruction, conse-
quently, bringing about a reduction in repression.  So, just as the pleasure-principle can 
become a viable existential choice if surplus-repression is extinguished from the per-
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formance-principle, Eros and Thanatos will also become expressible, by returning to 
what Marcuse sees as their unified source: the quiescence of tension.49 
,I DV LW VHHPV WKHUH LV QRWKLQJ LQ )UHXG·V WKHRU\ WKDW FRPSOHWHO\ DJUHHV ZLWK
Marcuse that Death will not strike, earlier than is appropriate, at life, at least Marcuse 
ILQGV DQ DOO\ LQ 5LFRHXU  +H DOVR DUJXHV WKDW ¶7KH GHDWK LQVWLQFW WXUQV RXW WR EH WKH
most striking illustration of the constancy principle, of which the pleasure principle is 
always regarded as a mere psyFKRORJLFDOGRXEOH·DQGFRQFOXGHVWKDW ¶WKHGHDWKLQVWLQFW
introduced precisely in order to account for the instinctual character of the compulsion 
WR UHSHDW LV QRW EH\RQG WKH SOHDVXUH SULQFLSOH EXW LV VRPHKRZ LGHQWLFDO ZLWK LW· FP: 
319).  Such a revision of the pleasure principle, to ally it with death, reveals the problem 
DWWKHKHDUWRI)UHXG·VHVVD\:KDWQHHGVWREHUHFRJQL]HGDQG,WKLQNWKHLPSOLFDWLRQV
of this are in Eros and Civilization, is that it is Eros, the synthetic principle, not Thanatos, 
that is beyond the pleasure-principle.  And it is this re-theorising of Eros via narcissism 
that, as we shall see in the next section, results from a dialectic of the instincts. 
7KLVLVDFRPSOLFDWHGSRLQWWKDWUHOLHVRQ)UHXG·VODWHUWRSRJUDSK\DQGDQ over-
coming of some of the differences between the ego and the id.  The ego, Freud argues, 
LV V\QWKHWLF DQGKDVD WHQGHQF\ WR ¶´KDUPRQL]Hµ´UHFRQFLOHµ´RUJDQL]Hµ WKHFRQIOLFWV
DQG GLYLVLRQV LQ PHQWDO OLIH· LAD: 84).  This synthetic capacity is attributable, ulti-
                                                 
49 7KHVHDUFKIRUD ¶XQLILHGVRXUFH·DW WKHRULJLQRIKLVWRU\ %HLQJ LVRQHRI WKHPDin thematics of HO.  
0DUFXVHEHJLQVWKDWERRNIROORZLQJ+HJHO·VFRQWHQWLRQWKDWSKLORVRSK\EHJLQVZLWKWKHIDOOLQWRGLYLVLRQ
(Entzweiung), from which all the dualities, subject/object, understanding/sensibility, mind/body, 
spirit/matter, etc, arise.  Marcuse attempts to trace all these back to the division caused by the thinking 
subject which divides itself (from Being) in the act of positing an object and which only returns to unity in 
+HJHO·V¶5HDVRQ·,QGHHGLWLVDSSDUHQW³and I shall go some way to showing it below³that the quest for 
a unity at the basis of instincts in EC LVSDUDOOHOWR0DUFXVH·VTXHVWIRUWKHFRPPRQRULJLQRIXQGHUVWDQd-
LQJDQG VHQVLELOLW\ LQ WKDW HDUOLHUERRN  , VKDOO UHWXUQ WR WKLV LQ WKHQH[W FKDSWHU &IQRWH WR6FKLOOHU·V
¶(LJhtHHQWK/HWWHU·LQLetters: 127. 
 Curiously, Robinson, even whilst observing the same Hegelian trajectory in Marcuse, fails to see a 
dialectic of instincts in Eros and Civilization.  Indeed, it is on this point that he differentiates Brown and 
Marcuse, for he does see such a dialectic in Brown (FL: 213-,KRSHKHUHWRUHGUHVV5RELQVRQ·VRYHr-
sight. 
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mately, to Eros, the bringer of unity, and the seeker of ever-wider unification.  The in-
stinctual task of Eros is the dual legacy of the primary monad and of the need to sustain 
the route to death immanent in the organism, that is to return to an undifferentiated 
state.  Narcissism, in both its positive and its negative forms, is a way of maintaining this 
LQVWLQFWXDO LQMXQFWLRQ 7KXV%URZQSRLQWVRXW ¶MXVW DV)UHXG VDLGREMHFW-finding was 
refinding, we may add that the fusion sought by the ego is re-IXVLRQ·LAD: 84).  The 
HJRLQLWVV\QWKHWLFUROHLVDFWXDOO\GDQFLQJWRWKHWXQHRIWKHLG,Q¶ILQGLQJ·UHDOLW\WKH
ego is rather striving to repeat the unity that is sustained in unconscious wishes.  Objects 
and the reality they make up are, actually, responses to an instinctual demand for unity, 
and reality is not other to the instincts, in a privative sense, but is made manifest by their 
actions.  There are two ways this can work out.  The first is through the logic of domina-
tion, and I call thLV ¶WKH QDUFLVVLVP RI WKH XQGHUVWDQGLQJ·  7KH VHFRQG LQVWDQFH LV
through an originary co-EHORQJLQJ,FDOOWKLVDQG¶HURWLF·RU¶HFVWDWLFQDUFLVVLVP·,ZLOO
say more on this shortly. 
 
IV 
 
%URZQDOVRDVVXPHV IROORZLQJFOXHV LQ)UHXG·V WKHRU\RIFKLOGKRRd, that the instincts 
can be appeased and a state of nature can be reached.  Of course, we must see this 
WKURXJK WKH GLDOHFWLFDO UHIRUPXODWLRQ RI WKH ZRUG ¶QDWXUH·  1DWXUH LV QRW other to the 
¶KXPDQ· LW is how and what the human becomes.  Thus nature is not in the past, say a 
Rousseauvian primitivism, but is the emergence of the present uncontaminated by the 
past, freed from the neurosis of history.  For Freud there is an insuperable gap between 
WKH¶QDWXUDO·RUWKH¶LQVWLQFWXDO·DQGWKHEHQHILWVRIFLYLOization.  For Brown and Marcuse, 
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reading Freud through Hegel and the young Marx, nature exists as the possible expres-
sion of human essence as instinct (Trieb), but also as the possible negation of that es-
VHQFH%URZQ·VURXWHWRWKLVDQGLWLVHFKRHGLQ0DUFXVH·VWKHRU\RIPHPRU\WKDW,VKDOO
ORRNDW LQWKHQH[WFKDSWHU LV WRFRQVLGHUWLPHDQGILQLWXGHXQGHUWKHKHDGLQJ ¶'HDWK
7LPH(WHUQLW\· 
For Brown, in contrast to Marcuse and Ricoeur, the unification of life and death 
does not just present a new concept of man, but also of history. 
 
The reunification of Life and Death³DFFHSWLQJIRUWKHPRPHQW)UHXG·V
equation of Death and Nirvana³can be envisioned only as the end of the 
historical process  )UHXG·V SHVVLPLVP KLV SUHIHUHQFH IRU GXDOLVP UDWKHU
than dialectics, and his failure to develop a historical eschatology are all 
of a piece.  To see how man separated from nature, and separated out 
the instincts, is to see history as neurosis; and also to see history, as neu-
rosis, pressing restlessly and unconsciously toward the abolition of history 
and the attainment of a state of rest which is also a reunification with na-
ture.  It comes to the same thing to say that the consequence of the dis-
ruption of the unity of Life and Death in man is to make man the his-
torical animal. 
(LAD: 91; emphasis added) 
 
0DUFXVH·V¶QHZFRQFHSWRIWKHSHUVRQ·EURXJKWDERXWE\DQKLVWRULFDODOWHUDWLRQRIWKH
instincts under conditions of non-repressive technology and the realignment of the real-
ity and pleasure principles, is replaced here with the vision of an eschatological end of 
history, the end of time.  Neurosis, Brown consistently argues, points to its own cure; 
history itself is obsessed with its own end³the lingering end that is a state of peace.  
+LVWRU\XQOLNHLQ0DUFXVH·LQWerpretation of Hegel, is located against nature³nature has 
no history; it just is, it does not become7KHKXPDQWUDJHG\LVQHYHU¶WRHQMR\LQVWHDGRI
paying back old scores and debts, and [never] to enter that state of Being which was the 
goal of his BecRPLQJ·LAD: 19).  We can see from this that Brown is presenting a vi-
VLRQDOPRVWGLDPHWULFDOO\RSSRVHGWR0DUFXVHIRUZKRPLW LV WKHWHFKQRORJLFDO ¶XQGHr-
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VWDQGLQJ·RIQDWXUHWKDWZLOODOORZIRUKXPDQUHOHDVHIURPLQVWLQFWXDOUHQXQFLDWLRQDQG
allow life and death to regress to the steady pulse of the pleasure-principle.  Brown has 
QRSDUDOOHOFRQFOXVLRQWRWKLVLGHDRIFRQWUROOLQJRUGRPLQDWLQJQDWXUHVXFKWKDWQDWXUH·V
GHPDQGVDUHH[FOXGHGDOWRJHWKHU+LVSRVLWLRQLVD¶UHWXUQ·WRQDWXUH$QDWXUHWKDWZDs 
only left under conditions of repression, to let it overtake humanity and to regain an 
animal balance with the forces that construct us at the most elemental level, the in-
VWLQFWV7KLVZRXOGLQ%URZQ·VWHUPVEHWKHHQGRIWLPHDQHVFKDWRORJLFDOUHYROution, 
ZKHUH ¶DJDLQ SV\FKRDQDO\VLV FDUULHG WR LWV ORJLFDO FRQFOXVLRQ DQG WUDQVIRUPHG LQWR D
WKHRU\RIKLVWRU\JDWKHUVWRLWVHOIDJHOHVVUHOLJLRXVDVSLUDWLRQV·LAD: 93).  By a theory 
of history, he means a theory of the end of history, as we find in the Bible, as well as in 
+HJHODQG0DU[%URZQ·VKLVWRU\ ¶HQGV·QRWZLWKUHYHODWLRQRUDEVROXWHNQRZOHGJHRU
the dictatorship of the proletariat³though in part it is all of those things.  His history 
HQGVE\SOXQJLQJKXPDQLW\LQWRWKHLPPDQHQFHRI¶QDWXUH· 
There is clear blue water between Brown and Marcuse on this point.  Though 
both see the instincts as fundamentally historical, what they understand by history is not 
the same.  For Marcuse, as we have seen, the process of history (Geschichte) itself remains 
dominant whereas for Brown history becomes merely symptomatic.  What I mean by 
this is that in Eros and Civilization the instincts, as mutable, are the product of history and 
must sublate the present historical stage defined by technological advancement.  Their 
QHJDWLYHSRZHULV¶VXEWHUUDQHDQ·EC: 16) and only emerges in an epiphenomenal repres-
VLRQ,Q%URZQ·VZRUNKRZHYHUWHFKQRORJ\KDVQRGHFLVLYHLQIOXHQFHLQGHHGWKHUHLV
no epochal principle at work at all.  History only exists because of the hitherto 
irreconcilability of the instincts³it is the product of those instincts and not vice-versa.  
Ultimately the difference between Marcuse and Brown depends on whether ontological 
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precedence is given to history, as Marcuse holds, or to instincts, as Brown holds.  Be-
cause Brown thinks of history as a symptom³rather than possessed of its own self-
movement (Bewegtheit), then the decisive change, which makes a reconciliation possible, 
is not technological advancement, but psychoanalysis itself.  History can EH¶FXUHG·Life 
Against Death does not presuppose a teleology, say the completion of the Enlightenment 
project, but an eschatology.  The reconciliation of instincts is not the product of a particu-
lar path, but of the sudden enlightenment put forward by Freud³in the broadest possi-
ble sense it is a religious enlightenment not a rationalistic one.  This difference on the 
meaning of history goes some way to explaining the increasing differences between 
Marcuse and Brown in the controversy over /RYH·V%RG\ that form the basis of Chapter 4. 
If Brown is to conclude that Eros is the drive behind history, then he first has to 
FRPH WR WHUPV ZLWK LWV DGYHUVDU\ 7KDQDWRV  ,W LV 7KDQDWRV·V $YDWDU WKH UHSHWLWLRQ-
compulsion, that keeps civilization tied to time, humanity to its history, which is against 
nature³a trend we have seen develop from the interpretations of Aristotle.  As we have 
also seen, this yields the neurotic movement of time as the return of the repressed.  Life, 
on its own, as Eros, Brown argues, has no need for historical time.  He takes his cue 
IURP)UHXG·VXQGHUGHYHORSHGFRQFOXVLRQWKDWWKHUHLVQRWLPHLQWKHLGWKDWWKHUHQRWh-
ing is forgotten and nothing is negated.  This is a position that lives on in the recollec-
tion of primary narcissism and in the demands of the pleasure principle.  Nature, how-
ever, he argues, recognises death, but is not made ill by it³though life and death exist at 
WKHPRVWEDVLFRUJDQLFOHYHOWKH\DUHQRWLQFRQIOLFW¶7KDWLVWRVD\WKHUHLVVRPHVRUWRI
GLDOHFWLFDOXQLW\·(LAD: 100). 
7KLVLV¶The Psychoanalytical Meaning of History·ZKLFKLVWKHVXEWLWOHKHJLYHVWRKLV
book.  What must be stressed in this title is the word meaning, indicating that this is a 
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hermeneutic and not a historiographic problem.50  It is expressly not writing history 
IURPDSV\FKRDQDO\WLFSRLQWRIYLHZDVWXG\LQWKH2HGLSDOPRWLYDWLRQVRI¶JUHDWLQGi-
YLGXDOV·IRUH[DPSOHEXWDQLQWHUSUHWDWLRQRIWKHYHU\GULYHVRIKLVWRU\XVLQJWKHLPSOica-
WLRQV RI )UHXG·V ODWH PHWDSV\FKRORJ\  $QG DV IRU 0DUFXVH this means a conceptual 
revolution from class-VWUXJJOHRUPDVWHUDQGVODYHWRDGLDOHFWLFRILQVWLQFWV¶)URPWKH
SV\FKRDQDO\WLFDOSRLQWRIYLHZ·%URZQDUJXHV ¶XQVDWLVILHGDQGUHSUHVVHGEXW LPPRUWDO
desires sustain the historical process.  History is shaped beyond our conscious will, not 
E\WKHFXQQLQJRIUHDVRQEXWE\WKHFXQQLQJRIGHVLUH·LAD: 16).  That this is a Freu-
GLDQ LQWHUSUHWDWLRQRI+HJHO DQG0DU[ LV FRQILUPHGE\ WKH IROORZLQJ VWDWHPHQWV ¶7KH
riddle of history is not in Reason but in desiUHQRWLQODERXUEXWLQORYH·DQG¶)URPWKLV
point of view, repressed Eros is the energy of history and labour must be seen as subli-
PDWHG(URV· LAD 16, 17).  Eros is the key to history, but the movement of Eros in 
¶PDQ·LVGHVLUHWKXV¶WKHHVVHQFHRIPan consists, not as Descartes maintained, in think-
LQJEXW LQGHVLULQJ· LAD: 7)³I desire therefore I am³a complete overturning of the 
GRPLQDQFHRIGLVHPERGLHG ¶PLQG· LQ LQWHUSUHWDWLRQVRI WKHHVVHQFHRI ¶KXPDQLW\·  ,n-
deed, one of the professed claims of Life Against Death is to return the soul to the body 
as embodied Geist.  It should be apparent, then, from these statements why Brown be-
lieves a psychoanalytical theory of history is necessary.  Because the force that moves 
                                                 
50 7KXV,GLVDJUHHWRWDOO\ZLWK5RELQVRQ·VDVVHUWLRQWKDW¶>%URZQ@ZDVXQDEOHWRDFFRXQWIRUWKHKLVWRULFDO
rise of repressive civilization (the subtitle of Life Against Death¶7KH3V\FKRDQDO\WLFDO0HDQLQJRI+LVWRU\·
was both pompous and misleading), and equally incapable of envisioning any historical escape from the 
GLOHPPDRIPRGHUQXQKDSSLQHVV· FL: 233.  Brown was not trying to make a historiographic point but  
rather a hermeneutic one. 
 7KHUHLVDOVRDQDUJXPHQWDERXW%URZQ·VUHVSRQVHWRKLVWRU\FDUULHGLQDissent in the late 1960s.  
7KHRSHQLQJVDOYRLV/LRQHO$EHO·V¶,PSRUWDQW1RQVHQVH·0DUFK-April, 1968, pp. 147-157) which accuses 
Brown of having an inadequate idea of  the anthropological bases of history.  The return of fire is by Ar-
WKXU(IURQ¶,Q'HIHQVHRI1RUPDQ2%URZQ·6HSWHPEHU-October, 1968, pp. 451-455), who accuses Abel 
of misreading Freud and misrepresenting Brown.  Abel responds in the same issue (pp. 455-458), and does 
not recant.  Overall, their contretemps adds very little to any reading of Brown, dealing mainly with their 
RZQSDUDGLJPV7KHZKROHDUJXPHQWLVZDUPHGRYHUDQGVHUYHGXSLQPRUHGHWDLOE\(IURQLQ¶3KLORVo-
phy, CriticisPDQGWKH%RG\·Paunch, 1973, pp. 72-163. 
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history is not consciousness, not thinking, not even the cunning of reason, but the uncon-
scious, which must be understood through its representations which are expressions of 
repressed instinctual desire. 
This is the struggle captured in the title of his book: life against death is the psy-
choanalytical meaning of history.  Any kind of positive counter-Enlightenment project, 
OHDQLQJRQ)UHXG·V LQVWLQFW WKHRU\ZKLFK LVFOHDUO\ZKDWERWK%URZQDQG0DUFXVHDUH
offering, has to theorise a dialectic in which Eros triumphs, and in which death does not 
disappear, but is sublated.  It must not be death itself that is the problem, because it is 
never going to go away³Marcuse and Brown are not offering immortality³but rather 
the way that Western civilisations cope with, or fail to cope with, death; what it means 
for them and how it structures the lives possible within them.  Indeed, for Brown, it is in 
death that the saving power grows.  Both Brown and Marcuse, searching for a widely 
applicable solution, tend to generalise here.  But the conclusion they come up with, 
something that is apparent in the dominant Western forms of Judeo-Christian thought 
and in psychoanalysis itself, is that life and death are considered as separate³that death, 
the absoluteness of finitude, is not an issue for life, and certainly not for the life of the 
body.  To any view that accepts non-contradiction in definitions this seems absurd, but 
to dialectical thinking truth only emerges within or as the movement of contradictions: 
as their sublation.  Thus, the truth of life is death and vice-versa, and the outcome of 
this movement must be a different understanding of what has hitherto been called life 
and death. 
It is not death itself that is the problem, but the human treatment of it as other, 
as punishment, as something inhumaQKHQFH%URZQ·VDVVHVVPHQWRISV\FKRDQDO\VLVDV
¶WKHVFLHQFHRIRULJLQDOVLQ·>LAD: 14]).  Humans, he argues, repress their death and in 
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so doing create history as the history of this repression, civilization as neurosis.  It is 
their failure to recognise, at the most basic level, that life and death are, dialectically, the 
¶VDPH·)UHXGLVSHUKDSVVXJJHVWLYHRIWKLVFRQFOXVLRQZKHQKHDUJXHVWKDWWKHJRDORI
all life is death, but he shies away from the truth as Brown sees it, and retains a dualism.  
Freud, he points out, aligned his metaphysical principle with the pre-Socratic philoso-
SKHU(PSHGRFOHV·FRVPRORJLFDOGLYLVLRQEHWZHHQORYHphilia) and strife (neikos).  Brown, 
however, aligns himself with the earlier Greek thinkers, Anaximander, who asserted a 
SULPDOXQGLIIHUHQWLDWHGVWDWHDQG+HUDFOLWXVZKRVXJJHVWHGWKH¶XOWLPDWHXQLW\RIRSSo-
VLWHVLQFOXGLQJOLIHDQGGHDWK·LAD: 83).  There is an important distinction between the 
two positions: one ends in the reinforcement of therapeutic pessimism, despair and divi-
sion, the other points to reconciliation, which for Brown means hope.  If there is a cos-
mological unity between life and death, then there is no inherent reason why humans 
should not enjoy it.  He uses Hegel to further his point. 
 ,Q%URZQ·VUHDGLQJRI+HJHO¶KLVWRU\·LVZKDWPDQGRHVZLWKKLVGHDWK 
 
Dialectics is a dialectic of life against death 
death is a part of life 
Like Freud, Hegel says the goal of all life is death: 
¶7KHQDWXUHRIWKHILQLWHOLHVLQWKLVWKDWLWGLVVROYHVLWVHOI· 
it must go under 
this is self-FRQWUDFWLRQLQSUDFWLFHLQDFWLRQ« 
 
Hegel, Phenomenology ¶1RWWKHOLIHWKDWVKULQNVIURPGHDWKDQGNHHSVLt-
self undefiled by devastation (Verwüstung), but the life that suffers death 
and preserves itself in death is the life of the Spirit.  Spirit gains its truth 
by finding itself in absolute dismemberment (Zerrissenheit·51 
 
                                                 
51 1RUPDQ2%URZQ¶)URP3ROLWLFVWR0HWDSROLWLFV· LQCaterpillar (Vol. 1, October, 1967), pp. 62-94, p. 
85. 
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Man, faced with his own death³his own negation³WUDQVIRUPV ¶WKHFRQVFLRXVQHVVRI
death into a struggle to appropriate the life of another human being at thHULVNRIRQH·V
RZQOLIHKLVWRU\DVWKHFODVVVWUXJJOHWKHGLDOHFWLFRIPDVWHUDQGVODYHLQ+HJHO·VWHUPi-
QRORJ\LVEDVHGRQDQH[WURYHUVLRQRIGHDWK·LAD: 102).  We are already familiar with 
these ideas.  What Brown does, even more clearly than the Hegelian Marcuse does 
(again, perhaps because he is not in his own field), is link this to Freud.  Freud has con-
cluded that the will to mastery over nature and other people is also an extroversion of 
the death instinct³sado-masochism.  Freud first thought that people were innately ag-
gressive; only later did he turn this around and, like Hegel, see aggression as a way of 
protecting the self; Thanatos rebounding off Eros as violence.  What Brown adds to this 
is the notion of the unconscious, and thus he changes death as an absolute into death as 
an interpretation of the death instinct under conditions of its repression. 
 
Hegel needs reformulation in the light of psychoanalytical doctrine of 
repression and the unconscious.  It is not the consciousness of death 
that is transformed into aggression, but the unconscious death instinct; 
the unconscious death instinct is that negativity or nothingness which is 
extroverted into the action of negating nature and other men.  Freud 
KLPVHOI«GHULYHG DIILUPDWLRQ IURP (URV DQG negation from its instinc-
tual opposite. 
(LAD: 102-103) 
 
%URZQ·VSRLQW LV WKDW WKHQHJDWLRQRI WKHRWKHU³be it nature as an object or another 
subject³in the process of the extroversion of death is mistaken by consciousness.  
Eros, which for Hegel demands the extinction of otherness, can in fact open itself as the 
affirmation of otherness, in exactly the same way that the subject was affirmative in the 
phase of primary narcissism.  It is in this way, I would say, that for Brown Desire be-
FRPHV/RYH¶,GHVLUH WKHUHIRUH,DP·EHFRPHVVRPHWKLQJOLNH¶,ORYHWKHUHIRUHwe DUH·
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It figures an original and expansive co-belonging.52   And, as he says repeatedly, it is only 
repression that keeps Eros and Thanatos from coming into agreement.  And repression 
is the sine qua non of history from which Brown wants to escape in order to return³
though not by going backward, but in a messianic sense³WRZKDWKHFDOOVWKH¶6DEEDWK
RI(WHUQLW\·³the bliss of childhood. 
For Brown, as we saw with Marcuse, when Freud uses the word death, he does 
not mean death, but rather the equivocal tripartite matrix of the Nirvana-principle, the 
repetition compulsion, and sado-masochism.  Only the last of these in any way applies 
to destruction, and all three can be tied to the pleasure principle.  At this point I see the 
same problem facing Brown as faces Marcuse.  If the pleasure-principle is actually allied 
with the death instinct (is its existential expression), then just what is beyond the pleasure-
principle, and, moreover, how can Eros be thought in order to grow into that space?  
For it is surely something beyond the pleasure principle that is going to bring about the 
kind of utopian visions they both advocate.  The pleasure principle itself, as Freud for-
mulates it, is intimate only with a kind of death.  For the pleasure-principle is the advo-
cate of separation, the annihilation of the stimulation brought about by difference and 
otherness³it is the principle of negation³pleasure is, in this sense, negative.  As Brown 
SXWV LW ¶2QO\ DQ XQUHSUHVsed humanity, strong enough to live-and-die, could let Eros 
VHHNXQLRQDQGOHWGHDWKNHHSVHSDUDWHQHVV·LAD: 106).  As I have already established, 
LQRUGHUWRPDNHWKHGLDOHFWLFDOUHYHUVDOERWK%URZQDQG0DUFXVHPDNHXVHRI)UHXG·V
VSHFXODWLYH¶RFHDQLFIHHOLQJ·WKDWPRPHQWRIXQGLIIHUHQWLDWLRQZKHQWKHUHZDVSOHDVXUH
in otherness because it was affirmed in unity.  This first stage of childhood equates with 
+HJHO·VODVWVWDJHRINQRZOHGJH,WLVWKHFLUFOHRIEHLQJDVZHVDZZLWK$ULVWRWOH·Vnous 
                                                 
52 In Chapter 4 there is a lengthy discussion of what this means. 
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theos, a going out, an ex-stasis, which returns in an extinction that is an affirmation.  It is 
the standard romantic trope that returns from diremption to unity. 
7KLVLVWKHSULQFLSOHRI1DUFLVVXVVRSHUIHFWO\UHQGHUHGE\5LONH·VSRHPRI
that title. 
 
Narcissus perished.  From his beauty rose 
incessantly the nearness of his being, 
like scent of heliotrope that clings and cloys. 
But his one avocation was self-seeing. 
 
Whatever left him he loved back again, 
he whom the open wind could not contain; 
rapt, closed the round of reciprocity, 
annulled himself, and could no longer be.53 
 
I do not mean to provide a reading for this poem outside of the context presented here.  
The Narcissus myth could, of course, be read in terms of the dangers of secondary nar-
cissism,54 bXW5LONH·VSRHPLVPRUHUHOHYDQW,EHOLHYHWRWKHWUDQVLHQFHRISULPDU\QDr-
cissism.  It begins with a death, but the negation is not of the other, but of the self as 
ego.  Primary narcissism is egoless, or, to put it another way that means the same thing: 
everything LVWKHHJRWKHLPDJHFDSWXUHGLQ(PHUVRQ·VHSLSKDQ\+HJHODUJXHVWKDWWKH
ego emerges as the desire to extinguish the other.  The path of Eros is, rather, the ex-
tinction of the self, but it is a perishing in which the ego grows³it sees itself every-
ZKHUHDOPRVWE\DFFLGHQW7KHZRUG¶DYRFDWLRQ·55 which Hamburger chooses, does not 
                                                 
53 Maria Rainer Rilke (trans. Michael Hamburger), An Unofficial Rilke (London: Anvil, 1992), p. 43. 
54 6XFKDUHDGLQJLVSURYLGHGLQWKHPRGHUQ7HG+XJKHVWUDQVODWLRQRI2YLGZKHUH1DUFLVVXVPLVWDNHV¶WKH
SLFWXUHRIKLPVHOIRQWKHPHQLVFXV)RUWKHVWUDQJHUZKRFRXOGPDNHKLPKDSS\·DQGLVD¶3oor misguided 
ER\:KDW\RXKRSH7R OD\KROGRIKDVQRH[LVWHQFH/RRNDZD\DQGZKDW\RX ORYH LVQRZKHUH· IURP
¶(FKRDQG1DUFLVVXV·7HG+XJKHVTales from Ovid (London: Faber and Faber, 1997), pp. 79-80. 
55 7KRXJK,SXWHPSKDVLVRQWKLVZRUG+DPEXUJHU·Vchoice is something of a mystery.  Avocation sug-
gests something trivial, a hobby or a pastime, whereas the German word gesetzt (LKPDEHUZDUJHVHW]W«) im-
plies that it was mandatory, from the past participle of Setzen, to put something in place.  The over all feel 
RI5LONH·VOLQHLVUDWKHUWKDWLWLV1DUFLVVXV·VGHVWLQ\WRVHHKLPVHOI³perhaps this refers back to the cling-
ing, cloying scent. 
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FRQWDLQ WKH FRPSXOVLYH IHHO RI VHFRQGDU\ QDUFLVVLVP  $QG WKH JUDYLW\ RI 1DUFLVVXV·
modest avocation returns the world to him in an erotic, ever widening, circle which the 
¶RSHQZLQGFRXOGQRWFRQWDLQ·1DUFLVVXV·EHLQJWKHQLVQRW¶DQQXOOHG·E\WKHGHDWKLn-
stinct, but by the life instinct³Eros is able to return to an undifferentiated state not by 
killing the ego, but by its infinite expansion into the world.  This is the transient state 
that the rethinking of Eros by Marcuse and Brown hopes to sustain.  A movement out-
ward that inverts the Hegelian drive to absolute knowledge.56  It is not in the negation 
and domination of others that Eros thrives and stills Thanatos, but in the affirmation of 
otherness.  A Narcissism of pure self-reflection allies itself only to death, a narcissism that 
obliterates the self allies itself to life.  Life, Eros, is beyond the pleasure principle be-
cause, in welcoming difference it tolerates³maybe even thrives on³tension, a tension 
WKDWLVXQWDLQWHGE\WKUHDW7KLVWHQVLRQLVGHVFULEHGE\:LOGHQDV¶QHJDWLYHHQWURS\·RU
¶HPHUJHQWHYROXWLRQ· WKHQHJDWLRQRI WKHHQWURS\RI WKHGHDWK LQVWLQFW DV WKH1LUYDQD
principle.  It is the force pURYLGHG E\ DQ RSHQ V\VWHP DQ XQUHVWULFWHG HFRQRP\ ¶WKH
constant tendency to higher and higher levels of organization³which implies a very 
high order of morphogenesisWKHDELOLW\WRHODERUDWHDQGFKDQJHVWUXFWXUH·0)0,W
preserves what he calls D¶JUDGLHQW·WKDWUHIXVHVWKHKRPHRVWDVLVRIHQWURSLFIRUPV,WLV
the higher organisational principle of, particularly social, life.57 
                                                 
56 As we shall see below, this inversion is arguably implicit in Hegel himself. 
57 On this point Wilden actually positionVKLPVHOIDJDLQVW%URZQ¶(URVLVDQDIILUPDWLYHJUDGLHQWSURGXc-
ing, differentiating principle.  But as that which seeks the identification of self with other, under the com-
mands of the Other, [(]as that which Norman O. Brown sees as the great unifying principle, being-one-
with-the-world uniting the notions of narcissism and object choice), Eros is the principle of negation of 
GLIIHUHQFHWKHUHGXFWLRQRIJUDGLHQWLWLVHQWURSLFLQLWVHOI·0)0,QWKLV,EHOLHYHKHKDVPLVUHDG
the dialectical natuUHRI%URZQ·VWKRXJKW 
 In Chapter 4 I shall try to show that this principle of expansion is fundamental to the imagination 
and to creativity. 
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 I can now begin to explain what I meant by the narcissism of the understanding 
and its other, referred to at the end of WKHODVWVHFWLRQ)LUVWO\LQ¶ILQGLQJ·UHDOLW\WKHHJR
is rather striving to repeat the unity that is sustained in unconscious wishes.  Secondly, 
there is the linked claim that objects and the reality they make up are, actually, responses 
to an instinctual demand for unity.  Such a finding is only to follow the Hegelian path to 
reality which, through the dialectic of negation, strives to bring existence in line with es-
sence.  For Marcuse and Brown, the essence of what it is to be human is instinctual, but, 
moreover, it is Eros.  It is in both the reality principle and the pleasure principle that the 
G\QDPLFWHQVLRQEHWZHHQHVVHQFHDQGH[LVWHQFH LVSOD\HGRXW 1HLWKHURI)UHXG·VWZR
SULQFLSOHVDSSOLHVWR¶UHDOLW\·LQWKHUHWKRXJKWHVVHQWLDOVHQVH,DPPDintaining here, but 
are rather the field of conflict.  Both reality and pleasure are the way the essences exist, but 
not how they ex-sistQRWKRZWKH\DUHLQWKH¶H[SDQGHGILHOG·RI(URV$VZHVDZDERYH
objects as they arise in the field of nature, are LQIDFWWKH¶REMHFWLILFDWLRQ·RIWKHFRQIOLFW
between essence and existence that emerges as nature and history.  Nature (Brown) and 
history (Marcuse), on this reading, are attempts to (re)attain unity, to re-find essential 
desires in existent things.  It is because of this that we can conclude, reality is not other to 
the instincts, in a privative sense, but is made manifest by their actions.  Moreover, how 
this expansion is approached will determine whether domination or co-belonging is the 
telos of the dialectic. 
 
V 
 
Narcissism is the self-movement of the ego as its strives to gather itself in otherness, to 
love back again whatever leaves it.  The question remains, though, whether this move-
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ment, Hegel calls it desire, annihilates the other or the self.  IQ 0DUFXVH·V DQG %URZQ·V
UHDGLQJVLWLVWKHVHOIWKDWJLYHVZD\WRRWKHUQHVV+HJHO·VGHVLUHLVUHSODFHGE\ORYH,QD
more conventional reading of Hegel or of Freud, quite the opposite might be assumed.  
Such a reading of Freud is provided by Rieff. 
 
FreXG·VLGHDVRIVH[XDOLW\DVDJHQHUDOHQHUJ\RIWKHVHOIPD\EHJLYHQDQRWKHU
interpretation: that satisfaction from an object is but a devious means of self-
ORYH«/RYLQJWKHERG\LVORYHGDQGWKXVDQ\REMHFWLVDEVRUEHGLQWRWKH
subject; even adult loves retain their autistic and self-regarding character.  
That love must serve the self or the self will shrink from us, that the self may 
chase love around an object and back to itself again³WKLVLV)UHXG·VEULOOLDQW
and true insight, reminiscent of La RochIRXFDXOG·VNHHQGHWHFWLRQRIWKHHJR
behind the curtain. 
(FMM: 157-158) 
 
From the position of Eros and Civilization and Life Against Death, what Rieff is lacking is 
WKH LGHDRIDZLGHQHGVHOI LQSULPDU\QDUFLVVLVP 7KLV LV WKHNH\WRERWK%URZQ·VDQG
MarcXVH·VWKRXJKWLILWLVGHQLHGWKH\IDOODSDUW)RU5LHIIWKHSULPDU\PRQDGLVVWLOODQ
XQSUREOHPDWLF ¶VHOI· DQ HJR LQ ZDLWLQJ  7KH ¶ERG\· RI QDUFLVVLVP DV VXFK JDLQV QR
pleasure from the other, has no relation to the other.  It is thus a primary autism not a 
primary narcissism.58  5LHII·VFKLOGLWVHHPVEHJLQVLQDOLHQDWLRQ¶WKHERGLO\VHOIZHILUVW
H[SORUH DQG OLNH EHIRUH ZH NQRZ ZKDW LW LV WR OLNH RWKHU ERGLHV· FMM: 156).  For 
Rieff³as for Freud³the world is alien and hostile.  The oceanic feeOLQJLVUHJUHVVLYH¶D
IODJJLQJ RI WKH HJR· ZKLFK GHQLHV WKH ¶SHUPDQHQW FRQIOLFW EHWZHHQ VHOI DQG QRQ-VHOI·
(FMM: 267).  Reunion at the expense of the ego is simply an irrational surrender.  Indeed, 
it is very hard to perceive any value, utopian or otherwise, in the extinguishing of the ego 
as one object among many.  This may provide another explanation as to why Marcuse 
and Brown move apart in later years, with Marcuse implying a refutation of some of the 
                                                 
58 We will see another version of this with Castoriadis in Chapter 4. 
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ideas of Eros and Civilization, moving closer to Rieff, and Brown intensifying his quest for 
unity.  It also leads to a critique of this position by Joel Whitebook. 
 :KLWHERRN UHFRJQLVHV RQO\ KXEULV LQ 0DUFXVH·V FODLPV IRU QDUFLVVLVP DQG E\
H[WHQVLRQWKRXJKKHLVQRWFRQVLGHUHGLQ:KLWHERRN·VVWXG\%URZQ·VFODLPV+HPDr-
VKDOVDODUJHDPRXQWRIZRUNVXEVHTXHQWWR0DUFXVH·VERRNZKLFKVXJJHVWVWKHDXWKRr-
LW\DQGRPQLSRWHQFHRIQDUFLVVLVPLVLQIDFW¶DGHIHQVLYHVKDP·PU: 14), a position al-
ZD\V SUHVHQW LQ )UHXG·V ZRUN  )RU :KLWHERRN³and I concur though draw different 
conclusion³WKH¶WUHDWPHQWRIQDUFLVVLVPOLHVDWWKHVSHFXODWLYHDQGSUREOHPDWLFFRUHRI
0DUFXVH·VDOUHDG\XQDEDVKHGO\VSHFXODWLYHZRUN·PU: 33).  In his critique he argues that 
primary narcissism relies on a reality based on the primary monad of mother-baby-world 
DQGFDQOHDGRQO\WR¶GH-GLIIHUHQWLDWLRQ·+HXVHVDQH[SUHVVLRQERUURZHGIURP+HJHO·V
DQDORJRXVFULWLTXHRIWKH\RXQJ6FKHOOLQJLQKLV¶3UHIDFH·WKDWWKLVHJRLFPRQLVPOHDGVWR
WKH ¶QLJKW«LQ ZKLFK DOO FRZV DUH EODFN· PU: 13-14).  It is of course interesting that 
Whitebook, presumably knowingly, would aim a critical phrase used by Hegel in the di-
rection of a Hegelian.  For Whitebook, the phrase means that primary narcissism is an 
omnivorous expression of the libido dissolving Eros and Thanatos into a fatal identity 
that utterly submerges the ego.  We have already seen, however, how Marcuse and 
%URZQWXUQWR+HJHOUDWKHUWKDQ)UHXGLQGHIHQFHRISULPDU\QDUFLVVLVP7KXV+HJHO·V
phrase is an apposite riposte, for what he means to FULWLFLVHE\LWLV6FKHOOLQJ·VQRWLRQRI
absolute identity that collapses into the impossibility of difference.  For Schelling, Walter 
Kaufman argues, it was only the perspective of an inadequate ego that brought differen-
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tiation into the world.59  Hegel, oQWKHFRQWUDU\PHDQVWKDWDEVROXWHNQRZOHGJH¶XQGHr-
VWDQGV·HYHU\WKLQJEXWSUHVHUYHVLWLQLWVGLIIHrence. 
For Hegel the understanding (Verstand) meant two things.  The first is the proc-
ess by which the subject is able to determine the world in an elementary form.  Marcuse 
HVWDEOLVKHVLWDVIROORZV¶8QGHUVWDQGLQJ«FRQFHLYHVDZRUOGRIILQLWHHQWLWLHVJRYHUQHG
by the principle of identity and opposition.  Everything is identical with itself and with 
nothing else; it is, by virtue of its self-identity, opposHG WR DOO RWKHU WKLQJV· RR: 44).  
7KLVLVEDVLFDOO\WKHVDPHDVZKDWKHFDOOV¶FRPPRQ-VHQVH·³we know it as the logic of 
non-contradiction or the reality-principle³which is the general security that each thing 
exists untouched in its individuality and maintains itself as such.  This obviously corre-
sponds to pre-dialectical thinking.  The later meaning of the word, coming after dialecti-
cal consciousness, states that: 
 
The unity of the thing is not only determined but constituted by its rela-
tion to other thinJV DQG LWV WKLQJKRRG FRQVLVWV LQ WKLV YHU\ UHODWLRQ«
The thing becomes itself through its opposition to other things; it is, as 
Hegel says, the unity of itself with its opposite, or, of being-for-itself 
with being-for-another.  In other words, the very ¶VXEVWDQFH·RIWKHWKLQJ
must be gleaned from its self-established relation to other things.  This, 
however, is not within the power of perception to accomplish; it is the 
work of (conceptual) understanding. 
(RR: 109) 
 
What the Understanding60 does, in this case, is to take the perception of a particular 
thing, say a simple salt, and to follow the path by which we come to terms with what it 
¶LV·LWVVXEVWDQFH)LUVWO\DVLWLVSHUFHLYHGLWLVnegated by that perception, broken into 
                                                 
59 6HH:DOWHU.DXIPDQ·VFRPPHQWDU\WRKLVWUDQVODWLRQRIWKH¶3UHIDFH·WRWKHPhenomenology in Hegel: Texts 
And Commentary (New York: Doubleday, 1966), pp. 26-+HJHO·VZRUGV DUHRQS  DQG6FKHOOLQJ LV
FLWHGLQ.DXIPDQ·VFRPPHQWDU\RQS7KHLQIOXHQFHRIWKH\RXQJ6FKHOOLQJRQ(PHUVRQLVapparent 
here (see Chapter 1). 
60 Following the convention, I shall capitalise Understanding when it is meant in this second sense. 
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sense data (white, cubic, hard, etc.); the role of the Understanding is to negate this differ-
ence so that the thing is reconstituted in its universality.  By universal here Hegel means 
nothing more than how the particular once Understood can be utilised in the self-
movement of the subject toward freedom where that object is for a subject.  The double 
QHJDWLRQWDNHVZKDWZDV¶LQ-LWVHOI·ZUDSSHGXSLQLWVLQGLYLGXDOLW\DQGUHFRJQLVHVWKDWLW
LV¶IRU-DQRWKHU·³as such it is universal: through the dialectic, the salt comes to be for us.  
The pattern of the Understanding is repeated in all acts of cognition right up to self-
consciousness and the dialectic of desire in the master/slave conflict.  The Understand-
ing is the faculty by which objects come to emerge from the subjectivity of the per-
ceiver; their universality is recognised as their dialectical engagement with the subject. 
 The problem with the Understanding, though, is that because of the nature of its 
subjectivity, when it goes out from the subject, it finds nothing but itselI DV LQ5LHII·V
reference to La Rochfoucauld).  It is a finite version of nous theos, or, what I am calling 
here, the narcissism of the understanding.  The truth it seeks behind the veil of appearance 
given by everyday understanding is revealed, in Understanding as the truth of the subject, 
that is its teleological path to freedom in reason.  Nevertheless, the question holds: does 
reason in negating the particularity of the object annihilate its otherness or preserve it?  
How this is taken determines how we are to read Brown and Marcuse and how we are 
to take the narcissism of the understanding that this represents.  Marcuse observes that 
¶8QGHUVWDQGLQJILQGVQRWKLQJEXWitself when it seeks the essence behind the appearance 
RIWKLQJV· RR: 111), and he cites Hegel from the Phenomenology ¶,W LVPDQLIHVW WKDWEe-
hind the so-called curtain, which is to hide the inner world, there is nothing to be seen 
unless we ourselves go behind there, as much in order that we may thereby see, as that 
there may be something EHKLQGWKHUHZKLFKFDQEHVHHQ·RR: 111).  This suggests more 
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than a simple analogy or correlation between noumenal reality and the phenomenal Un-
derstanding of that reality. 
For Marcuse this direct, or Absolute, relationship cuts right to the heart of 
HegHO·VLPSRUWDQFHIRU8WRSLDQWKLQNLQJDQGSV\FKRDQDO\VLVLQSDUWLFXODU,WVHHPVWR
suggest that a subjective change will bring about an objective change³that a dialectical Un-
derstanding of reality brings about a total revision of reality.  To this end Marcuse can 
see in this a fundamental contribution to an idealist politics, of which both Freud and 
Marx are heirs. 
 
+HJHO·V LQVLVWHQFHWKDWWKHVXEMHFWEHUHFRJQLVHGEHKLQGWKHDSSHDUDQFH
of things is an expression of the basic desire of idealism that man trans-
form the estranged world into a world of his own.  The Phenomenology of 
Mind accordingly follows through by merging the sphere of epistemology 
with the world of history, passing from the discovery of the subject to 
the task of mastering reality through self-conscious practice. 
(RR: 110) 
 
Existence and essence only come together when reality is mastered, which means that a 
fundamental identity is observed between subject and object and an epochal change in 
history takes place. 
Holding on to the question of what happens to otherness as the most vital ques-
tion here, precisely how essence is described again becomes important.  The problem is to 
escape the narcissistic abyss of thought thinking itself, of having no object but itself (RR: 
163), which was the oEMHFWLYHHQGRI+HJHO·VSKLORVRSK\³freedom only existing in pure 
thought.  In this narcissism of the understanding all is merged into the kind of logical 
rationality that spells its domination.  Hegel is as we can see suggestive of this end,61 and 
                                                 
61 6HHIRUH[DPSOH0DUFXVH·VFRPPHQW¶RXULQWHUSUHWDWLRQDOVRUHIXWHV'LOWKH\·VYLHZWKDWWKHFRQFHSWRI
´RWKHUQHVVµLVDVRXUFHRIHPEDUUDVVPHQWIRU+HJHO·HO&IWKHUHVWRIWKLV&KDSWHU¶7KH$EVROXWH
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his thought is often considered a colonial strategy that obliterates all difference into the 
6DPHWKH¶LGHQWLW\WKLQNLQJ·RIWKHQDUFLVVLVPRIWKHXQGHUVWDQGLQJ 7KLVLVDQHJDWLYH
approach that posits nature in terms of categories and measurable quantities.  It contains 
an a priori conception of nature as open to domination.  In Freud this corresponds to the 
reality principle in that it withstands reality testing (again, a tautology) which comprises 
precisely these a priori conceptions of measurability, repeatability, etc.  For Whitebook, 
this is another danger of Eros and Civilization, that the synthetic ego, leaving the subject 
for the object, is liable to fall into a systematic (Aristotelian) vision of the world.  White-
book cites Samuel Weber who suggests that ¶WKHDWWHPSWWRJUDVSWKHZRUOGLQV\VWHm-
atic thought, which is to say in terms of unity and totality results from the narcissistic 
HJR·VLPSXOVHV«WRLPSRVHLWVRZQDUWLILFLDODQGULJLGXQLW\RQWKHZRUOG·PU: 109).  It is 
DOVRZRUWKUHFDOOLQJKHUH)UHXG·VUHPDUNLQ¶2Q1DUFLVVLVP$Q,QWURGXFWLRQ·WKDWV\s-
tematic philosophy arises from paranoia, which is a form of narcissism (NI: 91).  This is 
a point to which I return in Chapter 4. 
 Marcuse, however, reads Hegel positively, and shows how he can be located as 
WKH SUHVHUYHU RI GLIIHUHQFH JLYLQJ XV WKH SRVVLELOLW\ WKDW ¶LGHQWLW\· GRHV QRW PHDQ WKH
¶6DPH· 
 
Essence denotes the unity of being, its identity throughout change.  Pre-
cisely what is this unity of identity?  It is not a permanent and fixed sub-
stratum, but a process wherein everything copes with its inherent con-
tradictions and unfolds itself as a result.  Conceived in this way, identity 
contains its opposite, difference, and involves a self differentiation and 
an ensuing unification.  Every existence precipitates itself into negativity 
and remains what it is only by negating this negativity.  It splits up into a 
diversity of states and relations to other things, which are originally for-
eign to it, but which become part of its proper self when they are 
brought under the working influence of its essence.  Identity is thus the 
                                                                                                                                           
Difference within Being: Equality-with-Self-in-Otherness. Being as Motility [Bewegtheit@· HO: pp. 39-49) 
IRUDPRUHGHWDLOHGUHDGLQJRIRWKHUQHVVLQ+HJHO·VSKLORVRSK\.  Cf. MHH: 185f. 
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VDPHDV WKH ¶QHJDWLYH WRWDOLW\·ZKLFKZDV VKRZQ WREH WKH VWUXFWXUHRI
UHDOLW\LWLV¶WKHVDPHDV(VVHQFH· 
(RR: 146) 
 
It is worth taking some time to explain what Marcuse means in the context of the re-
thinking of narcissism and the instincts taking place in Eros and Civilization and Life 
Against Death. 
 ¶(VVHQFHGHQRWHVWKHXQLW\RIEHLQJLWVLGHQWLW\WKURXJKRXWFKDQJH·,Q+HJHO·V
ZRUGV ¶Essence is infinity as the supersession RIDOOGLVWLQFWLRQV· PS: 106).  In our terms, 
essence has been given over to Eros, the preserver of life, unity and growth.  Eros is the 
principle of being.  Marcuse says as much in Eros and Civilization¶7KHGHDWKLQVWLQFWDf-
firms the principle of non-being (the negation of being) against Eros (the principle of 
EHLQJ·EC: 125).  The death instinct is not death per se, it is not the mere end of organic 
life (though it is that too), but is the dialectical contradiction (negation) of Eros.  Being 
is the negation of non-being and non-being is the negation of being³dialectically they 
are unified in this opposition, the one cannot exist without the other.62  The unity of this 
LGHQWLW\ZKLFK0DUFXVHTXHVWLRQV¶LVQRWDIL[HGVXEVWUDWXP·LWGRHVQRWFRQVLVW in any 
Platonic ideal reality to which the evanescent world of change must correspond.  Iden-
tity is, rather, the dynamic exchange between life and death, which, as we have seen, is 
the energy of history³LQ%URZQ·VWHUPVWKHPHDQLQJRIKLVWRU\/LIHDQGdeath must 
overcome their inherent contradictions.  The contradiction is one of tension: life seeks ei-
ther its slow extinction over the life of the species, or³as we have reconfigured it 
here³it seeks to preserve tension as the pleasure of otherness recalled from primary 
narcissism.  Death wants the immediate quiescence of life, the staying of tension.  Mar-
                                                 
62 See G. W. F. Hegel (trans. A. V. Miller), Science of Logic (Amherst NY: Humanity Books, 1999), pp. 82-
108. 
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cuse and Brown both attempt to find a point wherein the dialectic sublates.  Again, they 
FKRRVHSULPDU\QDUFLVVLVP+HUHWKH\PLJKWDUJXH ¶LGHQWLW\FRntains its opposite, dif-
IHUHQFHDQGLQYROYHVGLIIHUHQWLDWLRQDQGDQHQVXLQJUHXQLILFDWLRQ·,QWKLVZD\GHDWKDV
the negation of Eros, is not removed from the movement, nor is life reduced to a per-
PDQHQWFDWDWRQLD 5DWKHU WKHQHJDWLYLW\ WKDW LV ¶SUHFLSLWDWHG· WKDW LV WKHFRQWUDGLFWLRQ
EHWZHHQWKHHJRDQGWKH¶RWKHU·LVLQWXUQQHJDWHGDQGWKHRWKHULVSUHVHUYHGLQDQHx-
panded ego.  The dialectic operates such that there is a movement from primary narcis-
sism, which is negated by otherness, but because of the synthetic capacity of the ego en-
acting the desires of the id, the other can be united with, yet retained in its otherness.  The 
HJRWRIROORZ0DUFXVH¶VSOLWVXSLQWRDGLYHUVLW\RIVWDWHVDQGUHODWLRQVWRRWKHUWKLQJV
which are initially foreign to it, but which become part of its proper self when they are 
EURXJKWXQGHUWKHZRUNLQJLQIOXHQFHRILWVHVVHQFH·LWORYHVEDFNDJDLQZKDWHYHUOHDYHV
it.  That essence is the instinctual desire for unity and undifferentiation.  This is how 
identity can be WDNHQWRPHDQXQLW\LQRWKHUQHVVZKLFKLVWKH¶VWUXFWXUHRIUHDOLW\·¶QHJa-
WLYHWRWDOLW\·DQG¶HVVHQFH·7KXVLGHQWLW\GRHVQRWPHDQXQLIRUPLW\VWDELOLW\KDrmony, 
but rather, expansion, restlessness63 and creativity.  It is, thus, beyond the pleasure prin-
ciple, but is not unpleasureable; it is an affirmation of the once and future pleasure of 
SULPDU\ QDUFLVVLVP  7KH QHJDWLRQ RI WKH QHJDWLRQ LV DIILUPDWLRQ  7KXV HYHQ +HJHO·V
DEVROXWHVHHQDV(URVLVQRWDVWDEOHHQGEXW¶DVLWZHUHGLDOHFWLFDOWhought, unfolded 
in its totality [which] thus contains its negation; it is not a harmonious and stable form 
                                                 
63 $V5LFRHXUFRQILUPV ¶Unruhigkeit WKH ¶UHVWOHVVQHVV·RI OLIH LVQRWDWILUVWGHILQHGDVGULYHDQGLPSXOVH
but as noncoincideQFH ZLWK RQH·V VHOI WKLV UHVWOHVVQHVV DOUHDG\ FRQWDLQV ZLWKLQ LWVHOI WKH QHJDWLYLW\ WKDW
PDNHV LW RWKHU DQGZKLFK LQ PDNLQJ LW WR EHRWKHUPDNHV LW EH VHOI· FP  DQG ¶7KH RSSRVLWLRQ LQ
ZKLFKHDFKFRQVFLRXVQHVVVHHNVLWVHOILQWKHRWKHUDQG´GRHVZKat it does only so far as the other does the 
VDPHµLVDQLQILQLWHPRYHPHQWLQWKHVHQVHWKDWHDFKWHUPJRHVEH\RQGLWVRZQOLPLWVDQGEHFRPHVWKH
other.  We recognize here the notion of Unruhigkeit, the restlessness of life, but raised to the reflective de-
gree through opposition and struggle; it is only in this struggle for recognition that the self reveals itself as 
never being simply what it is³DQGWKHUHIRUHDVEHLQJLQILQLWH·FP: 467). 
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but a process of unification of opposites.  It is not complete except in its otherness·RR: 165; 
HPSKDVLV DGGHG  +HJHO·V RZQ SURMHFW LQ 0DUFXVH·s interpretation, ends not in the 
Same, but in the Other.  However, as shall become crucial in later chapters, it is an 
otherness that remains held to the determinism of a rationalistic teleology and to the 
recollective power of memory (Erinnerung). 
 This reading of Marcuse through Hegel in Reason and Revolution actually antici-
SDWHV WKHPDLQ WKUHDGRI:KLWHERRN·V FULWLTXHVDQGHYHQSUH-HPSWV:KLWHERRN·VRZQ
alternative.  Whitebook argues that rather than an egoic monism the ego needs to be 
expanded by what KH FDOOV DIWHU 3LDJHW ¶GHFHQWUDWLRQ· ZKLFK ¶UHIHUV WR WKH SURFHVV
WKURXJK ZKLFK FKLOGUHQ·V HJRFHQWULVP LV GLVORGJHG DQG WKH\ DUH FRPSHOOHG WR UHRULHQW
WKHPVHOYHVLQDZRUOGRIPXOWLSOHSHUVSHFWLYHV·PU: 13).  Opposed to this view of de-
centration is the decentred subject of so-FDOOHG ¶SRVW-VWUXFWXUDOLVW· FULWLTXHV ZKLFK Ue-
GXFHVWKHVXEMHFWWRDQHIIHFWRID¶GH-FHQWULQJ·E\DQRWKHUV\VWHPVXFKDVODQJXDJHRU
power.  It seems to me that a Hegelian understanding of the dialectic of Eros enacts 
precisely the first egoic re-orientation to other egos³indeed, that seems to be immanent 
to the movement of the Phenomenology.  The difference, though, is that for Whitebook, as 
for Rieff, the ego is initially weak and only becomes strengthened through this re-
orientation ordered by the father.  For Marcuse and Brown, it is the initial strength of 
primary narcissism that creates the later ego as the expansion of Eros and its synthetic 
function is consequent upon an instinctual dialectic.  What a weak ego fears, Whitebook 
argues, is engulfment by the Mother or Other, what Hans Leowald, after Karen Horney, 
FDOOVWKH¶GUHDGRIWKHZRPE·64  The father at first appears to be the saviour of the child 
                                                 
64 +DQV/HRZDOG ¶(JRDQG5HDOLW\· LQPapers on Psychoanalysis (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980), 
pp. 16-17. 
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by intervening in the dyad and allowing the individual ego to be.  With this intervention 
the father brings the reality-SULQFLSOH WR EHDU DQG VXEVHTXHQWO\ WKH ¶LPSXOVH WR UH-
establish the lost Narcissistic-PDWHUQDO XQLW\ LV LQWHUSUHWHG DV D ´WKUHDWµ QDPHO\ WKH
threat of materQDO HQJXOIPHQW· EC: 230).  This threat, however, depends entirely on 
whether unity is achieved through domination or through a dialectical expansion. 
An analogous criticism is voiced by Nancy Chodorow, only the terms are re-
versed from the will of the mother to that of the child.  She argues that only through an 
objectification of the mother³seeing her not as a subject³FDQ0DUFXVHDQG%URZQ¶Hn-
vision narcissistic union and the complete satisfaction of pre-genital demands and de-
VLUHVDVSURJUHVVLYHVRFLDOLPSXOVHV·65  The mother must be annihilated in order for the 
GHVLUHVRIWKHVXEMHFWWREHIXOILOOHG7KHPRWKHU·VUROHDVSURYLGHUDQGVHSDUDWHDJHQW
fulfilling her own goals is thus obviated and the self extended in its place.  That is, the 
memory of gratification negates the activity of nourishment given by another, and a 
FKLOGKRRG LGHD RI WKH ¶WUXH· DV D XQLIRUP H[WHQVLRQ RI WKH VHOI EHFRPHV WKH WHORV RI
their liberatory theory.  At first glance there is a lot of truth in this.  But by taking Brown 
and Marcuse out of an Hegelian or idealist theory of synthetic history³the only posi-
tion in which I would claim they make any sense³and placing them into a psychoana-
lytic/object relations context which is predicated on separation and distinction of roles, 
it is not surprising that they appear to fall into contradiction and inherent sexism as 
Chodorow claims. 
In connection with this there is one point I would like to pursue, and it concerns 
WKHQDWXUHRISULPDU\QDUFLVVLVPDQGLQWHUVXEMHFWLYLW\&KRGRURZDUJXHVWKDW¶%URZQ·V
                                                 
65 1DQF\&KRGRURZ¶%H\RQG'ULYH7KHRU\2EMHFW5HODWLRQDQGWKH/LPLWVRI5DGLFDO,QGLYLGXDOLVP·SS
114-153, in Chodorow, Feminism and Psychoanalytic Theory (Oxford: Polity Press, 1989), p. 141ff.  Hereafter 
referred to as FPT in the text. 
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DQG 0DUFXVH·V LGHDOL]DWLRQ RI D QDUcissistic mode of relating and of drive gratification 
based on the pleasure principle precludes those very intersubjective relationships that 
VKRXOGIRUPWKHFRUHRIDQ\VRFLDODQGSROLWLFDOYLVLRQ·FPT: 135).  By this, she means to 
point to the flaw at the centre of their hopes for future communities showing that they 
would reduce everything to an expression of infantile desires.  In opposition, she con-
cludes following Freud that: 
 
the reality principle does not simply signify an abstract, repressive civili-
zation based on the performance principle and domination, or on a 
morbid and neurotic history and culture.  Rather, the reality principle is 
in the first instance the subjectivity of others³the recognition that oth-
ers have their own intentions, goals, and experiences of pleasure and 
pain.  For the child, learning the meaning of the self-other distinction 
DQGRIRQH·VUHODWHGQHVVWRDGLIIHUHQWLDWHGRWKHULVWKHVDPHWKLQJDVWKH
reality principle and is intrinsic to the construction of the self. 
(FPT: 136) 
 
In response to this, it is important to counterpose Ricoeur: 
 
the desire of the other is directly implied in the emergence of Eros; it is 
always with another that the living substance fights against death, against 
its own death, whereas when it acts separately it pursues death through 
the circuitous paths of adaptation to the natural and cultural environ-
ment.  Freud does not look for the drive for life in some will to live in-
scribed in each living substance: in the living substance by itself he finds 
only death. 
(FP: 291) 
 
For Ricoeur the instincts are not the strivings of a wilful child to be civilised by the real-
ity-principle.  They are a direct implication of intersubjectivity; the very process of over-
FRPLQJ$QDQNēGHVFULEHGE\)UHXGLQKLVLQLWLDOGHIinition of Eros as a complicating and 
H[SDQVLYH ¶IRUFH· 5LFRHXUZULWHV ¶)UHXGQHYHUGHVFULEHG LQVWLQFWVRXWVLGHRIDQ LQWHr-
VXEMHFWLYHFRQWH[W·FP: 387).  Life, Eros, only emerges through a widening that takes in 
 121 
DQGUHVSRQGVWRRWKHUVDWILUVW$QDQNēand later other subjects.  The relationship to the 
RWKHURQO\DULVHVEHFDXVHWKHUHDUHLQVWLQFWV$OVRIRU+HJHOWKH¶,·LValways ¶:H· 
 
A self-consciousness exists for a self-consciousness.  Only so is it in fact self-
consciousness; for only in this way does the unity of itself in its other-
QHVVEHFRPHH[SOLFLWIRULW«:KDWVWLOOOLHVDKHDGIRUFRQVFLRXVQHVVLV
the experience of what Spirit is³this absolute substance which is the 
unity of the different independent self-consciousnesses which, in their 
RSSRVLWLRQHQMR\SHUIHFWIUHHGRPDQGLQGHSHQGHQFH¶,·WKDWLV¶:H·DQG
¶:H·WKDWLV¶,·66 
(PS+HJHO·VHPSKDVLV 
 
It is vital to see the whole of the Hegelian dialectic at play when Marcuse, in particular, 
talks about primary narcissism, and not just the often underdeveloped philosophical in-
tuitions of Freud.  The Hegelian dialectic of desire can only exist in the maintenance of 
otherness, because only in otherness can the self be confirmed.  This process is on going 
and infinite. 
Brown also escapes &KRGRURZ·VFHQVXUHEHFDXVHLQKLVLQWHUSUHWDWLRQKHUHYLVHV
WKHDJJUHVVLYHQHJDWLRQLQDQDFOLVLVZKLFKLVKLVUHDGLQJRIWKHFKLOG·VQHHGWRnegate the 
mother in order to possess her nourishing qualities.  Instead, he suggests that narcissism 
incorporateV LWE\ ¶QRW UHDOO\ LQFRUSRUDWLQJ LWEXW LQFRUSRUDWLQJ LWSDVVLYHO\E\PDNLQJ
RXUVHOYHVOLNHLW·LAD: 44).  Thus, he does not seek to possess the other, but to identify 
with it.  And this identity is the outcome of a dialectic of recognition and equality.  For 
Brown, anaclisis is the desire to possess the object, and narcissism is the desire to identify 
ZLWKWKHREMHFW7KLVUHYLVLRQLVLPSRUWDQWEHFDXVH$QDQNēLQLWVWUDQVODWLRQDVQHFHs-
                                                 
66 ,WLVZRUWKPHQWLRQLQJLQWKLVFRQWH[W.HQOH\5R\FH'RYH·VVXJJHVWLRQWKDWWKH¶:H·KHUHGLVFXVVHGE\
+HJHODUH LQIDFWWKHSKLORVRSKHUV :KLFKLVWREHFRQWUDVWHGZLWKWKH ¶:H·RIWKHSUROHWDULDWRI0DU[·V
thesis eleYHQ  'RYH ¶+HJHO·V 3KHQRPHQRORJLFDO 0HWKRG· LQ :DUUHQ ( 6WHLQNUDXV HG New Studies in 
+HJHO·V3KLORVRSK\ (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1971), pp. 46, 49. 
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sity, contains within in it the connotation of lack or inadequacy.67  Anaclisis, in its grab-
bing after the other, points to this lack.  Identification or narcissism, on the other hand, 
with its suggestion of union, observes an extant plenitude in otherness.  Brown makes this 
point apropos of Platonic Eros and Christian AJDSH¶7KH3ODWRQLF(URVLVWKHFKLOGRI
defect or want.  Its direction is away from the insufficient self; its aim is to possess the 
REMHFWWKDWFRPSOHWHVLW·LAD$QGWKH&KULVWLDQ$JDSH¶ZLWKLWVVDFULILFLDOVWUXc-
ture, has the same basis in the insufficiency of the self, but in it the self can be com-
SOHWHGE\QRREMHFW >WKDW LVRQO\E\*RG@DQG WKHUHIRUHPXVWEHH[WLQJXLVKHG· LAD: 
)UHXG·V(URVDVQDUFLVVLVWLFVHHNVLGHQWLILFDWLRQDQGSDVVLYHXQLRQLWVSOHQLWXGHLV
immanent in its transcendence (a romantic realization of an ideal completion).  This 
might not be a strict Freudian answer, but it proves consistent with the thinking through 
of psychoanalysis that Brown achieves in Life Against Death.  He links this directly to the 
oceanic feeling described earlier, and in doing so confirms that the overcoming of lack is 
not dependent on technology, but on a way of finding objects that does not dominate or 
possess them, being, rather, dependent on the erotic fulfilment of narcissism, where the 
subject determines reality in line with freedom, that is in line with instinctual gratifica-
tion. 
So Marcuse and Brown are bound to disagree with the answers provided by a re-
ality-principle which suggests that the truth lies only in division, and rather suggest the 
possibility of a re-emergence of narcissism under conditions of mature, by which is 
meant non-repressive, reality.  Intersubjectivity is key here, and it is the culmination of 
the master and slave or class struggle and the dialectic of desire.  Though neither Mar-
                                                 
67 %\WKLV%URZQDQWLFLSDWHVDQGDYRLGV:KLWHERRN·VFULWLTXHRI0DUFXVH·VPLVXQGHUVWDQGLQJ RI$QDQNē
that ends Chapter 3. 
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cuse nor Brown state precisely what this would look like³and Chodorow is correct to 
criticise them on this (FPT: 137)³merely pointing to that fact that this possibility is con-
tained in unconscious desires and emerges in romantic, mythic and poetic³aesthetic³
tropes.  But how they treat the aesthetic is determined by the series of differences or bi-
narisms between the responses to romanticism and idealism found in Eros and Civilization 
and Life Against Death in their congruent passage to an expansive or ecstatic dialectic of 
QDUFLVVLVP7KDWLV0DUFXVH·VFRQFHSWLRQRIDWHFKQRORJLFDOtelos arising from the proc-
HVVRIKLVWRU\DVUHDVRQYHUVXV%URZQ·VYLVLRQRIDQHVFKDWRORJLFDOUHWXUQWRQDWXUHIURP
history as symptom.  In the next two chapters, these divisions will become clearer 
through an exploration of aesthetics and of myth. 
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³³Chapter Three³³ 
The Aesthetic State: Phantasie, Myth and Memory 
 
7KHIXOOIODYRXURI0DUFXVH·VDQG%URZQ·VXWRSLDQLVPFRPHVWKURXJKLQWKHLUUHYLVLRQ
of narcissism, opening up a benevolent aspect that Freud had been reluctant to pursue.  
Once they have disclosed this possibility for narcissism, they attempt to provide coher-
ent visions of how this impulse has been apparent in culture from the very beginning.  
Because, if the repression that results from the contradiction between life and death is 
the energy of history³either as symptom or process³it is also the dynamic that gives 
us culture.  And it is to cultural practice rather than, say, empirical economic data, that 
they appeal to provide the necessary evidence to support their theories.  The relevant 
forms they address are phantasy, myth and aesthetics.  However, with regard to aesthet-
ics, I shall only discuss Marcuse in this chapter because he is a theoretician, whereas 
Brown is a practitioner, whose work is interpreted in the last two chapters. 
 I am arguing that it is romantic and idealist philosophy, remembering the cir-
cling of their mutual crisis that creates the utopian visions of Life Against Death and Eros 
and Civilization 7KHRSWLPLVP WKH\PDLQWDLQRYHUDJDLQVW)UHXG·VSHVVLPLVPFDQRQO\
arise because they have a limited interest in³and place no real value upon³the thera-
peutic concerns of psychoanalysis³DQ LQWHUHVW LQ ZKLFK IRU H[DPSOH FKDUJHV 5LHII·V
pessimism and his refutation of the dialectic of hope and despair.  Rather, they read psy-
choanalysis as an aspect of the synthetic trend in European philosophy.  One of the 
things I tried to make clear in the last chapter is just this, that Brown and Marcuse are 
contributing to³RUWRXVH&DYHOO·VZRUG¶LQKHULWLQJ·³a speculative romantic and ideal-
ist philosophy which has only a tangential relation to clinical practice.  But not only are 
they not contributing to clinical practice, they are ignoring the evidence it provides if it 
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GRHVQRWFRKHUHZLWKDODUJHUFKDLQRI¶V\PSWRPV·DULVLQJIURPWKHLUFKRVHQSKLORVRSKi-
cal and cultural heritage.  Because the truths they want are largely confirmed outside of 
the analytic situation (because they are not angling for a cure, but a representation of the 
possibility of cure) they can champion the very structures that Freud wanted to overcome: 
the id, the pleasure principle, the instincts, phantasy, perversion and narcissism.  Indeed, 
almost everything that Brown and Marcuse write takes its direction from the regressive 
impulses, from the Orphic backward glance, that for Freud descends into unconscious 
turmoil. 
 
I 
 
5HJUHVVLRQ REVHUYHV 0DUFXVH LQ DOO LWV PDQLIROG IRUPV LV DQ ¶XQFRQVFLRXV SURWHVW
against the insufficiency of civilization: against the prevalence of toil over pleasure, per-
IRUPDQFHRYHUJUDWLILFDWLRQ·EC: 109).  Though it only emerges in symptoms (neurotic, 
SRHWLFSKLORVRSKLFDOUHJUHVVLRQGLVSOD\VWKH¶LQQHUPRVWWHQGHQF\LQWKHRUJDQLVP·EC: 
109) to turn against a civilization that believes a priori in the domination of the most ba-
sic drives in nature and strives to exclude humanity from that sphere.  Regression is not 
something that Marcuse is afraid of; he welcomes it as a necessary corrective gesture by 
which repressed libidinal energies can escape.  He writes: 
 
the emergence of a non-repressive reality principle involving instinctual 
liberation would regress behind the attained level of civilized rationality.  
This regression would be psychical as well as social: it would reactivate 
early states of libido which were surpassed in the development of the re-
ality ego, and it would dissolve the institutions of society in which the ego 
exists. 
(EC: 198) 
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0DUFXVH·V QRQ-repressive reality principle is, as we have seen, all but identical to the 
pleasure principle.  It renders it a viable existential possibility.  In his Hegelian vocabu-
lary, it approaches the confluence of existence and essence.  He is quite clear, then, that 
these conditions can be met because contemporary civilization has actually attained a 
level of rationality and of productivity that is unnecessary³that does not just match up 
to but is in excess of its needs.  In this, he is hinting at the post-industrial, consumerist, 
one-dimensionality that becomes a focus of his work in the early 1960s.  Of course, 
such a theory remains dependent upon the dominance of scarcity through WHFKQē as does 
VRPXFKRI0DUFXVH·VXWRSLDQLVP+RZHYHULWDOVRUHOLHVRQWKHVSHFXODWLYHUH-thinking 
of regressive libidinal energies organising themselves in accordance with the instincts, 
DQGZLWKDSULRULW\JLYHQE\WKHQDUFLVVLVWLF¶SDVW· 
 For RicoHXUUHJUHVVLRQLVWKHFHQWUDOWHQGHQF\KHFDOOVLWWKH¶PHORGLFFRUH·>FP: 
440]) of Freudianism.  The interpretation of dreams and of neurotic symptoms forms an 
¶DUFKDHRORJ\·ZKHUHLQWKHIUDJPHQWVRIWKHSDVWGRPLQDWHWKHXQGHUVWDQGLQJRIWKHSUe-
sent.  By pointing out that the last word of The Interpretation of Dreams LV ¶SDVW·5LFRHXU
VHHNVWRJLYHHPSKDVLVWRKLVSRLQWDVZHOODVWR)UHXG·VGLVPLVVDORIWKHIXWXUH3V\FKo-
DQDO\VLV GRHV QRW ORRN WR WKH IXWXUH EXW LV UHJDUGHG ¶DV D UHYHODWLRQ RI WKH DUFKDLc, a 
manifestation of the ever prior [which] has roots, both old and new, in the romantic 
phiORVRSK\ RI OLIH DQG WKH XQFRQVFLRXV· FP: 440).1  That romanticism is built out of 
                                                 
1 )RU5LFRHXUWKLVLVDQRWKHUSRLQWRIWHQVLRQEHWZHHQ)UHXGDQG+HJHO+HDUJXHV¶6SLULWKDVLWVPHDQLQJ
in later forms or figures; it is a movement that always destroys its starting point and is secured only at the 
end.  The unconscious, on the other hand, means that intelligibility always proceeds from earlier figures, 
whether this anteriority is understood in a strictly temporal or in a metaphysical sense.  Man is the sole 
being at the mercy of childhood; he is a creatXUHFRQVWDQWO\GUDJJHGEDFNZDUGE\KLVFKLOGKRRG«7RSXW
the antithesis most concisely, I will say that spirit is history and the unconscious is fate³the early fate of 
FKLOGKRRGWKHHDUO\IDWHRIV\PEROLVPVSUHJLYHQDQGUHSHDWHGZLWKRXWHQG«·FP: 468).  And again, he 
DUJXHVWRPHUJHWKHVHWZRSULQFLSOHVZRXOGEHD¶IDFLOHHFOHFWLFLVP·FP: 468)³as we have seen both Mar-
cuse and Brown disagree that that is necessarily a bad thing. 
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fragments we have already seen, but we can take this further here and see the fragment 
DVWKHDUFKDHRORJ\RIWKHVXEMHFWWKHLPDJRVRIWKHSDVWWKDW¶WXUQ-XS·XQGHUWKHIUHVK
ploughed ground of sexuality, poetry and myth.2  $V-RHO:KLWHERRNSXWVLW¶7KHWUDQs-
JUHVVLYH SKDQWDVPV RI WKH XQFRQVFLRXV«QRW RQO\ DUH D VRXUFH RI UHJUHVVLRQ but also 
provide the imagos RIDGLIIHUHQWUHDOLW\· UP: 6).  Marcuse uses this source to turn the 
idea of regression around making it equivalent to progression: 
 
The liberation of the past does not end in its reconciliation with the pre-
sent.  Against the self-imposed restraint of the discoverer [i.e., Freud], the 
orientation on the past tends toward an orientation on the future.  The re-
cherche du temps perdu becomes the vehicle of future liberation. 
(EC: 19) 
 
Though the reference to Proust makes it clear that Marcuse is, in part, referring to 
memory3 I want to concentrate for now on two other regressive paths: phantasy and 
myth. 
 One aspect of regression on which Brown and Marcuse do not agree is the place 
of phantasy (Brown spells it fantasy).  Freud famouVO\GHVFULEHVSKDQWDV\ LQKLV ¶7ZR-
3ULQFLSOHVRI0HQWDO)XQFWLRQLQJ· 
 
With the introduction of the reality principle one species of thought-
activity was split off; it was kept free from reality-testing and remained 
subordinated to the pleasure principle alone.  This activity is phantasying, 
which begins alUHDG\ LQ FKLOGUHQ·V SOD\ DQG ODWHU FRQWLQXHG DV day-
dreaming, abandons dependence on real objects.4 
 
                                                                                                                                           
 I return to some of these ideas in the next chapter with reference of CastRULDGLV·LGHDRIWKHUDGi-
cal imagination. 
2 I examine the relationship between fragments and primordial symbolism in the next chapter. 
3 See Section 4. 
4 6LJPXQG )UHXG ¶7ZR-3ULQFLSOHV RI 0HQWDO )XQFWLRQLQJ· LQ -DPHV 6WUDFKH\ WUDQV On Metapsychology 
(HDUPRQGVZRUWK3HQJXLQS+HUHDIWHUUHIHUUHGWRDV¶7ZR3ULnFLSOHV·LQWKHWH[W 
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We know that Marcuse places the origin of the reality principle with the philosophical 
interprHWDWLRQRI/RJRVDV ¶FDWHJRULVDWLRQXQGHU UHDVRQ· OHDGLQJ WRGRPLQDWLRQ 7KXV
ZHFDQDVVXPHWKDWWKH LQWHUSUHWDWLRQRISKDQWDV\DVDVHSDUDWH ¶VSHFLHVRI WKRXJKW· LV
born at the same moment.  For Freud this activity is split off because it forms no useful 
function in adulthood, save as a refuge dangerously close to neurosis.  He suggests that 
the only safe outlet for phantasy is art³for Freud a crystallised day-dream,5 which, by 
FUHDWLQJDQRWKHU ¶ZRUOG·FDQUHOHDVH WKHGDQJHURXV UHJUHVVLYH LPSXOVHVRI WKe pleasure 
principle to which phantasy is attached.  Marcuse, though, recognises in phantasy an 
important continuity with existence prior to the domination of reason and its instru-
mentality.  Phantasy is independent of the claims made upon the body by so-called reality, 
LQGHHG¶SKDQWDV\KDVDWUXWKYDOXHRILWVRZQZKLFKFRUUHVSRQGVWRDQH[SHULHQFHRILWV
own³QDPHO\WKHVXUPRXQWLQJRIWKHDQWDJRQLVWLFKXPDQUHDOLW\·EC: 143).  This can 
be interpreted to mean that through the hopes maintained in phantasy the distinction 
between essence and existence, unique to repressed humanity, can be challenged.  And 
DV WKLV SRVLWLYH ¶UHWXUQ RI WKH UHSUHVVHG·³that is repressed life not repressed death³
¶3KDQWDV\KDGDOZD\VEXLOWWKHEULGJHEHWZHHQWKHXQUHFRQFLODEOHGHmands of object and 
VXEMHFWH[WURYHUVLRQDQG LQWURYHUVLRQ· EC: 148).  In this sense, phantasy is given the 
fundamental ontological role we have already seen given to Eros.  It is the path to ob-
jects in the world which gives them their reality, but which does not seek to dominate, 
but rather to unite.  Phantasy is the symptom provided by the return of the repressed 
primary narcissism.  However, whether an idealist phantasy can square itself with reality, 
can become a more valid reality, is something that remains to be proved. 
                                                 
5 6HH6LJPXQG)UHXG¶&UHDWLYH:ULWHUVDQG'D\-'UHDPLQJ·LQ-DPHV6WUDFKH\HGThe Standard Edi-
tion of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Vol IX (London: Hogarth, 1959), pp. 143-153. 
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 For Freud, phantasy is fundamentally regressive and potentially debilitating³
indeed, he argues that phantasy always retains the mark of repression. 
 
In the realm of phantasy, repression remains all-powerful; it brings about 
the inhibition of ideas in statu nascendi before they can be noticed by con-
sciousness, if their cathexis is likely to occasion a release of unpleasure.  
This is the weak spot in our psychical organization; and it can be em-
ployed to bring back under the dominance of the pleasure principle 
thought-processes which have already become rational. 
(Two Principles: 40) 
 
In this sense phantasy is a reflex defensive structure that flees reality, if it is likely to be 
unpleasurable.  That this sustains the promise of the pleasure principle is clear enough.  
+RZHYHUIRU)UHXGWKLVLVDIDOVHSURPLVHDQGWKHIOLJKWIURP¶UHDOLW\·LVLUUDWLRQDOLWXn-
does all the work of maturity and in particular the education brought about by contem-
porary scientific standards.  There is, Freud seems to suggest, no need to study the diffi-
culties of the world if the refuge of phantasy, by which he means mythology, supersti-
tion, religion³not to mention neurotic withdrawal³remains easily available to the psy-
che.  Ironically, science itself is seen as problematic, in that it follows the path of a tempo-
rary renunciation of pleasure for long term reward, thus it only displaces the pleasure 
principle but does not over-turn it.  Phantasy, for Freud, is a kind of nostalgia; it can be 
preserved in the mature psyche, but it is always the remnant of something more funda-
mentally lost.  In a telling footnote, he argues that the retention of the pleasure principle 
LQSKDQWDV\LVDQDORJRXVWRWKHZD\¶DQDWLRQZKRVHZHDOWKUHVWVRQWKHH[SORLWDWLRQRI
the produce of its soil will yet set aside certain areas for reservation in their original state 
and for protection from the changes brought about by civilization.  (E.g. Yellowstone 
3DUN·7ZR-Principles: 39).  This choice of analogy confirms the position of Freud vis-
à-vis Marcuse.  The reality principle exploits and dominates for the improvement of 
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SURGXFWLRQZKHUHDV WKHSOHDVXUHSULQFLSOHEHORQJV WRDSULPLWLYH ¶RULJLQDO VWDWH·ZKLFK
KDVEHHQRYHUFRPHE\¶FLYLOL]DWLRQ· 
 It is perhaps surprising that Brown goes even further than Freud does in his 
criticisms of fantasy.6  In fact, this is probably the point where he is, implicitly, most 
FULWLFDORI0DUFXVH·VSURMHFW%URZQEHJLQVZKHUHZHOHIWKLPZLWKUHJDUGWRREMHFWUela-
tions in the last chapter.  Fantasy is the backward glance of narcissistic libido which, 
though appealing to union (identification) rather than to domination (his interpretation 
of anaclisis) is also necessarily regressive in the way outlined by Freud.  The reason for 
this is that it operates as a sublimation RIVH[XDODLPV7KXVWKHDFWXDO OLYLQJSUHVHQW¶LV
denied by reactivating fantasies of past union, and thus, the ego interposes the shadow 
RI WKH SDVW EHWZHHQ LWVHOI DQG WKH IXOO UHDOLW\ RI OLIH DQGGHDWK LQ WKH SUHVHQW· LAD: 
162).  Fantasy is a way of avoiding the harshness of the life and death struggle that, for 
Brown is actualized as history.  Instead of facing the causes of history directly³which 
ZRXOG ¶HQG·KLVWRU\³fantasy allows aberrant imagos of the past to dominate the pre-
sent, sucKDVWKH¶FRQVFLHQFH·DQGWKH¶VXSHUHJR·%XWPRUHLPSRUWDQWO\IRU%URZQWKH
DWWDFKPHQWWRWKHSDVWDVIDQWDV\LVZKDWJLYHVULVHWRWKHVRXO¶WKHVKDGRZ\VXEVWLWXWH
IRUDERGLO\UHODWLRQWRRWKHUERGLHV·LAD: 162).  It does so at the expense of the living 
body traced with life, death and otherness.  He goes on, 
 
The more specific and concrete mechanism whereby the body-ego be-
comes a soul is fantasy.  Fantasy may be defined as a hallucination which 
cathects the memory of gratification; it is of the same structure as the 
dream, and has the same relation to the id and to instinctual reality as the 
dream.  Fantasy and dreaming do not present, much less satisfy, the instinctual de-
mands of the  id, which is  of the  body  and seeks bodily  erotic union  with the  world;  
 
                                                 
6 7KH¶I·UDWKHUWKDQWKH¶SK·LVWHOOLQJIRUWZRUHDVRQVILUVWO\EHFDXVHLWPHDQVWKHZRUGORVHVLWV*HUPDQLF
philosophical pedigree; and a second related point, Marcuse only uses this spelling when he talks, deprecat-
LQJO\RI¶FKLOGLVKIDQWDV\·EC: 159). 
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they are essentially, like neuroVLV¶VXEVWLWXWH-JUDWLILFDWLRQV· 
(LAD: 163-164; emphases added) 
 
Fantasy, then, like other cures that are part of the problem³neurosis, religion and psy-
choanalysis itself³does not correspond to the actual movement of the instincts or the 
realization of Eros as the expansion of the body.  In fact, it does quite the opposite, it 
OHDGVWRDQHJDWLRQRIWKHERG\ZKLFKLVDOVRDQHJDWLRQRIWKDWHURWLFUHDOLW\WKHLG·VHx-
pansion into the world through the mutual expansion of the ego, which as we saw in the 
last chapter, constructs a positive narcissistic reality.  Unlike Marcuse who presents the 
phantastic as a source of future liberation, Brown sees fantasy as a hallucinatory idea 
(Vorstellung) which deludes the ego by negating the present and replacing it with the past.  
It is a process of backward representation in which the ego uses its own recollected im-
DJHVWRUHSODFHWKH ¶UHDOLW\·RIWKHHURWLFERG\ WKDW LV WKHERG\DV(URV ,QWKLVVHQVH
Brown seems to assert that fantasy aligns itself with the misrecognised idealism of the 
narcissism of the understanding, in which the ego perpetuates its narrow place in the 
world, surrounded by its own reflections, which are but memories of past gratifications.  
From this it must be gathered that for Brown primary narcissism is not an historical 
stage that can be re-membered, but, as shall be shown, belongs to his eschatological 
WXUQLQJLQWRWKH¶QRZ· 
 An additional problem, one encountered by Freud much to his cost, is that the 
primal fantasies appear to have no existence apart from their re-enactment in the ana-
O\WLFRUQHXURWLFVHWWLQJ2UDV%URZQZULWHV¶WRSXWLWDQRWKHUZD\WKH\GRQRWH[LVWLQ
memory or in the past, but only as hallucinations in the present, which have no meaning 
H[FHSWDVQHJDWLRQVRIWKHSUHVHQW·LAD: 166).  Fantasies present themselves retroac-
tively (NachträglichkeitDVDUHVSRQVHWRWKH¶LQIDQWLOHIOLJKWIURPOLIH-and-GHDWK·LAD: 
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166).  This is the curse of the (negative) idealism of humanity, which posits something 
other than the body, other than ecstatic-instinct, as the process of being.  This un-real 
goal emerges, Brown argues, from the very real flight from the body that begins with the 
repression of infantile sexuality and reaches its acme with the mind-body dualism; a du-
DOLVPZKLFK DV DQ H[HPSODU\ DEVWUDFWLRQ LV WKHPDLQ WDUJHWRI%URZQ·VSROHPLF +H
argues³and there is a Hegelian twist to this³that the most profound knowledge we 
can gain about ourselves only emerges from the most abstract positions, which involves 
the negation of our bodies, of our materiality.  This materiality, as alluded to in the last 
chapter, is inverted³the displacement from below upward³being eventually domi-
nated by vision (theoria), which is most able to maintain the distance between bodies.  
6R¶$VOLIHUHVWULFWHGWRWKHVHHQDQGE\KDOOXFLQDWRU\SURMHFWLRQVHHQDWDGLVWDQFHDQG
veiled by negation and distorted by symbolism, sublimation perpetuates and elaborates 
the infanWLOHVROXWLRQWKHGUHDP·LAD: 172). 
Sublimation is no real answer for Brown.  There is, as he demonstrates with elan 
in Life Against Death, a general reversal in the accepted version of the aspirations of 
mankind.  At the most basic level the foundation of monetary exchange on the primitive 
economy of shit³WKHFKLOG·VILUVW¶SURGXFW·³with the mother, and on a more elevated 
level, the proposition that higher metaphors are often based on physical attributes, the 
ZHOONQRZQH[DPSOHEHLQJ¶VSLULW·,QKLVUHDGLQJRI6ZLIW%URZQFRQFOXGHVWKDW¶1RW
RQO\ WKH JHQLWDO IXQFWLRQEXW DOVR WKH DQDO IXQFWLRQ LV GLVSODFHGXSZDUG· LAD: 197).  
+HWDNHVWKLVWRLWVOLPLWLQKLVEULOOLDQWGLVFXVVLRQRI/XWKHU¶3URWHVWDQWLVPZDVERUQLQ
the temple of the Devil, and it found God again in extremest aliHQDWLRQ IURP *RG·
(LAD7KDWLVWKHYLVLRQRIUHIRUPHGUHOLJLRQJLYHQWR/XWKHURQWKH¶MDNHV·WKH
second divine kenosisRU ¶HPSW\LQJRXW· LVWKHH[HPSODU\DUFKHW\SHRIVXEOLPDWLRQXp-
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ZDUGV2U(PHUVRQ·VUHYHUVDO¶:KDWLVWKHUHGLYLQHLQDORDG of bricks?  What is there 
RIWKHGLYLQHLQDSULY\"0XFK$OO· >Journals :126].)  In this radical Protestantism, the 
world, the body and in particular money, is given to the Devil³is a shard from the 
'HYLO·V DUVH  7KH ZRUOG LV TXLWH OLWHUDOO\ IRU /XWKHU WKH VKLW LQ ZKLFK *RG·V IORZHUV
grow.  The irony is, of course, that the attributes admired by Protestantism, parsimony, 
RUGHUOLQHVV DQGREVWLQDF\ DUH LGHQWLILHGE\SV\FKRDQDO\VLV DV ¶DQDO WUDLWV· LAD: 203).  
Much of culture, both Marcuse and Brown arJXHUHWDLQVMXVWVXFKD¶WDLQW·RIWKHSOHDs-
ure principle held over from the anal phase.  This is one reason why Marcuse argues that 
Freud ultimately rejects artistic or liberal culture in favor of constraint as the impetus of 
civilization.  The unconscioXVWKRXJKUHIXVHVWRIRUJHW¶WKHHTXDWLRQZLWKIUHHGRPDQG
KDSSLQHVVWDERRHGE\WKHFRQVFLRXVQHVV·EC: 18).  Its continued presence is the force 
behind utopian speculation and romantic discontent. 
6XEOLPDWLRQ WKHQIRU%URZQ LV WKH ORVVRI ¶OLIH·DV(ros, which returns as the 
SHUSHWXDOTXHVWIRUWKDWOLIHLWLV¶WKHPRGHRIDQRUJDQLVPWKDWPXVWGLVFRYHUOLIHUDWKHU
WKDQOLYHPXVWNQRZUDWKHUWKDQEH·LAD: 171).  It is the attempt to return to a world 
that has been carved off from us, idealised into subject-object positions. 
 
If the mechanism of sublimation is the dream, the instinctual economy 
which sustains it is a primacy of death over life in the ego.  The path 
ZKLFKOHDGVIURPLQIDQWLOHGUHDPLQJWRVXEOLPDWLRQRULJLQDWHVLQWKHHJR·V
incapacity to accept the death of separation, and its inauguration of those 
morbid forms of dying³negation, repression, and narcissistic involution.  
The result is to substitute for the reality of living-and-dying the desexual-
ized or deadened life. 
(LAD: 174) 
 
In its most pervasive form desexualised sublimated fantasy presents itself to us as lan-
guage, as symbolisation, which, Brown argues, operates as a hallucination of what is not 
there ¶QHJDWLQJ ZKDW LV WKHUH FRQIHUU>LQJ@ RQ UHDOLW\ D KLGGHQ OHYHO RI PHDQLQJ DQG 
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OHQG>LQJ@DV\PEROLFDOTXDOLW\WRDOOH[SHULHQFH·LAD: 167).  The animal in language is 
WKHDQLPDOWKDWKDVORVWLWVZRUOG¶DQGZKLFKSUHVHUYHVLQLWVV\PEROV\VWHPVDPDSRI
WKHORVWUHDOLW\JXLGLQJWKHVHDUFKWRUHFRYHULW·LAD: 167).7  Culture is this Atlantian 
map writ large.  Maybe one tentative conclusion we could reach at this point is that 
Marcuse mistakes the map for the territory; mistakes the transgressive force of phan-
tasy³which is not in dispute³for the lost object of narcissism.  That which for Brown 
is misrecognised as memory is for Marcuse the thing itself.  The first case tends to romanti-
cism, the second, to idealism.  We will only get any further here in subsequent discus-
sions of language and the imagination. 
 One thing that Brown and Marcuse agree on, at least structurally, is that this 
problem begins with the Greeks.  For Marcuse it is the now familiar interpretation of 
$ULVWRWHOLDQ/RJRVEXWIRU%URZQLWLV¶$SROOR«WKHJRGRIIRUP³of plastic form in art, 
of rational form in thought, oIFLYLOL]HGIRUPLQOLIH·LAD$SROORDV¶IRUP·LV
the negation of the instincts, he is the god who taught the Greeks how to sublimate, an 
inheritance felt throughout the Western world.  Brown follows Nietzsche in defining the 
Apollonian world as made up of the dream: 
 
Apollo rules over the fair world of appearance as a projection of the in-
QHUZRUOGRIIDQWDV\DQGWKHOLPLWZKLFKKHPXVWREVHUYH¶WKDWGHOLFDWH
boundary which the dream-SLFWXUH PXVW QRW RYHUVWHS· >)UHXG@ LV WKH
boundary of repression separating the dream from instinctual reality. 
(LAD: 174) 
 
                                                 
7 See discussion of Vico in Chapter 5. 
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The deeper argument seems to suggest that the real shift, the revolution in thinking, oc-
curs when myth becomes philosophy, when mythos is interpreted as logos (for Brown the 
best philosophy is that which obtains to the status of myth).8 
$NH\ WH[WKHUH LV%URZQ·V LQWURGXFWLRQ WRKLV WUDQVODWLRQRI+HVLRG·VTheogony 
(1953), where he observes that the early Greek mythical idiom, the way in which they 
¶ZHUHDFFXVWRPHGWRVSHFXODWHRQWKHJUHDWTXHVWLRQVRIOLIH·9 must be translated into phi-
losophy in order for us moderns to understand it.  To say that myth is the language of 
the pleasure principle would be to go too far; rather, Brown suggests myth emerges 
from the era prior to the repressive division between reality and pleasure.  This is no lost 
utopia.  What it describes is not paradise or innocence, but the chance of a dialectical 
¶UHVXUUHFWLRQRIWKHERG\·³the title of the last chapter of Life Against Death.  The mythi-
cal poetry of the Theogony¶LVDUHLQWHUSUHWDWLRQRIWUDGLWLRQDOP\WKVLQRUGHUWRFUHDWHD
VHWRIV\PEROVZKLFKJLYHPHDQLQJWROLIHDVH[SHULHQFHGE\WKHSRHWDQGKLVDJH·Theo: 
35).  There is nothing radical here until you realise that this is what Brown comes to do in his 
own work.  His unselfconscious interdisciplinary mining of the history of philosophy, 
psychology, poetry and myth is just such an invocation of symbols appropriate to the 
ZULWHU·VDJH Life Against Death is a somewhat circumspect version of this vision.  The 
IRUFHRI%URZQ·VP\WKRJUDSK\ZLOORQO\EHUHYHDOHGZKHQZHUHDG/RYH·V%RG\ in Chap-
ter 4 and Closing Time in Chapter 5. 
 Many of the central themes of Life Against Death are highlighted by Brown as 
integral to the Theogony.  There is no doubt a certain amount of circular thinking here, by 
                                                 
8 The relation of mythos to logos is returned to in Chapter 5.  For an acute, but separate, reading of this see 
Martin Heidegger (trans. J. Glenn Gray), What is Called Thinking? (New York: Harper Collins, 1968), p. 10 
and passim. 
9 1RUPDQ2%URZQ¶,QWURGXFWLRQ·SS-48, Hesiod (trans. and ed. Norman O. Brown), Theogony (New 
Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1953), p. 15.  Hereafter referred to as Theo in the text. 
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which I mean Brown is reading Hesiod in terms already dominating his thinking in the 
later book, and that book in turn is coloured by the Theogony.  Indeed, if as he has sug-
gests more than once, his turn to Freud took place early in the 1950s,10 it is likely that 
there was a certain amount of overlap.  Two such themes I can pick up on immediately 
are the primal force of Eros and the conflict between Eros and Death.  His translation 
of the famous creation scene, the first WeVWHUQ*HQHVLVEHJLQV ¶)LUVWRIDOO WKH9RLG
[Chaos] came into being, next broad-bosomed Earth [Gaia], the solid and eternal home 
of all, and Eros [Desire], the most beautiful of the immortal gods, who in every man and 
every god softens the sinews and ovHUSRZHUVWKHSUXGHQWSXUSRVHRIWKHPLQG· Theo: 
56).  With Eros the creative energy that spawns gods and humans enters the cosmos, 
DQGDV%URZQREVHUYHVLWLVFUHDWLYHHQHUJ\WKDWLVWKH¶IXQGDPHQWDODWWULEXWHRISRZHU·
(Theo: 8) which exists in issue and is thwarted by castration.  It is also Eros that brings 
differentiation, growth and change into the cosmos, and thus is the origin of history as 
myth³for Brown an essential part of the Theogony·VVSHFXODWLYHVWUXFWXUH'HVLUHLWVHOI
has no offspring, but is the energetic source³the self-movement³of the procreation 
WKDWEHJHWV WKHP\WKLFDO ILJXUHVRI+HVLRG·VSRHP IURP&KURQRV WR=HXV WR3URPe-
WKHXV DQG WKH QDPHOHVV UDQNV RI ¶PHQ· ¶WKH LPPDQHQW FUHDWLYH HQHUJ\ ZKLFK +HVLRG
calls Desire is in all things, GULYLQJWKHPWRFRQVWDQWSUROLIHUDWLRQ·Theo: 41).  History is 
not yet symptom, it is rather poiesis: creation outside of (historiographical) time. 
 ,Q WKH VHFRQG LQVWDQFH DQGEHFDXVHRI WKH ILUVW+HVLRG·V XQLYHUVH LV G\QDPLF
and refuses inertia or death for its own sake.  This dynamism emerges, Brown argues, in 
the conflict between order and creativity.  Order does not yet mean the stable Apollon-
                                                 
10 Norman O. Brown, Apocalypse and/or Metamorphosis (Berkeley: California University Press, 1991), pp. 157, 
179.  Hereafter referred to as AM in the text. 
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ian order of restraint, but is rather self-developing and permits substantial freedom³it 
is an Erotic order.  (DFKVWDJHRI+HVLRG·VKLVWRU\OLNH+HJHO·VGLDOHFWLFFUHDWHVQHZFRn-
flicts, and order is rather the guiding principle of those conflicts than their suppression.  
+HZULWHV¶$QRUGHUZKLFKSHUPLWVIUHHGHYHORSPHQWLVRQHZKLFKGRHVQRWGRYLROHQFH
to the principle of creativity.  For Hesiod the conflict is not between creativity and iner-
WLDEXWEHWZHHQFUHDWLYLW\DQGRUGHU+HKDVDUHFXUULQJSDWWHUQRIFRQIOLFW·Theo: 43).  
+HVLRG·V RUGHU LV OLNH +HUDFOLWXV· ¶VXEWOH ´KLGGHQµ KDUPRQ\ ZKLFK LV D ´KDUPony in 
FRQWUDULHW\µ·Theo: 43)³and identity in otherness.  Death, then, does not bring an end, 
EXWHQJDJHVZLWK(URVLQDQRQJRLQJ¶VWULIH·ZKLFK%URZQDUJXHVLVDOVRWKHPRGHORI
the Greek society it was composed for (Theo: 46). 
 +HVLRG·VSRHPGRHVQRt yet engage in the symbolic replacement of reality, is not 
yet a flight from life-and-death but rather reveals their dialectic in its structure and nar-
rative.  The position of Eros, as the third term between earth and void, being and noth-
ing (Theo: 16), that allows the progressive generation of the myth from gods to men³
from a cosmic order to an anthropocentric order, preserves the truth of this dialectic.  
The understanding provided by the Theogony is not sublimated.  It is not the imposition 
of order on chaos, but is amongst the earliest statements of the truths Freud finds pre-
served in the unconscious and which Brown, the modern mythographer, uses his later 
writings to disclose. 
 Though Marcuse stresses the extant power of phantasy in his readings of myth, 
he is otherwise remarkably similar in his interpretations.  For Marcuse, much more than 
for Brown (though the same trend is there), myth is tied to its modern re-workings in 
the imaginations of the romantics and their heirs.  Thus his readings of Narcissus come 
from Valéry and Gide not from Ovid, and Orpheus belongs to Rilke.  His contrast is 
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between Prometheus as the representation of toil, and Narcissus and Orpheus as the 
representations of joy and union. 
 
If Prometheus is the culture-hero of toil, productivity and progress 
through repression, then the symbols of another reality principle must be 
sought at the opposite pole.  Orpheus and Narcissus (like Dionysus to 
whom they are akin: the antagonist of the god who sanctions the logic of 
domination, the realm of reason) stand for a very different reality.  They 
have not become-culture heroes of the Western world: theirs is the image 
of joy and fulfillment; the voice which does not command but sings; the 
gesture which offers and  receives;  the deed   which  is  peace and ends 
the labor of conquest; the liberation from time which unites man with 
god, man with nature. 
(EC: 161-162) 
 
,Q0DUFXVH·VSDQWKHRQ3URPHWKHXV³often seen as the rebel³replaces Apollo.  Pro-
metheus seems a strange choice.  He is the creator of man and the bringer of fire who 
tricked Zeus, the punishment for which was the first woman, Pandora (the reference is 
still Hesiod).  She, infamously, brought all the ills into the world, leaving only hope.  
What Prometheus symbolises, however, is that the price of culture is pain, that only 
productivity can lead to mastery³he is the example of the culture-hero who suffers, 
and who leaves an inheritance of suffering to mankind.  Moreover, the myth asserts that 
the feminine, the sexual, is disruptive and destructive³it is a punishment. 
Orpheus and Narcissus, however, stand for a different existential condition that 
refuses to accept that pleasure has a price, though, of course, ironically they both pay 
the ultimate price for that refusal.  Orpheus figures the imaginative power to shape the 
SK\VLFDO UHDOLW\ 5LONH·V ¶QHZ ELUWKV DQG WUDQVIRUPDWLRQ·11 the ability to communicate 
with nature and to shatter the rocks with his song.  Narcissus, as we have seen, denotes 
                                                 
11 Rainer Maria Rilke (trans. Stephen Cohen), Sonnets to Orpheus with Letters to a Young Poet (Manchester: Car-
canet, 2000), p. 15.  Hereafter referred to as SO in the text. 
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the unity of subject and object, of the human and the natural, in the erotic widening of 
the self that allows both self and world to be in their otherness.  Narcissism is not the 
withdrawal into the self but the liberation of the potential of beings in their freedom.  It 
is at this point that MarcXVHYHQWXUHVKLV UHDGLQJRI)UHXG·V WKHRU\RISULPDU\QDUFLs-
sism, from which he concludes: 
 
beyond all immature autoeroticism, narcissism denotes a fundamental re-
latedness to reality which may generate a comprehensive existential order.  
In other words, narcissism may contain the germ of a different reality 
SULQFLSOHWKHOLELGLQDOFDWKH[LVRIWKHHJRRQH·VRZQERG\PD\EHFRPH
the source and reservoir for a new libidinal cathexis of the objective 
world³transforming this world into a new mode of being. 
(EC: 168) 
 
)RU0DUFXVHDVIRU%URZQ·V+HVLRGWKLVLVWKHNH\WRDQHZorder.  Marcuse writes that 
LWLVRQO\%DXGHODLUH·VXVHRIWKLVZRUGLQWKHUHIUDLQIURP¶/·,QYLWDWLRQDXYR\DJH·WKDWVXs-
tains a non-UHSUHVVLYHVHQVH ¶/j WRXWQ·HVWTX·RUGUH HWEHDXWé,/Luxe, calme, et volupté · EC: 
164).  Marcuse concludes, and in this is almost echoing Brown (both, perhaps, revealing 
D +HJHOLDQ WUHQG WKDW LQ WXUQ EHORQJV WR WKH *UHHNV WKDW ¶6WDWLF WULXPSKV SURYH Gy-
namic; but it is a static that moves in its own fullness³a productivity that is sensuous-
QHVVSOD\DQGVRQJ·EC: 164-¶6LQJLQJLV%HLQJ>Gesang ist Dasein@·SO: 15).  It is 
DQ(URWLFRUGHUZKLFKEHORQJVWRZKDW0DUFXVHFDOOV¶WKHDHVWKHWLFGLPHQVLRQ· 
 
II 
 
0DUFXVH·V DHVWKHWLFV DUH IDVFLQDWLQJ QRW because of any success they might have as a 
theory of art, but because they follow the dramatic unworking, or romantic failure, that 
ZHVDZDWWKHKHDUWRI(PHUVRQ·V¶([SHULHQFH·,QKLVDWWHPSWWRDVFHQGIURPDSSHDr-
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ance to actuality, that is for art to be political and to heal the wounds of reason (its 
fragmentation), Marcuse has no choice but to fail because his philosophical antecedents, 
namely Kant and Schiller, refuse the possibility of any such rapprochement between the 
two realms.  He is, as we shall see, unable to fly by the nets of inherited philosophy. 
 (DFK RI 0DUFXVH·V ZRUNV RQ DHVWKHWLFV FRQWDLQV DQ H[SOLFLW QHHG RU KRSH IRU
reconciliation between reason and sensibility (Vernunft and Sinnlichkeit) in the reception of 
beauty, and of art in particular.  Each book, that is, except his last most pessimistic but, 
arguably, most convincing work on art after Eros and Civilization, The Aesthetic Dimension 
(1978).  Here he has ceased to hold such a hope (though if this hope was ever sustain-
able must be a question for this section).  Holding out for the promise of a reconcilia-
tion between reason, or the intellectual faculty, and sensuality, or the somatic faculty 
DQGWKHIDLOXUHWRVXVWDLQVXFKDUHFRQFLOLDWLRQKDVEHHQSDUWRI0DUFXVH·VZRUNVLQFHDW
lHDVWKLVERRNRQ+HJHOLQ+HUHKHZULWHV¶$FFRUGLQJWR+HJHO.DQWKDGQRWRQO\
indicated the internally possible unity between understanding and sensibility, but also 
EHWZHHQWKRXJKWDQGEHLQJVXEMHFWLYLW\DQGREMHFWLYLW\DVZHOO·HO: 17).  Though Kant 
would have resisted such a unity, the position that Marcuse has in mind, and which he 
discusses in detail in Eros and Civilization, is the relationship between imagination (Ein-
bildungskraft) as a sensuous faculty, and the understanding (Verstand) as a cognitive fac-
ulty, in the reception of beauty in the Critique of the Power of Judgment (1791), and in par-
WLFXODUWKHILUVWSDUWRIWKDWERRN¶7KH&ULWLTXHRI$HVWKHWLF-XGJPHQW· 
 The problem that Marcuse identifies in Enlightenment aesthetics is that the 
¶VHQVXRXV SHUFHSWLRQ· RI WKH EHDXWLIXO ZDV UHVWULFWHG IURP LWV LQFHSWLRQ LQ $OH[DQGHU
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%DXPJDUWHQ·VAesthetica (c.1750), to « OHV IDFXOWpVGH FRQQDLVVDQFHLQIpULHXUHj O·LQWHOOLJHQFH »12 
>¶WKH IDFXOWLHV RI NQRZOHGJH ´LQIHULRUµ WR WKH LQWHOOLJHQFH·@  This is characteristic of a 
long-standing philosophical denigration of the sensible that remains insidious in the phi-
ORVRSK\RI.DQWZKHUH¶UHDVRQPXVWH[HUFLVHGRPLQLRQRYHUVHQVLELOLW\>Sinnlichkeit@·13 
/HDGLQJWR0DUFXVH·VSRLQWWKDW¶7KHSKLORVRSKLFal history of the term aesthetic reflects 
WKHUHSUHVVLYHWUHDWPHQWRIWKHVHQVXRXVDQGWKHUHE\´FRUSRUHDOµFRgQLWLYHSURFHVVHV·
(EC: 181).  This priority of the intelligible over the sensible extends as far back as Plato:  
 
We must in my opinion begin by distinguishing between that which always is 
and never becomes from that which is always becoming but never is.  The 
one is apprehensible by intelligence with the aid of reasoning, being eternally 
the same, the other is the object of opinion and irrational sensation, coming to 
be and ceasing to be, but never fully real.14 
 
However, as we know from the Kantian settlement set out in Chapter 1, his relation to 
WKHVHQVLEOHDQGWKHLQWHOOLJLEOHLVTXLWHGLIIHUHQWIURP3ODWR·V,Q.DQW·VZULWLQJEHIRUH
his Critique of the Power of Judgement, the aesthetic corresponds to the pure intuition of 
time and space (the transcendental aesthetic).15  In the Critique of Pure Reason 
(1781/1787), sensibility extends only to objects of possible experience, that is not to 
things-in-themselves, but to our experience of perception from which we can intellectually 
postulate these things but from which we cannot determine WKHP:KDWLVPRVW¶UHDO·Ee-
longs to the perception of the sensible (intuition), and though reason can assume a 
thing-in-LWVHOILWFDQQRWREWDLQWRLW.DQW·VH[SHFWDWLRQRIUHDVRQXQOLNH3ODWR·VLVOLm-
                                                 
12 Armand Nivèlle, Les Théories esthétique en Allemagne de Baumgarten à Kant 3DULV 6RFLHWp G·pGLWLRQ ´/HV
%HOOHV/HWWUHVµS 
13 Immanuel Kant (trans. Paul Guyer and Eric Matthews), The Critique of the Power of Judgement (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2000 [1790 (2nd edn. 1793)]), p. 151.  Hereafter referred to as CJ in the text. 
14 Plato (trans. Desmond Lee), Timaeus and Critias (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1977), p. 28; emphasis 
added. 
15 See Chapter 4. 
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ited (merely regulative)³indeed, Marcuse implies, it constitutes a reversal of Platonism, 
from intellect to sense. 
 ,Q(QJOLVKHDFKRIWKHZRUGV¶VHQVXDO·¶VHQVXRXV·DQG¶VHQVLEOH·KDVDGLIIHUHQW
meaning and their common Latin root, sensus, is all but forgotten.  However, Marcuse 
points out that in German they correspond to the word sinnlich or to the noun form 
Sinnlichkeit (ECII7KHZRUG¶VHQVXRXV·ZDV coined in English by John Milton in 
RUGHUWRDYRLGWKHDSSHWLWLYHDQGFRUSRUHDOFRQQRWDWLRQVRI¶VHQVXDO· +LV3XULWDQGLs-
tortion has been maintained, and with it, the aversion to the sexual and instinctual con-
notations present in everyday as well as phiORVRSKLFDO*HUPDQ¶6HQVLEOH·KDVDOVRORVW
PXFKRI LWVPHDQLQJDV ¶SDOSDEOH·DQG LVPRUHRIWHQXVHG LQSKLORVRSK\WRPHDQ ¶SHr-
FHSWLEOHWRWKHPLQG·(QJOLVKWKHQWUDQVODWHVsinnlich(e) DV¶VHQVXRXV·UDWKHUWKDQ¶VHn-
VXDO·DQGGRZQSOD\VWKHPDWHULDOFRQQRWDWLRQVRIWKHZRUG¶VHQVLEOH·)RU0DUFXVHLWLV
vital to return the body to the senses and remove the stress upon the cognitive faculty in 
aesthetic theory.16  Marcuse sums up this point as follows: 
 
The etymological fate of a basic term is rarely an accident.  What is the 
reality behind the conceptual development from sensuality to sensuousness 
(sensitive cognition) to art (aesthetics)?  Sensuousness, the mediating 
concept, designates the senses as sources and organs of cognition.  But 
the senses are not exclusively, and not even primarily, organs of cogni-
tion.  Their cognitive function is con-fused17 with their appetitive func-
tion (sensuality); they are erotogenic, and they are governed by the pleas-
ure principle.  From this fusion of the cognitive and appetitive functions 
derives the confused, inferior, passive character of sense-cognition which 
makes it unsuitable for the reality principle unless subjected to and 
formed by the conceptual activity of the intellect, of reason.  And in so 
far as philosophy accepted the rules and values of the reality principle, the 
                                                 
16 ,WPLJKW DOVREHXVHIXO WR UHFDOO WKHRSHQLQJ VHQWHQFHRI0DU[·V ILUVW WKHVLVRQ)HXHUEDFK ¶7KHFKLHI
defect of all hitherto existing materialism³that of Feuerbach included³is that the thing, reality, sensu-
ousness [Sinnlichkeit], is conceived only in the form of the object or of intuition, but not as human sensuous 
activity, practiceQRWVXEMHFWLYHO\·LQ)UHGHULFN(QJHOVLudwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philoso-
phy (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1976).  Which concurVZLWK0DUFXVH·VUHDGLQJRI+HJHOLQWKHODVW
chapter. 
17 ¶&RQIXVHG·LQDHVWKHWLFWKHRU\PHDQV¶PL[HG·RU¶XQ-VHSDUDWHG·UDWKHUWKDQ¶EHZLOGHUHG·RU¶SX]]OHG· 
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claim of sensuousness free from the dominance of reason found no place 
in philosophy; greatly modified, it obtained refuge in the theory of art. 
(EC: 183-184) 
 
Here then, Marcuse uses a psychoanalytic discourse to retrieve the ontological priority 
of Eros, established in the last chapter, from the domination of reason, and asserts its 
continuity, albeit adulterated, in aesthetic theory.  What he is pointing to though, cru-
cially for his aesthetiFV LV WKDW DUW WKH ¶DUW-ZRUN· LV QRW WKH PRVW LPSRUWDQW WKLQJ
Rather, it is the feeling³the somatic³response to art that lies beyond, not beneath, the 
claims of reason.  The relationship between Eros and art is deeply rooted in psycho-
analysis, and the SOHDVXUHSULQFLSOH·VUHVSRQVLYHQHVVWRDUWLVUHFRJQLVHGE\0DUFXVHDVD
FULWLTXHRIWKHWHFKQRORJLFDOUHDVRQRIWKHSHUIRUPDQFHSULQFLSOH¶>7@KHEHDXWLIXOSHr-
WDLQVWRWKHGRPDLQRIWKHSULPDU\LQVWLQFWV·18 to their needs as represented by the de-
sires registered in the response to artworks.  Art is received as an expression of unful-
fillment which is also displayed in fantasy and perversion and, as such, like them, it cor-
responds to the return of the repressed primary needs of the psyche (EC: 145).  Marcuse 
VXPPHGXSWKLVSRZHURIDUWXQGHUWKDWJUHDWFODULRQFDOORIWKH1HZ/HIW:KLWHKHDG·V
¶7KH*UHDW5eIXVDO· 
For Marcuse, the aesthetic is a way of thinking and acting creatively that does not 
exclusively use rationality.  This is important because it allows a negative position to be 
taken with regard to rationalistic modernity and, as we shall see, the assertion of a ro-
PDQWLF UHXQLILFDWLRQ ZLWK QDWXUH·V KLVWRULFDO SURFHVV  7KH DXWKRULW\ IRU KLV DHVWKHWLF
QHJDWLYLW\ LVH[WUDSRODWHGIURP.DQW·VCritique of the Power of Judgment.  In this, his third 
Critique, Kant strove to find a way to put human understanding back into nature and to 
                                                 
18 Herbert Marcuse, An Essay on Liberation (Boston: Beacon Press, 1969), p. 26.  Hereafter referred to as 
EL in the text. 
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provide a ground, in judgment, for human morality.  That is, to make the understanding 
(the theoretical) chime with the moral (the practical), and the way he did this was to 
suggest that they came together in the reception, or judgment, of the beautiful³in do-
ing so Kant laid the ground for German romanticism.  Judgments, broadly speaking, are 
the way in which we come to decisions about our intuitions, how we can say a priori 
what something is (theoretically), how someone should act (practically), or if something 
seems beautiful (aesthetically).  The question, then, is why is an aesthetic judgment differ-
ent from a pure or practical judgment of the understanding?  The difference, Kant ar-
gues, is between cognition and feeling.  In judgments of the understanding we relate an 
intuition to a concept and thereby judge of it.19  A concept, in this instance, is different 
from what we saw in Hegel in the last chapter, where Begriff meant knowledge of the 
complete mediation of an object.  For Kant Begriff, or concept means, rather, the way in 
which the manifold of undetermined appearances is determined into one representa-
tion³it is an epistemological rather than an ontological category.  The key word here 
for the third Critique LV ¶GHWHUPLQHG· IRU.DQWGLVWLQJXLVKHVEHWZHHQ ¶GHWHUPLQLQJ·DQG
¶UHIOHFWLQJ· MXGJPHQWV WKHILUVWRIZKLFKDUHFRQFHSWXDO WKHVHFRQGSXUHO\IRUPDO ,Q
the latter instance, judgment corresponds to a feeling of pleasure or unpleasure, not to 
cognition.  Aesthetic judgments, or reflecting judgments, are grounded in the sensations 
of the body, not of the mind,20 WKXV¶7KHEDVLFH[SHULHQFHLQWKLVGLPHQVLRQLVVHQVXRXV
rather than conceptual; the aesthetic perception is essential intuition, not notion [Begriff@·
(EC: 176). 
                                                 
19 See Immanuel Kant (trans. Paul Guyer and Allen Wood), Critique of Pure Reason (Cambridge: Cambridge 
8QLYHUVLW\3UHVV ¶7UDQVFHQGHQWDO$QDO\WLF·SS-DQGWKH ¶2QWKH6FKHPDWLVPRIWKH3XUH
&RQFHSWVRI8QGHUVWDQGLQJ· pp. 271-277. 
20 Though, I would argue, in Kant this opposition is often not sustainable. 
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Marcuse goes on to summarise Kant: 
 
The aesthetic perception derives from the perception of the pure form of an 
REMHFW UHJDUGOHVVRI LWV ¶PDWWHU· DQGRI LWV LQWHUQDO RU H[WHUQDO ¶SXUSRVH·
$QREMHFWUHSUHVHQWHGLQLWVSXUHIRUPLV¶EHDXWLIXO·6XFKUHSUHVHQWDWLRQLV
the work (or rather play) of imagination.  As imagination, the aesthetic per-
ception is both sensuous and at the same time more than sensuousness (the 
¶WKLUG·EDVLFIDFXOW\21): it gives pleasure and is therefore essentially subjective; 
but in so far as this pleasure is constituted by the pure form of the object it-
self, it accompanies the aesthetic perception universally and necessarily³for 
any perceiving subject. 
(EC: 176-177) 
 
What is meant by form is that we, through our intuitions (time and space) impose, subjec-
tively, a representation upon an object that we cannot know in itself.  Moreover, in aes-
thetic judgments, we do not even attempt to NQRZWKH¶PDWWHU·RIWKHREMHFWWKDWPLJKW
be cognisable.  For example, we reflect on a painting, not the paint; we read a poem, not 
the print.  What is cognisable about a painting or poem, what it is, is not how we aes-
thetically respond to it, which, Kant argues, exists in purely formal terms as pleasure or 
unpleasure.  We can go as far as to say that in Kantian aesthetics there is no (art) object 
as such (in the sense of the famous transcendental X of the first Critique), only a feeling 
which we reflect upon; that is, a reflecting judgment. 
$OVR VXFK D IRUPDO FRQFHUQ LV ZLWKRXW D ¶SXUSRVH· RU ¶HQG· >Zweck].  Non-
conceptual judgments of beauty are not teleological.  In this Kant stresses the indeter-
PLQDELOLW\ RI WKH MXGJPHQW WKDW DV 0DUFXVH ZULWHV ¶:KDtever the object might be 
(thing, flower, animal, or man22), it is represented and judged not in terms of its useful-
QHVVQRWDFFRUGLQJWRDQ\SXUSRVHLWPD\SRVVLEO\VHUYHDQGDOVRQRWLQYLHZRILWV´Ln-
                                                 
21 Imagination, sensibility [Sinnlichkeit] and apperception; see Chapter 4. 
22 Kant does actually say that human beauty does not fit into this paradigm, because it always concerns a 
teleological interest in the health of the subject in question and belongs to the cultural (empirical) determi-
nations of race.  See CJ pp. 114-115; 118-119, where beauty is either normative or ideal, i.e., purposive. 
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WHUQDOµILQDOLW\DQGFRPSOHWHQHVV·EC: 178).  Art must be non-utilitarian (a problem for 
a Marxist aesthetics as we shall see) and cannot be a whole in itself (which is why Kant 
should not be used to support the New Criticism).  Rather, as to its relation to the larger 
picture of the world in which the aesthetic judgment occurs, it must be indeterminate 
and subjective.  Any response to art must be disinterested.  And because it contains no 
references to culture or other empirical or learned modes of judgment, the judgment of 
beauty can be assumed as at least (ideally) possible for all people, no matter when and 
ZKHUH WKH\ DUH ZKLFK JLYHV .DQW KLV IDPRXV ¶sensus communis·  6XEVHTXHQWO\ WKHVH
IRUPDOMXGJPHQWVDUHFDOOHG¶VXEMHFWLYHXQLYHrVDOV· 
 This is important for Marcuse because a subjective response to nature breaks 
away from the hold of the concept of the understanding and allows for a receptive free-
dom (a negation).  The subjectivity of aesthetic judgment is at the heart of the third Cri-
tique, because hitherto Kant had discussed objective knowledge and objective morality, 
but had had difficulty in placing the individual, had not been able to locate him or her in 
nature.  But pleasure felt purely in judging a beautiful object is³in fact has to be³
subjective as, Kant argues, there is no objective way in which pleasure could be shared a 
priori, so the subject judges purely for him or herself.  But, what causes pleasure is not a 
somatic thrill as such, but rather the satisfaction the subject feels in finding the under-
standing in nature itself³nature being the first object and exemplary model of beauty 
(here Kant can be seen to subsume the intuition under theoria, the dominance of vision).  
On one level, we can recall the last chapter, seeing this as another example of the narcis-
sism of the understanding.  For, and Kant makes this quite clear on several occasions in 
the first Critique, nature itself is nothing more than the totality of appearances brought 
together by the understanding³so, we might conclude that the understanding finds 
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pleasure merely in itself.23  This is certainly a plausible reading, and indeed, seems key to 
the comprehension of absolute idealism, where the subject makes its own nature (finds 
him or herself behind the veil).  But such a reading, though I think important, would 
perhaps miss the point, which is that the subject, through the act of reflecting judgment, 
finds him or herself at home in an element that is essentially other to his or her cogni-
tive faculties.  Nature, in this sense, is analogous to the noumenal substructure of appear-
ances (freedom) rather than to what the understanding makes of those appearances 
(cause and effect, or necessity).  A way of being that occurs precisely because in reflect-
ing judgment the subject does not press a claim to knowledge, only to feeling.  In some 
way this goes so far as to break out of the idealist claim that nature comes only with the 
XQGHUVWDQGLQJDQGDOORZVIRUVRPHWKLQJ¶RWKHU·WREHSULRUWRLW³but without curtailing 
the formal creative claim of the Kantian subject.24 
Pleasure, then, is derived from the subject being creatively at home in nature, releas-
LQJQDWXUHIURPFRQFHSWXDOREMHFWLYLW\DQGDOORZLQJ LWVLPSO\WR ¶EH· 0DUFXVHDrgues 
that: 
 
7KLVH[SHULHQFHZKLFKUHOHDVHVWKHREMHFWLQWRLWV¶IUHH·EHLQJLVWKHZRUNRI
the free play of the imagination.  Subject and object become free in a new 
sense.  From this radical change in the attitude toward being results a new 
quality of pleasure, generated by the form in which the object now reveals 
LWVHOI  ,WV ¶SXUH IRUP· VXJJHVWV D ¶XQLW\ RI WKH PDQLIROG· DQ DFFRUG RI
movements and relations which operates under its own laws³the pure 
manifestaWLRQRI¶EHLQJ-WKHUH·LWVH[LVWHQFH 
(EC: 178) 
 
                                                 
23 This is summarised in his Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics¶QDWXUHDQGSRVVLEOHH[SHULHQFHDUHTXLWH
the same, and as the conformity to law in the latter depends upon the necessary connection of appearances 
in experience (without which we cannot cognize any object whatever in the sensible world), consequently 
upon the original laws of the understanding, it seems at first strange, but is not the less certain, to say: the 
understanding does not derive its laws (a priori) from, but prescribes them to, nature·7UDQV-DPHV: Ellington and 
3DXO&DUXV,QGLDQD+DFNHWWS.DQW·VHmphasis.  
24 I examine the possibilities contained in this paragraph more concretely in the next chapter. 
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Through the free-play of the imagination (more on which in the next chapter), the sub-
ject and object are released into a new and free way of being which extracts the subject 
from the dominance of the reality principle.  The imagination in this instance has its 
own law (without a law³i.e., concept) and its own purposiveness (without a purpose or 
end³i.e., determination).  Nothing in the aesthetic judgment is determined in advance 
and that is what makes it so important for Marcuse, as it gives a space that is continually 
open in which to think the utopian moment.  The imagination, in its free-play, exceeds 
the mere determination of nature by the understanding.  What Kant gives Marcuse is a 
way of thinking of sensible pleasure as being quite as significant as reason itself³
indeed, as having some kind of priority.  In this sense his aesthetics, as Marcuse under-
stands them, have very little to do with artworks and everything to do with the way that 
sensibility mediates the realms of necessity (the conceptual determination of phenom-
ena) and of freedom (the indeterminate realm of the noumenal).  Which, according to 
MDUFXVH FRQVWLWXWHV WKH ¶SKLORVRSKLFDO HIIRUW WR PHGLDWH LQ WKH DHVWKHWLF GLPHQVLRQ
EHWZHHQVHQVXRXVQHVVDQGUHDVRQ«DQDWWHPSWWRUHFRQFLOHWKHWZRVSKHUHVRIWKHKu-
PDQH[LVWHQFHZKLFKZHUHWRUQDSDUWE\WKHUHDOLW\SULQFLSOH·EC: 179).  Art, then, is not 
the end of aesthetic judgment, but only the stimulus for it.  Art reveals the possibility of 
an otherness held in the dialectic of hope and despair. 
 1HYHUWKHOHVVWKHUDGLFDOQDWXUHRI.DQW·VIRUPXODWLRQZKLFKIUHHVWKHVHQVLELl-
ity from the tyranny of understanding (though only subsequently to assert the authority 
of reason), is only the beginning for Marcuse, who wants to politicise this gesture.  He 
WXUQVWR6FKLOOHU·VHQJDJHPHQWZLWK.DQWLQKLVAesthetic Letters.  What I will argue is that 
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the reasRQZK\0DUFXVH·VDHVWKHWLFVGRQRWFRKHUHDQGIDOOXOWLPDWHO\LQWRSHVVLPLVPLV
EHFDXVHWKH\WU\WRVXEODWH6FKLOOHU·VDHVWKHWLFVEXWWKH\UHPDLQ.DQWLDQ25 
6FKLOOHU ZDV ZULWLQJ LQ WKH DIWHUPDWK RI WKH )UHQFK 5HYROXWLRQ·V WXUQ LQWR WKH
Terror,26 and his was a determined attempt to rescue the Enlightenment from its inter-
QDOEDUEDULW\WRPRYHIURPWKHVWDWHRIUHDVRQWRDQ¶DHVWKHWLFVWDWH·$VKHZULWHV¶LI
man is ever to solve that problem of politics in practice he will have to approach it 
through the problem of the aesthetic, because it is only through Beauty that man makes 
KLVZD\WR)UHHGRP·Letters$QGLI.DQW·VFRQFOXVLRQVVKRZWKDWWKHXQGHUVWDQGLQJ
WKHUHDOLW\SULQFLSOHKDVEHHQXQIDLUO\ELDVHGWRZDUGUHDVRQWKHQ6FKLOOHU·VZRUN0Dr-
cuse argues, ¶DLPVDW D UHPDNLQJRIFLYLOL]DWLRQE\YLUWXHRI WKH OLEHUDWLQJ IRUFHRI WKH
DHVWKHWLFIXQFWLRQLWLVHQYLVDJHGDVFRQWDLQLQJWKHSRVVLELOLW\RIDQHZUHDOLW\SULQFLSOH·
(EC: 80). 
 Schiller, more than Kant, was sensitive to the corporeal significance of sensu-
ousness (Sinnlichkeit), basing his aesthetic theory on the equal priority of two metaphysi-
cal forms of energy that ground humanity: the sense-drive or sinnliche Trieb, and the 
form-drive or Formtrieb.  The first of these corresponds to the plastic nature of human-
ity, its shifting variations in the course of its being, that is to the temporal and the spatial 
(what Kant calls the intuitive), and also to the fact of its mere stuff (Stoff) which is the 
principle of becoming (Werden).  The second corresponds to the formal aspect of hu-
manity, its continuity amidst change and its desire for uniformity and eternity; that is, 
                                                 
25 7KLVWKHQLVFRQWUDU\WR3DXO'H0DQZKRKDVREVHUYHGWKDWWKHUHFHSWLRQRI.DQW·s aesthetics is so 
FRORXUHG E\ 6FKLOOHU WKDW DOPRVW QRERG\·V DHVWKHWLFV DUH UHDOO\ .DQWLDQ  7KH H[FHSWLRQ KH FLWHV LV
1LHW]VFKHZKRGHVSLVHGWKH.DQWKHWKRXJKWKHNQHZ3DXO'H0DQ¶.DQWDQG6FKLOOHU·LQKLV Aesthetic 
Ideology (Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press, 1997), pp. 129-162. 
26 See Josef Chytry, The Aesthetic State: A Quest in Modern German Thought (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1989), pp. 70-105, in particular, p. 77. 
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the principle of its Being (Wesen).27  These drives are not merely abstract metaphysical 
SULQFLSOHVEXWUDWKHUDVLQ+HJHO·VPHWDSKysics, actually constitute the way that we come 
to be, that is they are appetitive and wilful.  Because they are polar opposites, Schiller 
insists they never come into contact, one always acting at the expense of the other, but 
without resolving their dialHFWLFDODQWDJRQLVP7KLVLVZKDW6FKLOOHU·VWUDQVODWRUVUHIHUWR
DVD¶ELQDU\V\QWKHVLV·Letters: lxxxvii).  So, in the normative reality principle, the from-
GULYHGRPLQDWHVZKHUHDVLQWKHPRUH¶QDWXUDO·VWDWHZustand) of humanity the sensuous-
drive dominates (as for Freud, this natural state exists both at an earlier time and in 
childhood³though, also like Freud, Schiller admits that such a history is necessarily hy-
SRWKHWLFDORU¶LGHDO· 
The problem that Schiller shares with Marcuse, and why he becomes so vital for 
him in his reading of Kant, is that the Letters argue there must be a compromise between 
these two drives, and moreover, that the sensuous drive should to be given temporal 
SULRULW\  )RU DV 6FKLOOHUZULWHV ¶7KH VHQVXRXV >sinnliche@ GULYH«comes into operation 
earlier than the rational, because sensation precedes consciousness, and it is this priority 
>6FKLOOHU·VHPSKDVLV@RIWKHsensuous [sinnlichen] drives which provides the clue to the whole history 
of human freedom·Letters: 139; emphasLVDGGHG,QWKLVZD\6FKLOOHU·VLetters provide a 
prototype for what Freud was to call the oceanic, which formed the nexus of my reading 
of Brown and Marcuse.)  According to Schiller, the subject is at first undifferentiated 
IURP LWV ¶ZRUOG· LW LV SXre sense without form or the consciousness that results from 
IRUP 7KLVHPSW\VWDWHZKLFK6FKLOOHU UHIHUV WRDVDQ ¶HPSW\ LQILQLW\· Letters: 129), is 
overcome (aufgehoben in the pre-Hegelian sense), by the form drive, which asserts the 
                                                 
27 ,Q WKH ODVW FKDSWHU WKLV ZDV WUDQVODWHG DV ¶HVVHQFH· EXW here I am following the Wilkinson and Wil-
loughby rendering.  Indeed, this distinction between being and becoming, form and matter, ought to be 
VHHQDVDSUHFXUVRUWR+HJHO·VGLVWLQFWLRQEHWZHHQHVVHQFHDQGHxistence. 
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¶3HUVRQDOLW\·RU the unity of being, and the subject emerges.  This pattern, however, as a 
VKDOORZYHUVLRQRI+HJHO·VPhenomenology is not what concerns Marcuse explicitly; it is, 
rather, the way in which these two drives, though they do not touch, interact.  Schiller 
calOVWKLVWKH¶DHsthetic-GULYH·DQGLQLWboth the other drives are annulled. 
,QDVHQVH6FKLOOHU·VDHVWKHWLF-GULYH LVDPHWDSK\VLFDOK\SRVWDWLVDWLRQRI.DQW·V
¶IRUPDOSOHDVXUH·LQZKLFKQHLWKHUWKHXQGHUVWDQGLQJQRUVHQVLELOLW\GRPLQDWHEXWERWK
are in SOD\ ,QWKLVFRQGLWLRQ0DUFXVHZULWHV ¶PDQLVIUHHWR´SOD\µZLWKKLVIDFXOWLHV
DQGSRWHQWLDOLWLHVDQGZLWKWKRVHRIQDWXUHDQGRQO\E\´SOD\LQJµZLWKWKHPLVKHIUHH
His world is then display (ScheinDQGLWVRUGHULVWKDWRIEHDXW\·EC: 188).  Schein, dis-
SOD\RUPHUHDSSHDUDQFHRULOOXVLRQDV6FKLOOHU·VPDVWHUWHUPLVQRWKHUHGLVPLVVHGDVD
falling away, as it will be for Hegel, to be superseded by an Erscheinung, or mediated ap-
pearance.  But it is rather to be celebrated precisely because it does not mediate, because 
LWKDVQRUHODWLRQWR¶UHDOLW\·28 LWOHWVWKLQJV¶EH-WKHUH·DQGDVSXUHIRUPGRHVQRWWRXFK
them (it remains without a concept).  Marcuse explains: 
 
With this change in the basic and formative experience, the object of ex-
perience [i.e., nature] changes: released from violent domination and exploi-
tation, and instead shaped by the play impulse, nature would also be liber-
ated from its own brutality and would become free to display the wealth of 
its purposeless forms which express the ¶LQQHU OLIH· RI LWV REMHFWV  $QG D
correVSRQGLQJ FKDQJH ZRXOG WDNH SODFH LQ WKH VXEMHFWLYH ZRUOG«EH\RQG
want and anxiety human activity becomes display³the free manifestation of 
potentialities. 
(EC: 189-190) 
 
There is, however, a moment in this where Marcuse diverges, though without admitting 
LWIURP6FKLOOHU·VDYRZHGHQGV)RU6FKLOOHUWKHDHVWKHWLF-drive, manifested in play and 
dis-play, is only valid as a step on the way to the re-finding of an inherent morality.  
                                                 
28 Which for Schiller is both Realität and Wircklichkeit interchangeably. 
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Whereas Marcuse argues that in freeing sensuality from reason, the aesthetic has done 
its job, which is, in a sense, to overstep the world, to show it how it could be, not how it 
is.  Schein acts purely as a negative force, an antithesis to the false actuality of the world.  
And here we come WRWKHYHU\FHQWUHRI0DUFXVH·VURPDQWLFDHVWKHWLFVWKHSRWHQWLDOIRU
WKH LPDJLQDWLRQ WR H[FHHG WKH JLYHQ ZRUOG WR H[FHHG ¶UHDOLW\· DQG WR H[LVW DV schöner 
Schein, not merely in art works, but in an existential comportment to the world, which 
for Marcuse is erotic in the widened³and widening³VHQVH  ¶,PDJLQDWLRQ·KHZULWHV
¶SUHVHUYHVWKHREMHFWLYHVRIWKRVHPHQWDOSURFHVVHVZKLFKKDYHUHPDLQHGIUHHIURPWKH
repressive reality principle; in their aesthetic function, they can be incorporated into the 
coQVFLRXV UDWLRQDOLW\ RI PDWXUH FLYLOL]DWLRQ· EC: 193-194).  As a return of the pre-
UDWLRQDO LQ WKH UDWLRQDO0DUFXVH·V DQG6FKLOOHU·VDHVWKHWLFVDUHSURIRXQGO\DQWL-realist, 
and it is this, amongst other things, that makes for a vexed relationship with Marxism.29 
 Now, with his anti-realism in mind, we might want to ask what kind of art Mar-
cuse does approve of, what he finds appropriate to his own political position.30  How-
ever, I think that this is precisely the wrong question to ask, because it is not art that is 
in question, but, to return to Kant, it is judgment.  What is at stake is how we respond to 
that which we cannot know, such as the impossible otherness of nature or of our own 
natures, of which the novelty of the artwork is the exemplar.  Which becomes the uto-
pian question: how can we be lead to a world that is-not-yet and which figures a recon-
ciliation between phenomena and noumena, appearance and reality?  This, as Andrew 
Bowie observes, is central to the romantic aesthetic: 
                                                 
29 See Chapter 4. 
30 This is the question behind Timothy J. Lukes, The Flight into Inwardness: An Exposition and Critique of Her-
EHUW0DUFXVH·V7KHRU\ RI/LEHUDWLYH$HVWKHWLFV (Selinsgrove: Susquehanna University Press, 1985), who fails to 
provide an understanding of Kant or a reading of Schiller which is adequate to the problems Marcuse en-
counters.  However, he does provide the very taxonomy of artistic forms that I am deliberately going to 
avoid here (pp. 87-130). 
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In the Romantic conception art can be regarded as reconciling in the realm of 
appearance what is unreconciled in reality, and thus as a form of ideology.  
Art does so, though, because it grants freedom to the imagination, allowing it 
to move beyond the world of what there is to a world of as yet unrealised 
SRVVLELOLW\7KHUHLVWKHUHIRUHLQWKHVWULFWVHQVHRIWKHZRUGD¶XWRSLDQ·Ds-
pect involved in the understanding of art. 
(RCT: 14) 
 
7KLVWHQVLRQUHPDLQVYHU\PXFK LQWKHEDFNJURXQGRI0DUFXVH·V WKLQNLQJ %XW,VKDOO
brinJLWWRWKHIRUHDQGVKRZWKDWWKLV¶LGHRORJLFDOUHFRQFLOLDWLRQ·RUUDWKHUDFRQVLGHUHG
rejection of it, is precisely why his aesthetics break down and fall into the near despair of 
The Aesthetic Dimension.  I want to sketch this romantic trajectory of his aesthetics in the 
next section: the irreducible and ultimately unsublatable conflict between a formal Schein 
DQGUHFDOFLWUDQW¶UHDlLW\· 
 
III 
 
Marcuse identifies his own problem as early as Eros and Civilization and then spends the 
next twenty-five years circling around it and repeating it.  He sums it up as follows: 
 
As aesthetic phenomenon, the critical function of art is self-defeating.  The 
very commitment of art to form vitiates the negation of unfreedom in art.  
In order to be negated, unfreedom must be represented in the work of art 
with the semblance of reality.  This element of semblance (show, Schein) 
necessarily subjects the presented reality to aesthetic standards and thus de-
prives it of its terror.  Moreover, the form of the work of art invests the 
content with the qualities of enjoyment.  Style, rhythm, meter introduce an 
aesthetic order which is itself pleasurable: it reconciles with the content. 
(EC: 144-145) 
 
How can art actually affect a reality that it cannot touch without distorting it?  How can 
our mere sensuous pleasure manifest itself in real changes in society?  The romantic ori-
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JLQRIWKLVGXDOLW\DOUHDG\REVHUYHGLQ.DQW·VGLVLQWHUHVWHGQHVVLQWKDWDUW·Visness, its ma-
teriality or its ideality, is not an issue for aesthetic judgment, are made plain in SchilOHU·V
Letters.  Here semblance must not obtain to reality; to do so would be to overstep art 
and fall back from the aesthetic state into the merely real. 
 
But it is in the world of semblance alone that he [the poet, Dichter] possesses 
sovereign right, in the insubstantial realm of the imagination; and he pos-
sesses it there only as long as he scrupulously refrains from predicating real 
existence on it in theory, and as long as he renounces all idea of imparting 
real existence through it in practice. 
(Letters6FKLOOHU·VHPSKDVLV 
 
Nevertheless, for Schiller the aesthetic state (both Zustand, and Staat) remains the moral 
potential of humanity and the telos of his substantively didactic work (on the aesthetic 
education of man).  But this is only because his aesthetic theory raises the level of the ar-
gument above either materiality or form, the two drives, and onto a higher plateau.  
Marcuse is less sanguine despite his faith in the oceanic feeling, Eros, and even in phan-
tasy.  Art in and of itself ineluctably falls back into the mere form by which it is judged, 
that is, no sublation, no overcoming, of either form or matter takes place.  The aesthetic 
state (Zustand and Staat) is lost to utopia. 
However, this is not his only word on the subject.  In An Essay on Liberation 
IRUH[DPSOHKHLVWREHJLQZLWKDWOHDVWPXFKPRUHRSWLPLVWLFDERXWDUW·VSRw-
ers.  Here, the connection between the beautiful and the political, only a possibility in 
Kant, but explicit in Schiller, lies bHKLQGWKHTXHVWLRQV0DUFXVHDVNVKLPVHOI¶7KURXJh-
RXWWKHFHQWXULHV·KHZULWHV¶WKHDQDO\VLVRIWKHDHVWKHWLFGLPHQVLRQKDVIRFXVHGRQWKH
idea of the beautiful.  Does this idea express the aesthetic ethos which provides the 
common denominator of the aeVWKHWLFDQGWKHSROLWLFDO"·EL: 26).  Here form is expres-
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VLYHRIDQHZJRDOZKDWKHFDOOVD ¶QHZVHQVLELOLW\· 0RUHRYHUIRUPLVJHQXLQHO\SUo-
ductive:  
 
In the reconstruction of society for the attainment of this goal, reality alto-
gether would assume a Form expressive of the new goal.  The aesthetic quality 
of the Form would make it a work of art, but in as much as the Form is to 
emerge in the social process of production, art would have changed its tradi-
tional locus and function in society: it would have become a productive force in 
the material as well as cultural transformation.  And as such force, art would 
EHDQLQWHJUDOIDFWRULQVKDSLQJWKHTXDOLW\DQGWKH¶DSSHDUDQFH·RIWKLQJVLQ
shaping the reality, the way of life.  This would mean the Aufhebung of art: end 
RIWKHVHJUHJDWLRQRIWKHDHVWKHWLFIURPWKHUHDO« 
(EL: 31-32) 
 
There is a difficult and inexplicable elision here between the appearance of things and 
the way their reality is shaped.  For Schiller, if reality becomes art then it would be art 
that would cease to be.  Marcuse momentarily asserts the opposite, tries out the position 
he most wants to obtain by translating³sublating³reality into art, into a production of 
aesthetic form.  In this passage, he has clearly moved to a dialectical position³but it 
proves to be unsustainable. 
In the last chapter, we saw how the concept of nature emerges from the dialectic 
of consciousness, and how the real itself is actually an unstable factor in this ongoing 
process.  If Marcuse was being Hegelian here, then what he is saying makes sense.  But 
KHFDQQRWUHFRQFLOHKLV¶IRUPDOLVP·ZLWKKLVQHZFRQFHSWLRQRIDQDHVWKHWLFUHDOLW\7R
allow such a sublation Marcuse has either to release art from any such formal structure 
DQG¶PDNHLWUHDO·WKDWLVJLYHLWa concept (in either the Kantian or the Hegelian sense), 
which is suggested in the citation as an end or goal, or he has to reduce reality to a vul-
gar idealism of the merely formal.  This reprises, in a new mode, the romantic crisis of 
system and fragment.  He is incapable of maintaining either of these contradictory posi-
WLRQV  5DWKHU D IHZ SDJHV ODWWHU KH UHDVVHUWV WKH ELQDULVP WKH FRQVHTXHQFH RI DUW·V
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purely negative authority, and returns from Hegel to Schiller and Kant, to the separation 
of art and reality. 
 
The aesthetic necessity of art supersedes the terrible necessity of reality, sub-
limates its pain and pleasure; the blind suffering and cruelty of nature (and of 
WKH¶QDWXUH·RIPDQDVVXPHPHDQLQJDQGHQG³¶SRHWLFMXVWLFH·«$QGLQVLGH
this aesthetic universe, joy and fulfillment find their proper place alongside 
pain and death³everything is in order again.  The indictment is cancelled, 
and even defiance, insult, and derision³the extreme artistic negation of art³
succumb to this order. 
(EL: 44) 
 
Art is sublimation (/jWRXWQ·HVWTX·RUGUH«), every negation of reality is reassumed by real-
ity, is cancelled out because the formal qualities of art are just that: form.  Even though 
art continues to negate, and the imagination assumes a position counter to reality, by 
reYHDOLQJWKH¶WUXWK·RIWKDWUHDOLW\³is even in excess of it³it is a toothless negation be-
cause such art, as an aesthetic or reflecting judgment, cannot form a concept.  As such, 
it maintains a rather precarious ontological existence. 
To recapitulate, art works, as objects, do not transcend reality, only our judg-
PHQWVGR $V VXFK DQG EHFDXVHRI WKH.DQWLDQ6FKLOOHULDQRULJLQRI0DUFXVH·V DUJu-
ment, the artwork itself is not on these terms subversive, but only our reception of art.  
Therefore, when he talks about art, Marcuse faces a dilemma.  The example he draws on 
WRLOOXVWUDWHWKLVSUREOHPLVWKHEUDQFKRIWKHQFRQWHPSRUDU\DUWWKDWKHFDOOV¶DQWL-DUW·
by which he means those works which have rejected bourgeois or traditional concepts 
of form, by fracturing syntax, tonal structure, rhythm, the frame, perspective, etc.  But 
these, he argues, negate only to be drawn back into what they negate, show the way only 
to lead nowhere (they are indeterminate).  If they are not brought to nothing by aca-
GHPLFDFFHSWDQFH WKHQ WKH\DUHE\FRPPHUFLDO VXFFHVV 7KXV ¶7KHYHU\)RUPRIDUW
FRQWUDGLFWV WKH HIIRUW WR GR DZD\ZLWK WKH VHJUHJDWLRQRI DUW WR D ´VHFRQG UHDOLW\µ WR
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WUDQVODWHWKHWUXWKRIWKHSURGXFWLYHLPDJLQDWLRQWRWKHILUVWUHDOLW\·EL: 42).  Perhaps 
VXUSULVLQJO\0DUFXVHVHHPVWREHEDFNLQ3ODWR·VRepublic.  The ideality of the artwork in 
its reception is unsublatable and its materiality disappears beneath the Kantian inheri-
tance, which is the romantic inheritance.  The distilled problem then is that art cannot 
become praxis, cannot lead directly to a revolutionary act, only to revolutionary ideas.  
7KLVLVGHDOWZLWKPRVWFRKHUHQWO\LQ0DUFXVH·VODVWERRNThe Aesthetic Dimension. 
 Here Marcuse does two things, firstly, he takes the difficult relationship between 
form, content and reality to another degree; secondly, he asserts the failure of art as 
SUD[LVEHFDXVH ¶,QUHDOLW\ LW LVHYLOZKLFK WULXPSKVDQG WKHUHDUHRQO\ LVODQGVRIJRRG
ZKHUHRQHFDQILQGUHIXJHIRUDEULHIWLPH·31  The discussion of form, content and real-
ity is continuous with the foregoing argument that art as form is insuperably separated 
from the reality it represents.  And, again, Marcuse celebrates this as the true authority 
RIDUW,QGHHGMXVWDVLQ6FKLOOHU·VLetters, realistic art which corresponds to the discur-
VLYHSUDFWLFHVDQGHYHQWVRI ¶HYHU\GD\ OLIH·³by which I assume he means any kind of 
Lukàcian reflectionism or socialist realism³is dismissed as useless precisely because of 
LWV ¶XWLOLW\· $V IRU.DQW DUW UHPDins without interest and without purpose.  Art is art 
only where it transcends the given³or rather our understanding of the given. 
Here Marcuse inserts a subtle twist.  His example, again, is taken from the vari-
ous radical or anti-arts.  These, he argues, ¶VKDUHDFRPPRQDVVXPSWLRQ³namely, that 
the modern period is characterized by a disintegration of reality which renders any self-
enclosed form, any intention of meaning (Sinngebung) untrue, if not imSRVVLEOH·AD: 49-
50).  Thus, art gives up on mimesis becDXVHWKHZRUOGLWVHOI LVQRORQJHU¶UHDOLVWLF·DQG
                                                 
31 Herbert Marcuse (trans. and rev. Herbert Marcuse and Erica Sherover), The Aesthetic Dimension: Toward a 
Critique of Marxist Aesthetics, 1978 (German edn. Die Permanenz der Kunst (Munich: Verlag, 1977)), p. 47.  
Hereafter referred to as AD in the text. 
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anti-art claims to follow the truth of this new way of looking at the world.  In this in-
stance, Marcuse claims, anti-art asserts its truth as the impossibility of truth.  But, this 
very claim to truth by radical art is in itself problematic, for it only leads to another de-
VXEOLPDWLRQ)ROORZLQJWKHWUHQGLQ0DUFXVH·VWKRXJKWZHDUHQRWVXUSULVHGWRILQGKLP
VD\WKDW ¶2QO\LQWKH´LOOXVRU\ZRUOGµGRWKLQJVDSSHDUDVZKDWWKH\DUHDQGZKDWWKH\
FDQEH·AD: 54).  If anti-art is based on a new truth of reality then in and of itself, it 
would be false to the possibilities of a transcendent art that preserved a formal distance 
IURP¶UHDOLW\·,WKDVIDLOHG6FKLOOHU·VWHVWDQGIDOOHQEDFNLQWRWKHPHUHO\¶DFWXDO·7KXV
we are also not surprised to find that, in The Aesthetic Dimension, Marcuse returns to 
bourgeois art forms. 
 0DUFXVH·VGLDOHFWLFDOULJRUKDVWDNHQKLP\HWRQHVWDJHIXUWKHUDQWL-art does not 
even reflect the truth of a modern fragmented and intentionless social reality.  For, he 
argues, society is not fragmented, but rather increasingly homogenised and integrated 
(one-dimensional), against which stands the otherness of artistic form.  We seem to be 
left in an impossible position.  If anti-art appears unrealistic, it fails to transcend society 
precisely because it reflects the false consciousness or reality/performance principle, 
which argues that society, is IUDJPHQWHG  ¶7KH UHOHDVH Entschränkung) and desublima-
WLRQ·KHZULWHV ¶ZKLFKRFFXULQanti-art thus abstract from (and falsify) reality because 
they lack the cognitive and cutting power of the aesthetic form; they are mimesis with-
RXW WUDQVIRUPDWLRQ· AD: 52).  What they are mimetic of is precisely that which art 
should deny.  Marcuse is left once more with the paradoxical legacy of romanticism, 
where art fails because it does not touch reality, but its very distance from reality is its 
only strength.  The truth of art, that it turns content into form, is not the truth of reality, 
where form versus content is a false duality and a false dialectic.  In reality there is only 
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the process of negation as such.  Artistic form, in accepting the (false) fragmentation of 
everyday life as a starting point, has given up on the dialectic, leading to the crisis of ro-
manticism, which is always between the ideal totality and the (real) fragment as its nega-
WLRQ  $UW·V IRUPDO LGHDOLW\ VXJJHVWV D IDOVH DQG LPSRVVLEOH UHFRQFLOLDWLRQ RI VHQVLELOLW\
and understanding, obviating the truth of its fragmentary relatioQVKLSWR¶UHDOLW\·:KLFK
is why Marcuse has to conclude³and in this lies his critique of Marxist aesthetics³that: 
 
The political potential of art lies only in its own aesthetic dimension.  Its re-
lation to praxis is inexorably indirect, mediated, and frustrating.  The more 
immediately political the work of art, the more it reduces the power of es-
trangement and the radical, transcendent goals of change. 
(AD: xii-xiii) 
 
7KLVUHYHDOVWKDWEHFDXVHRIWKHULJRURI0DUFXVH·VRZQUHDGLQJRI6FKLOOHU·Vshöner Schein, 
his own great love of art and his continued belief in its ameliorative authority is still not 
allowed to determine the reality it critiques, and is not given a political power it does not 
possess.  Art, as appearance does not become reality, does not transform reality, it only 
H[LVWV LQ WKH VHSDUDWH DHVWKHWLF GLPHQVLRQ DV DQ ¶LGHD·³ZKDW .DQW FDOOV DQ ¶DHVWKHWLF
LGHD·)RUDOO0DUFXVH·V/HIW-Hegelian or Marxist intentions, his own aesthetics lead him 
back from a dialectic to a dualism³back, that is, to Kant.32 
 For Kant, as was briefly mentioned in Chapter 1, an idea is the necessary posi-
WLRQUHDFKHGE\¶UHDVRQ·WKDWH[FHHGVWKHXQGHUVWDQGLQJ³the experiences of which con-
stitute our reality.  In this sense, Kant interprets Platonism³that which is ideal is be-
yond that which is known to be real and is legislated by our finitude.  Through reason 
we can, for example, ask about god, the infinite, the moral³we can even act as though 
                                                 
32 This return to Kant is also noted by Sidney Lipshires, though in a slightly different context.  See, Lip-
shires, Herbert Marcuse: From Marx to Freud and Beyond (Cambridge MA: Schenkman, 1974), p. 82. 
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they exist in religion, in mathematics or in the kingdom of ends respectively, but we can 
never experience these ideas as grounded.  But reason also extends out from aesthetics, 
SURYLGLQJ D QHFHVVDULO\ UHJXODWLYH DHVWKHWLF LGHD  .DQW·V FUXFLDO GHILQLWLRQ RI WKH DHs-
thetic idea runs as follows, and I think it is important to see in this much of what comes 
down to us as romanticism. 
 
The imagination (as a productive cognitive faculty) is, namely, very powerful in creating, 
as it were, another nature, out of the material which the real one gives it.  We entertain 
ourselves with it when experience seems too mundane to us; we transform 
the latter, no doubt always in accordance with analogous laws, but also in 
accordance with principles that lie higher in reason (and which are every bit as 
natural to us as those in accordance with which the understanding appre-
hends empirical nature); in this we feel our freedom from the law of asso-
ciation (which applies to the empirical use of that faculty), in accordance 
with which material can certainly be lent to us by nature, but the latter can be 
transformed by us into something entirely different, namely into that which steps beyond 
nature. 
(CJ: 192; emphases added) 
 
The aesthetic idea steps beyond nature, steps beyond the given, by following through the 
YHU\¶ODZV·WKDWDUHJLYHQLQWKDWQDWXUH7KHSURGuction of reality by the understanding 
[Verstand] is transcended by the imagination as it observes the very pattern of reason 
[Vernunft@$V0DUFXVHSXWVLW¶$UWVWDQGVXQGHUWKHODZRIWKHJLYHQZKLOHWUDQVJUHVs-
LQJWKDWODZ·AD: 11).  This transcendent (and transcendental) imagination gives Mar-
FXVH WKH ¶UHJXODWLYH LGHD· AD: 69) on which stands the liberative potential of his aes-
thetic theory.  Indeed, this is the very definition of freedom for Kant, the ability to go 
beyond the phenomenal laws of cause and effect, to open ourselves to the noumenal³
even if only through analogy³in reflecting judgment. 
We are returned to the higher court of reason; but, for Kant, reason (Vernunft) is 
not repressive (the closest to that would be the understanding: Verstand), but of itself is 
ERWK WKHJRDODQG WKHZD\ WRIUHHGRP 7KLV LVQRW WRVD\ WKDW0DUFXVHVKDUHV.DQW·V
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Enlightenment optimism, though he does take from him his philosophical support.  
Rather, for Marcuse the regulative idea that corresponds to transcendent aesthetic form 
HPHUJHVRQO\ LQVRIDUDV ¶DUWSUHVHUYHVZLWK WKHSURPLVHRIKDSSLQHVV WKHPHPRU\RI
WKHJRDOV WKDW IDLOHG· 7KH UHJXODWLYH LGHDEHFRPHV ¶WKHGHVSHUDWH VWUXJJOH WR VDYH WKH
ZRUOG·AD: 69) over against the reality principle of productive forces and the enslave-
ment to the memory of failure.  In this instance, art is negation pure and simple. 
 
The nomos which art obeys is not that of the established reality principle but 
RILWVQHJDWLRQ%XWPHUHQHJDWLRQZRXOGEHDEVWUDFWWKH¶EDG·XWRSLa.  The 
utopia in great art is never the simple negation of the reality principle but its 
transcending preservation (Aufhebung) in which past and present cast their 
shadow on fulfillment.  The authentic utopia is grounded in recollection. 
(AD: 73) 
 
So, forPFDQQRWEHGLGDFWLF FDQQRW VKRZ ¶UHDOLW\· FDQQRWSURGXFH DSROLWLFV $UW LQ
itVHOILVD¶EDGXWRSLD·DQR-place of thought that emerges from the failure of romanti-
FLVPDQGDFRQWLQXLQJDWWDFKPHQWWR.DQW·V WZR-world theory, wherein reality remains 
uQWRXFKDEOHDQGZKLFK LQWKLV LQVWDQFHFDQQRWEHRYHUFRPH%XW¶JUHDWDUW·DOVRpre-
serves this failure, makes it somehow accountable to itself, responsible to what it cannot 
achieve.  This is the transcending preservation of an authentic utopia grounded in recol-
OHFWLRQ$QGLWLVWR0DUFXVH·VODVWKRSHPHPRU\WKDW,WXUQLQWKHODVWVHFWLRQRIWKLV
chapter. 
 
 
 
IV 
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)UHGULF -DPHVRQKDVSRLQWHGRXW WKDW WKH WLWDQ0QHPRV\QH ¶0HPRU\· WKHPRWKHURI
the muses, has a similar significance for Marcuse as Eros and Thanatos have for Freud.33  
0HPRU\WKH3ODWRQLF¶DQDPQHVLV·OLWHUDOO\¶EULQJLQJEDFNWRPLQGUH-PHPEHULQJ·LVIRU
Marcuse the plenitude that negates the partial reality of the performance-principle.  
Memory preserves, in some form, the truth values of the essential potential of individu-
als over against the repressive influence of the reality principle.  It does not allow the 
subject to entirely forget that there was once a period of fulfillment.  In this, I think, lies 
the difference between imagination as transcendental form (the projection of plenitude) 
and phantasy as recollection (the remembrance of plenitude).  Hence its therapeutic 
power and its centrality to psychoanalysis, but also its difficulties and dangers.  Memory 
is irrational and atemporal, it is regressive; but, as only the repressed subject is rational, 
Marcuse argues, recovered memory enacts the negation RIUHSUHVVLRQ¶$VFRJQLWLRQJLYHV
way to re-cognition, the forbidden images and impulses of childhood begin to tell the 
truth thDWUHDVRQGHQLHV5HJUHVVLRQDVVXPHVDSURJUHVVLYHIXQFWLRQ·EC: 19).  Memory 
also sustains the imagos of phantasy that I considered above, the fantasies of the future 
and of liberation.  For Marcuse, as Martin Jay observes, memory has a utopian potential. 
 
Memory, by restoring the forgotten past, was thus a model of the utopian 
temporality of the future.  In other words, it was not merely the content 
of what is remembered that constitutes the liberating power of memory, 
EXW DOVR WKH IDFW RI PHPRU\·V DELOity to reverse the flow of time that 
makes it a utopian faculty.  If there is to be a true human totality in the 
future, anamnistic totalization in the present is one of its prefigurations.34 
 
                                                 
33 Fredric Jameson, Marxism and Form: Twentieth-Century Dialectical Theories of Literature (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1974), p. 112. 
34 0DUWLQ -D\ ¶$QDPQLVWLF 7RWDOL]DWLRQ 5HIOHFWLRQV RQ 0DUFXVH·V 7KHRU\ RI 5HPHPEUDQFH· Theory and 
Society, (Vol. 1, No. 10, January 1982, pp. 1-15) p. 9.  Hereafter referred to as AnT in the text. 
 163 
-D\KHUHGUDZVRQ0DUFXVH·VFRQWHQWLRQZKLFK%URZQHFKRHVWKDW ¶WKHIDWDOHQHP\RI
lasting gratification is timeWKHLGHDRILQQHUILQLWHQHVVWKHEUHYLW\RIDOOFRQGLWLRQV·DQG
WKDWWKH¶VWUXJJOHDJDLQVWWLPH·LVWKHsine qua non RI¶LQWHJUDOKXPDQOLEHUDWLRQ·EC: 191).  
Though, as we saw, time for Brown was symptomatic, whereas for Marcuse it was, as 
memory, not merely the dim trace of the past that can be conjured in the present, but 
rather the sweeping wave in the which the present is enclosed.  It is the entirety of sub-
jective history, in the Hegelian sense, that has brought us to this moment.35  Because of 
this, the past is the present and the present is the past³they are the negations of each 
other.36  7KLVLVZKDW-D\LVVXJJHVWLQJZLWK¶DQDPQLVWLFWRWDOL]DWLRQ·LWLVWKHWLPHOHVVQHVV
RIWKH¶SUHVHQW·ZKLFKLV WKHRQWRORJLFDO¶SUHVHQFH·RIKLVWRU\7KLQJVSDVVLQWRDEVHQFH
through their negation in the present; but, equally, they are preserved in that present, are 
sublated into it.  The past does not just go away. 
Remembrance in German is Erinnerung.  Like Trieb, this word has no satisfactory 
WUDQVODWLRQSDUWLFXODUO\ZKHQ LW LV HQPHVKHG LQ+HJHO·V WKRXJKW 0DUFXVH JLYHV LW WKH
VHQVH RI ¶´WXUQLQJ LQWR RQHVHOIµ >D@ re-turn IURP H[WHUQDOL]DWLRQ· EC: 117n).  It is the 
movement of the subject described by the Phenomenology back into itself with the knowl-
edge of the world that we saw in the dialectic of Understanding.  A totalized memory, 
WKHQZRXOGEHWKHSURGXFWRI$EVROXWHNQRZOHGJHLQ0DUFXVH·VVHQVHDQGEULQJVZLWK
it the freedom that entails.  Even a freedRPIURPWKHUHSUHVVLYHIHDURIGHDWK¶WKHERQG
that ties Eros to the death instinct[, t]he brute fact of death denies once and for all the 
reality of a non-UHSUHVVLYHH[LVWHQFH·EC: 231).  For it is death and transience, not just 
the fading of memory, that makes time the enemy of lasting gratification. 
                                                 
35 Cf. MHH: 186. 
36 )RU0DUFXVH·VGHWDLOHGUHDGLQJRIWKLVVHHRR: 103ff and HO: passim. 
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7KHIOX[RIWLPHLVVRFLHW\·VPRVWQDWXUDODOO\LQPDLQWDLQLQJODZDQGRr-
der, conformity, and the institutions that relegate freedom to a perpetual 
utopia; the flux of time helps men to forget what it was and what can be: 
it makes them oblivious to the better past and the better future. 
(EC: 231) 
 
For Marcuse, the Erotic transcendence into the world which returns, in Understanding, 
from objects, as a mediated Absolute, must also absolve the transience of history, which 
is preserved in the tension of re-membrance.  Memory retroactively puts back together 
what was severed by repression. 
What the past preserves, in contradiction to the present, is alternatives.  The al-
ternative that is important to Marcuse is the remembrance, the turning back into, pri-
mary narcissism.  Remembrance, Erinnerung, is the negation of the extant understanding 
of temporal conditions, the fixation to a categorical movement of time, clock time.  
Time, under present conditions, he argues, is reflected in the necessity of forgetting, a for-
getting which is a forgiving and a forgiving which perpetuates the crimes of the past.  
¶7KH ZRXQGV WKDW KHDO LQ WLPH DUH WKH ZRXQGV WKDW FRQWDLQHG WKH SRLVRQ· EC: 232).  
¶(URV·KHZULWHV¶SHQHWUDWLQJLnto consciousness, is moved by remembrance; with it he 
protests against the order of renunciation; he uses memory in his effort to defeat time in 
DZRUOGGRPLQDWHGE\WLPH·EC: 233).  Eros has a double task of negation, firstly to ne-
gate the forgetting of injustice, and secondly to negate the forgetting of instinctual ful-
filment.  The first of these tasks Marcuse gives to art, in its negative relation to the real-
ity principle in which it preserves the promise of the pleasure principle (which we saw in 
Kant as the understanding finding itself in nature³in beauty).  The second task he gives 
to psychoanalysis and philosophy, which is to the negativity of a Critical Theory that 
destabilises the inertia of thinking.  In both these instances memory is the instantiation 
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RI D FULWLFDO RU ¶$UFKLPHGHDQ SRLQW· AnT: 8) outside of present conditions because 
memory returns from a negativity, it re-members; it does not work with the part, but the 
whole.  Though these primary negations may be given to literature and to thinking, they 
LQWKHPVHOYHVDUHQRWJRLQJWRDFKLHYHDQ\WKLQJ$VKHZULWHVRI3URXVW¶WKLVGHIHDWRI
time is artistic and spurious; remembrance is no real weapon unless it is translated into 
KLVWRULFDODFWLRQ·EC: 233).  Memory must be translated into praxis, if it is to be decisive 
in the struggle against domination.  Here is restated the problem with artistic form that 
was encountered in the last section. 
There are two pressing critiques of this position, one articulated via Whitebook 
from Ricoeur, the RWKHU IURP (UQVW %ORFK YLD -D\  :KLWHERRN DWWDFNLQJ 0DUFXVH·V
premises outlined in the last chapter, contends that he is not only naïve but wrong to 
EHJLQE\DVVRFLDWLQJ)UHXG·V$QDQNēZLWKPDWHULDOVFDUFLW\DQGWKHQWRVXJJHVWWKDWVFDr-
city has been overcome through WHFKQē.  His point is that Marcuse is fundamentally in-
correct HYHQWRWUDQVODWH$QDQNēDVQHHGZDQWRULebensnot.  In theory, Whitebook has 
nothing against the suggestion that material scarcity can and should be overcome.  
However, he argues, and I think he is correct in this, that for Freud, 
 
there is also an essential connection between Ananke and temporality in 
the form of transience; Ananke presents itself to us in the figure of loss, 
the ineluctable result of the fleeting existence of things, that is, the inexo-
rable unidirectional flow of time and the loss that inevitably results from 
it. 
(UP: 29) 
 
The question Whitebook asks Marcuse is whether the struggle against time, if it is even 
conceivable, is actually desirable at all (in this we must also remember Emerson and Fu-
nes the Memorious).  Like Brown, one of the things that Marcuse sees, particularly in 
the mythical figures of Orpheus and Narcissus, is an arrest of time.  For Whitebook, this 
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LVSDUWRI0DUFXVH·V¶omnipotent denial of reality·PU:KLWHERRN·VHPSKDVLVZKLFKLQ
traditional psychoanalysis is set off against not only want, but also transience, that is the 
absence of the (lost) object which becomes internalised in the process outlined above.  
7KLVWUDQVLHQFHLVLQWHJUDOWRWKHVXEMHFW·VFRPLQJWRNQRZWKHZRUOGDWDOOWRLWVILQGLQJ
of objects, for if this is to be a re-ILQGLQJWKHQWKHREMHFWVPXVWEH¶ORVW·,WVHHPVKLJKO\
XQOLNHO\WKDWDSXUHO\)UHXGLDQUHDGLQJRI0DUFXVH·VWKHRU\RIQDUFLVVLVWLFREMHFWFKRLFH
a union that relies on the oceanic feeling, can coherently emerge from transience. 
Whitebook is here relying on RicoHXU·VWUDQVODWLRQRI$QDQNēDV¶LQHOXFWDEOH·RU
¶LQH[RUDEOH·,WLVVRPHWKLQJWKDWGLUHFWO\PLOLWDWHVDJDLQVWWKHKDOOXFLQDWRU\IXOILOOPHQWRI
primary narcissism; it is attached to the reality principle, which for Freud is the real 
PHDQLQJRI$QDQNē 7KH basic principle runs thus: if there is no loss, and as such, if 
loss is not registered in the emergence of time, then there can be no desire, which as we 
KDYHVHHQLVWKHHQJLQHRI0DUFXVH·VDQG%URZQ·VGLDOHFWLFV'HVLUHLVWKHZD\WKLVORRS
operates and from which the time sense comes.  But, what is more important for 
Whitebook, is that the human response to loss is symbolisation, is language itself³a con-
clusion that we saw with Brown, where language is the attempt to recover the lost 
world.  If the cirFXLWRIGHVLUH ¶TXDLQVDWLDEOHGHPDQG·PU: 73) is broken, then speech 
itself would be impossible.  Speech, by these lights, emerges from the gap between the 
wish and its fulfillment, between the lost object and its re-finding.  Language has an un-
breakable relationship to time.  This is why, though he may agree in part with the specu-
ODWLYHORJLFDQGLQWHJULW\RI0DUFXVH·VSRVLWLRQ:KLWHERRNKDVWRDVNLIVXFKDSosition 
is desirable. 
 While :KLWHERRN·V FULWLFLVP RI 0DUFXVH·V XVH RI $QDQNē VWDQGV LQ SDUW LW LV
QHFHVVDU\ WRJRRQ WRGLIIHUHQWLDWH WZR ¶W\SHV·RI WLPH 2QWKHRQHKDQG WKHUH LV Ua-
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WLRQDOWLPHDQGRQWKHRWKHUKDQGD¶WLPH·LQZKLFKWKHVHOILVSUHVHUYHGLQLWVHVVHQFH
or Hegelian time.  The first is only a means to the second, and the second is more com-
plex than the simple omnipotent denial of reality.  It is, as we have seen, the coming into 
being of reality.  In Eros and Civilization, Marcuse sums up his reading of Hegel and his-
tory as follows: 
 
The labor of history comes to rest in history: alienation is cancelled, and 
ZLWK LW WUDQVFHQGHQFH DQG WKH IOX[ RI WLPH  7KH VSLULW ¶RYHUFRPHV LWV
WHPSRUDOIRUPQHJDWHV7LPH·>+HJHO@%XWWKH¶HQG·RIKLVWRU\UHFDSWXUHV
its content: the force which accomplishes the conquest of time is remem-
brance (re-collection).  Absolute knowledge, in which the spirit attains its 
WUXWKLVWKHVSLULW¶HQWHULQJLQWRLWVUHDOVHOIZKHUHE\LWDEDQGRQVLWVHx-
traneous) existence and entrusts its GestalWWRUHPHPEUDQFH·>+HJHO@%e-
ing is no longer the painful transcendence toward the future but the 
peaceful recapture of the past.  Remembrance, which has preserved eve-
U\WKLQJ WKDW ZDV LV ¶WKH LQQHU DQG WKH DFWXDOO\ KLJKHU IRUP RI WKH VXb-
VWDQFH·>+HJHO@ 
(EC: 116-117) 
 
The citations are from the concluding parts of the Phenomenology.  The most pressing 
GHILQLWLRQZKLFKFRQILUPVRXUDERYHSRVLWLRQLVWKDW¶WKH´HQGµRIKLVWRU\UHFDSWXUHVLWV
content: the force which accomplishes the conquest of time is rePHPEUDQFH·5HPHm-
brance as totalization is not the absence of loss or the denial of loss; it is the negation of 
loss that must pass through it in order to return from it.  The end of history is in the 
SURFHVV RI KLVWRU\ ZKDW 0DUFXVH FDOOV WKH ¶SUHVHUYDWLRQ RI WLPH LQ WLPH· EC: 234).  
/DQJXDJHDQG V\PEROLVDWLRQDUHQRWKHUHE\GLVDYRZHGEXW DV0DUFXVH·V HPSKDVLVRQ
poetry and myth shows, are the main, if hidden, roots for the movement of history.  In-
deed, in Reason and Revolution0DUFXVHZULWHVWKDW¶/DQguage is the medium in which the 
ILUVW LQWHJUDWLRQ EHWZHHQ VXEMHFW DQG REMHFW WDNHV SODFH· RR: 75); it is what creates 
community and also gives mastery over objects, it both individualises and appropriates 
the other.  This, of course, is diametrically oppRVHGWR%URZQ·VYLHZLQLife Against Death 
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where the totalization of memory, or the mere memories of past gratifications, domi-
QDWHVWKHUHDOLW\RIWKHHURWLFERG\%URZQ·VWUDQVFHQGHQFHDVVKDOOEHFRPHLQFUHDVLQJO\
clear, is only for the present³it creates only for the now: it is timeless not because it 
recaptures (remembers), but because it creates ex nihilo. 
So whilst I agree with Whitebook that FrHXG·V$QDQNēLVWUDFHGZLWKWUDQVLHQFH
I do not think that Marcuse wants to avoid this, but to pass through it0DUFXVH·VDIILUPa-
tion of Eros and plenitude is not merely the denial of anything that happens after pri-
mary narcissism but is the philosophical and psychoanalytical process of double nega-
tion that returns to it.  There is, then, no call for an original plenitude, but only the myth 
of such a totality preserved in the memory retroactively (Nachtraglichkeit).  Marcuse, as Jay 
SXWV LWZDV ¶LQWURGXFing a myth of original wholeQHVV RUSHUIHFWSUHVHQW RI WKH ´UH-
PHPEHULQJµRIZKDWKDVEHHQGLVPHPEHUHGZKRVHURRWV LI LQPHPRU\DWDOOZHUHLQ
UHPHPEHUHGGHVLUHUDWKHUWKDQUHPHPEHUHGIXOILOOPHQW· AnT: 10-11).  So desire is re-
tained as the retroactive engine or force that drives the progressive dialectic. 
7KHWURXEOHUHPDLQVWKRXJKDQGWKLVLVWKHEXUGHQRI%ORFK·VLPSOLHGFULWLTXH
WKDW LI WKHUH LV QR ORQJHU DQ\ ¶SDLQIXO WUDQVFHQGHQFH WRZDUG WKH IXWXUH· EXW RQO\ WKH
¶SHDFHIXOUHFDSWXUHRIWKHSDVW· how do new conditions emerge in history.  Anamnesis is 
HVVHQWLDOO\ D UHJUHVVLYH IRUFH DQG OLNH+HJHO·VRZQ WKHRU\ LW SD\VQRPLQG WR WKH Iu-
ture³dialectics (contra Ricoeur) are essentially backward looking, Orphic, by nature: 
the telos is contained in the inception.  Anamnesis belongs to the maïeutic tradition of 
Socratic dialogue which maintains that knowledge is already present and can be recalled 
LI WKH ULJKW TXHVWLRQV DUH DVNHG  7KLV LV D FLUFXODU NQRZOHGJH ZKHUH WKH ¶VRXO PHUHO\
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meets in reality whaW LWDOZD\VNQHZDVLGHD·37  It cannot explain, nor does it allow for 
the shock that may take place in the discovery of the new.  Jay explains that Bloch pre-
fers the term anagnorisisRU¶UHFRJQLWLRQ·ZKLFKLVEDVHGRQKLV¶LGLRV\QFUDWLFRQWRORJ\RI
WKH ´not-\HWµ· AnT  ZKLFK GRHV QRW EHOLHYH LQ DQ DUFKDLF SOHQLWXGH RI ¶IRUPDO·
knowledge held in the connotations of anamnesis.  Anagnorisis, Bloch says: 
 
is revealing: that the new is never completely new for us because we bring 
with us something to measure it by.  We always relate what we find to 
earlier experience or to an image we have of it.  As a result it often hap-
pens that we misjudge it upward or downward, but still it becomes richer 
for us, and is colored with history.  It approaches us from our own past 
and must prove that it is genuine.  Anamnesis provides the reassuring evi-
dence of complete similarity; anagnorisis, however, is linked with reality by 
RQO\DWKLQWKUHDGLWLVWKHUHIRUHPRUHDODUPLQJ«anagnorisis is a shock. 
(Bloch: 178) 
 
%ORFK·V theory suggests that the past cannot rest complete in the present because the 
present itself brings something new with it and the gap between them elicits a shock 
rather than a peaceful recurrence.  It strikes me that a theory which maintains a gap be-
tween an incoming future and a recollection of the past is better suited to a continuation 
of romantic dissatisfaction with its inherent skepticism of Absolute Idealism³in par-
ticular the way it deals with reflecting judgment.  This is the most pertinent critique of 
Marcuse and it exists not only in his aesthetics but also in his own criticism of Brown, 
who, as we have seen, has a completely different conception of temporality.  We will see 
LWLQIXOOIORZHULQWKHQH[WFKDSWHUZKHQ,XVH&RUQHOLXV&DVWRULDGLV·Vnotion of tempo-
ral alterity, the complete disjunction between a futural otherness and a deterministic 
theory of history, to split the difference between Marcuse and Brown. 
                                                 
37 0LFKDHO/DQGPDQQWUDQV'DYLG3DUHQW¶7DONLQJZLWK(UQVW%ORFK.RUÿXOD·Telos (Vol. 25, Fall, 
1975, pp. 165-185) p. 178.  See also AnT: pp. 11-12. 
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 In conclusion, we can say that the problem is still one of otherness and is still 
one of time.  Is time the repression of historical otherness or the ingression of futural 
otherness?  Can a formal aesthetics affect concrete changes in reality?  Eros as the rest-
less movement toward otherness and toward a creative sustaining relationship between 
ego and object has to make this decision.  For Marcuse, it is clear, in phantasy the object 
FRPHVIURPWKHVXEMHFW·VSDVWDQGLWLVKHOGRQWREHFDXVHRIWKHSHUVLVWHQFHRISULPDU\
QDUFLVVLVPLQWKHXQFRQVFLRXV¶WKHLPDJHRIWKHUHGHPSWLRQRIWKHHgo: the coming to 
rest of all transcendence in a mode of being that has absorbed all becoming, that is for 
DQGZLWKLWVHOILQDOORWKHUQHVV·EC: 130).  But this collapses in his vision of representa-
tive art as Schein, which is as ineluctably removed from UHDOLW\DVZH IRXQG(PHUVRQ·V
experience was from the death of Waldo.  Yet, for Marcuse, art retains its liberative 
force because of the romantic dialectic of hope and despair.  For Brown, whose critique 
of regressive hallucination leads in the other direction, it is more difficult to place his 
relation to the otherness of art or of reality.  In some ways, for Brown, there is no 
other³LQWKLVVHQVHKLVLGHDOLVPLVSXUHUWKDQ0DUFXVH·VZKRLQWKLVLQVWDQFHLVDYLFWLP
RIWKHURPDQWLFV·QDwYHGHVLUHWRILQGWKHPVHOYHVHYHU\ZKHUHRQO\WRILQG¶HYHU\ZKHUH·
falling into fragments.  But this does not mean that for Brown everything is the same; 
rather it means that difference is only a part of a larger body, /RYH·V%RG\, the expansion 
of which exists as the motion of metaphor, that is, simply as poetry. 
